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Abstract 
Power blackouts are a recurring problem worldwide, and research in this area continues 
to focus on developing improved methods for their prediction and prevention. 
Controlled islanding has been proposed as a last resort action to save the network before 
imminent blackouts when the usual means fail in an unexpected manner. Successful 
controlled islanding has to deal with three important issues that are involved in the 
implementation of islanding: when to island, where to island and what to do after 
islanding is implemented in each island.  
This thesis presents a framework that combines all three issues to achieve successful 
islanding based on wide area measurement systems (WAMS). In addition, this thesis 
focuses on the question of when to island. This question is critical to the success of the 
three-stage controlled islanding scheme because the possible issues of false dismissal 
and false alarm have to be handled. In false dismissal, islanding is triggered too late. 
However, the potentially unstable system is still allowed to operate, and this unstable 
system, which could have survived, may cause uncontrolled cascading blackouts. In 
false alarm, islanding is triggered too early, and an originally stable system is forced to 
split into islands, resulting in unnecessary disruption and economic loss. Thus, the early 
recognition and identification of “the point of no return” before blackout is inevitable. 
The single machine equivalent (SIME) method is adopted online to predict transient 
stability during cascading outages that would shortly lead to blackouts, giving support 
in decisions about when to island in terms of transient instability. SIME also evaluates 
dynamic stability after islanding and ensures that the selected island candidates are 
stable before action is taken. Moreover, in this thesis, the power flow tracing-based 
method provides all possible islanding cutsets, and SIME helps to identify the one that 
has the best transient stability and minimal power flow disruption. If no possible island 
cut set exists, corrective actions through tripping critical generators or load shedding are 
undertaken in each island.  
The IEEE 10-generator, 39-busbar power system and 16-generator 68-busbar system are 
used to demonstrate the entire framework of the controlled islanding scheme. The 
performance of each methodology involved in each stage is then presented. 
ii 
 
 
Declaration 
No part of this thesis has been submitted elsewhere for any other degree or qualification. 
The content of this thesis is all my own work unless referenced to the contrary in the 
text. 
Copyright ©  2015 Hongbo Shao.  
“The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without the prior written consent of the author and information derived from 
it should be acknowledged”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
My EPSRC-funded PhD research began in January, 2011. The work described in this 
thesis was completed with the assistance of many people who deserve my gratitude. 
First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Janusz Bialek. I will never forget 
his knowledge, guidance and responsibility in conducting research and sharing life 
experiences. His enthusiasm and patience in research constantly inspired me to 
overcome challenges when obstacles occurred. I could not have completed this research 
project without his help.  
I would also like to thank my colleagues, Dr Patrick McNabb, Dr Sean Norris and Dr 
Zhenzhi Lin. They shared their experience and knowledge with me in this research 
project, and they gave me their friendly support and assistance. Because of the 
constructive discussions with them and their helpful comments, my research project 
progressed every day.  
Finally, I would like to thank my family—Yufu Shao, Huixia Song and Zihui Shao. 
Thanks for your understanding and support of my decision when I was at a crossroads 
in my life.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Publications 
 
Conference Papers: 
 H. Shao, Z. Lin, S. Norris and J. Bialek, “Application of Emergency-Single 
Machine Equivalent method for cascading outages,” 18th Power Systems Computation 
Conference, Wroclaw, Poland. Aug. 2014.  
 Z. Lin, S. Norris, H. Shao and J. Bialek, “Transient stability assessment of 
controlled islanding based on power flow tracing,” 18th Power Systems Computation 
Conference, Wroclaw, Poland. Aug. 2014.  
 H. Shao, S. Norris, Z. Lin and J. Bialek, “Determination of when to island by 
analysing dynamic characteristics in cascading outages,” IEEE PowerTech Conference, 
Grenoble, France. Jun. 2013. 
 S. Norris, H. Shao and J. Bialek, “Considering voltage stability in preventive 
islanding,” IEEE PowerTech Conference, Grenoble, France. Jun. 2013. 
 H. Shao and J. Bialek, “When to island in the controlled islanding scheme to 
prevent imminent wide-area blackouts,” 47th International Universities’ Power 
Engineering Conference, London, UK. Sep. 2012.  
 
Journal Papers: 
 Z. Lin, S. Norris, H. Shao and J. Bialek, “Controlled islanding: comparison 
between power flow tracing and slow coherency based approaches,” IEEE Transactions 
on Smart Grid. To be submitted in Mar. 2016. 
 H. Shao, Z. Lin, S. Norris and J. Bialek, “Adaptive three-stage controlled 
islanding to prevent imminent wide-area blackouts,” IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems. To be submitted in Mar. 2016. 
 Z. Lin, H. Shao, S. Norris and J. Bialek, “Improved slow coherency based 
islanding considering transient stability margins,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. 
To be submitted in Mar. 2016.  
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Contents 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. i 
Declaration ........................................................................................................................ ii 
Acknowledgement............................................................................................................ iii 
Publications ...................................................................................................................... iv 
Contents ............................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... x 
List of Tables.................................................................................................................. xiv 
Acronyms and Abbreviations .......................................................................................... xv 
Nomenclature ............................................................................................................... xviii 
Chapter 1: .......................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Research Background and Objective....................................................................... 1 
1.2 Contribution to Knowledge ..................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 2: .......................................................................................................................... 8 
Blackouts and Prevention .................................................................................................. 8 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 Recent Blackouts in Power Systems ....................................................................... 9 
2.2.1 India blackouts on 30 and 31 July 2012 ......................................................... 10 
2.2.2 California blackout on 8 September 2011 ...................................................... 12 
2.2.3 Brazil blackout on 10 November 2009 ........................................................... 13 
2.2.4 US/Canada Blackouts on 14 August 2003 ...................................................... 14 
2.2.5 Denmark/Sweden Blackouts on 23 September 2003 ...................................... 17 
2.2.6 Italy Blackouts on 28 September 2003 ........................................................... 19 
2.2.7 UCTE Disturbance on 3 November 2006 ....................................................... 21 
2.2.8 Conclusion to the blackout cases .................................................................... 23 
vi 
 
2.3 Conventional Prevention Methods for Blackouts ................................................. 24 
2.3.1 Power system security criteria ........................................................................ 24 
2.3.2 Three-defence-lines in the power system ....................................................... 26 
2.3.3 Voltage collapse prevention............................................................................ 28 
2.3.4 Frequency collapse prevention ....................................................................... 30 
2.4 Summary ............................................................................................................... 32 
Chapter 3: ........................................................................................................................ 34 
Power System Security Assessment................................................................................ 34 
3.1 Power System Security .......................................................................................... 35 
3.1.1 Factors affecting system security assessment ................................................. 35 
3.1.2 Direct method of stability analysis ................................................................. 35 
3.1.3 Online dynamic security assessment .............................................................. 38 
3.1.4 Security in system operations ......................................................................... 41 
3.1.5 Power system security criteria ........................................................................ 41 
3.1.6 Analysis of power system security ................................................................. 42 
3.2 Power System Stability ......................................................................................... 43 
3.2.1 Classification of power system stability ......................................................... 43 
3.2.2 Rotor angle stability in the generator .............................................................. 44 
3.3 Summary ............................................................................................................... 52 
Chapter 4: ........................................................................................................................ 54 
Review of Islanding Methods ......................................................................................... 54 
4.1 When to Island? ..................................................................................................... 54 
4.1.1 Decision Tree Method .................................................................................... 55 
4.1.2 DT-based Controlled Islanding Scheme ......................................................... 56 
4.1.3 DT building procedure .................................................................................... 59 
4.1.4 Case study of building a DT in a 14-busbar system ....................................... 61 
vii 
 
4.1.5 Cascading propagation research ..................................................................... 63 
4.2 Where to Island? .................................................................................................... 65 
4.2.1 OBDD methods............................................................................................... 65 
4.2.2 Spectral partitioning methods ......................................................................... 67 
4.2.3 Slow coherency methods ................................................................................ 68 
4.3 Summary ............................................................................................................... 70 
Chapter 5: ........................................................................................................................ 72 
Power Flow Tracing ........................................................................................................ 72 
5.1 Proportional Sharing Principle .............................................................................. 72 
5.2 Tracing Methodology ............................................................................................ 74 
5.2.1 Upstream-looking algorithm ........................................................................... 74 
5.2.2 Downstream-looking algorithm ...................................................................... 75 
5.3 Application of Tracing in Controlled Islanding .................................................... 78 
5.4 Optimization Objective for Islanding Scheme ...................................................... 84 
5.4.1 Minimal power flow disruption ...................................................................... 84 
5.4.2 Minimal power imbalance .............................................................................. 85 
5.4.3 Minimal voltage stress .................................................................................... 85 
5.5 Islanding Solution for Decisions ........................................................................... 86 
5.6 Summary ............................................................................................................... 88 
Chapter 6: ........................................................................................................................ 90 
Cascading Outage Simulation ......................................................................................... 90 
6.1 Simulation Results for Cascading Outages ........................................................... 92 
6.1.1 Study case A ................................................................................................... 94 
6.1.2 Study case B.................................................................................................... 95 
6.1.3 Study case C.................................................................................................... 95 
6.2 Summary ............................................................................................................... 98 
viii 
 
Chapter 7: ........................................................................................................................ 99 
Extended Equal Area Criterion ....................................................................................... 99 
7.1 Introduction of EEAC ........................................................................................... 99 
7.1.1 General OMIB formulation .......................................................................... 101 
7.1.2 Critical machine ranking ............................................................................... 104 
7.1.3 EAC in OMIB system ................................................................................... 105 
7.2 Measurement Data Required in EEAC Application ............................................ 107 
7.3 Summary ............................................................................................................. 108 
Chapter 8: ...................................................................................................................... 109 
Single Machine Equivalent and its Application for Preventive Islanding .................... 109 
8.1 Introduction of SIME .......................................................................................... 109 
8.2 Application of SIME in the Preventive Islanding Scheme .................................. 111 
8.2.1 Framework of three-stage controlled islanding ............................................ 111 
8.2.2 Stage 1: When to island ................................................................................ 113 
8.2.3 Stage 2: Where to island ............................................................................... 115 
8.2.4 Stage 3: Dynamic stability evaluation .......................................................... 115 
8.3 Summary ............................................................................................................. 116 
Chapter 9: ...................................................................................................................... 118 
Simulation Results of the Controlled Islanding Scheme .............................................. 118 
9.1 Case Study of a 39-busbar System ...................................................................... 118 
9.1.1 Transient stable case for 39-busbar system .................................................. 119 
9.1.2 Transient unstable case for 39-busbar system .............................................. 121 
9.1.3 Assessment of transient stability of the islands in a 39-busbar system ........ 122 
9.1.4 Stability evaluation of each island in a 39-busbar system ............................ 126 
9.2 Case Study of a 68-busbar System ...................................................................... 128 
9.2.1 Transient stable case in a 68-busbar system ................................................. 130 
ix 
 
9.2.2 Transient Unstable Case for 68-busbar system............................................. 131 
9.2.3 Assessment of the transient stability of islands in a 68-busbar system ........ 133 
9.2.4 Stability evaluation in each island in the 68-busbar system ......................... 136 
9.3 How Long Does It Take to Execute the Three-Stage Procedure? ....................... 138 
9.4 Summary ............................................................................................................. 139 
Chapter 10: .................................................................................................................... 141 
Conclusion and Future Work ........................................................................................ 141 
10.1 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 141 
10.2 Future Work ...................................................................................................... 144 
Appendix A: .................................................................................................................. 146 
Modelling and Protection .............................................................................................. 146 
A.1 Generator Modelling .......................................................................................... 146 
A.2 Generator Protection ........................................................................................... 149 
A.3 Transmission Network Protection ...................................................................... 150 
Appendix B: .................................................................................................................. 154 
System data for simulated network ............................................................................... 154 
B.1 39-bus system ..................................................................................................... 154 
B.2 68-bus system ..................................................................................................... 157 
References ..................................................................................................................... 164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: India’s NEW Grid power system separation on 31 July 2012……………..10 
Figure 2.2: Frequency profile from data measurement of Phasor Measurement Units 
(PMUs) …………………………………………………………………………..….....11 
Figure 2.3: Power flow redistribution on FirstEnergy Corp.’s 345-kV lines…………..15 
Figure 2.4: Voltages on FirstEnergy Corp.’s 138-kV lines: impacts of line trips……...16 
Figure 2.5: Rate of line and generator trips during the cascade……………………..…16 
Figure 2.6: Voltage and frequency acquired by WAMS at 400kV connection between 
southern Sweden and eastern Denmark…………………...……………………………18 
Figure 2.7: Frequency behaviour in Italy in the transitory period…………………...…20 
Figure 2.8: Frequency recordings received by WAMS before and after area was 
split……………………………………………………………………………………..22 
Figure 2.9: Typical evolution of US/Canada cascading blackouts……………………..27 
Figure 2.10: Real power-voltage (P-V) curves………………………............................29 
Figure 2.11: Reactive power-voltages (Q-V) curves…………………………..……….29 
Figure 2.12: Frequency regulation intervals subject to a disturbance……………….....31 
Figure 3.1: Online dynamic security assessment system mechanism………………….39 
Figure 3.2: Security margin nomogram under current OC……………………………..40 
Figure 3.3: Categories of the power system’s security……………………………..…..42 
Figure 3.4: Classification of power system stability…………………………………...43 
Figure 3.5: Idealized model and power-angle curve…………………………………...47 
Figure 3.6: Evolution of the state of the system………………………………………..49 
xi 
 
Figure 3.7: Equal area criterion…………………………………………………….…..51 
Figure 4.1: A decision tree with five internal nodes and six terminal nodes………...…56 
Figure 4.2: DT-based controlled islanding strategy……………………………………57 
Figure 4.3: Proposed DT-based controlled islanding scheme………………………….58 
Figure 4.4: IEEE 14-busbar system…………………………………………………….61 
Figure 4.5: Decision Tree for 14-busbar system……………………………………….63 
Figure 4.6: Failures produced at stages modelled by branching processes………...…..64 
Figure 5.1: Proportional sharing principle……………………………………………...73 
Figure 5.2: Tracing example in a 6-busbar network……………………………………77 
Figure 5.3: Tracing method application in controlled islanding……………………….78 
Figure 5.4: Tracing method in first iteration based on seed node 5 …………………...80 
Figure 5.5: Tracing method in second iteration based on newly-identified seed node 
2…………………………………………………………………………………….…..81 
Figure 5.6: The process of the tracing matrix algorithms which is applied in the 6-
busbar system………………………………………………………………...…….…..82 
Figure 5.7: Tracing example in 39-busbar system with seed node on bus 26 and with 
threshold value of 0.8 p.u……………………………………………………………....83 
Figure 5.8: Tracing example in 39-busbar system with seed node on bus 26 and with 
threshold value of 1.6 p.u……………………………………………………………....83 
Figure 5.9: Flow chart to illustrate the steps to find the threshold value with best 
islanding solutions…..….……………………………………………………………....86 
Figure 5.10: Full solution set in 39-busbar system in terms of transient weight, voltage 
weight and frequency weight …………………………………………………………..87 
xii 
 
Figure 6.1: The 39-busbar system……………………………………………………...93 
Figure 6.2: Frequency changes in islanded Areas 1 and 3 and Area 2…………….…...94 
Figure 6.3: Cascading redistribution of power flow after Line 19-33 and 20-34 were 
tripped…………………………………………………………………………………..95 
Figure 6.4: Cascading redistribution of power flow after Line 21-22, 22-23 and 25-37 
were tripped………………………………………………………………………...…..96 
Figure 6.5: Voltage drops and collapses during cascading tripping…………..……......97 
Figure 6.6: Line 26-29 is tripped by distance protection………………..……………...97 
Figure 7.1: Principle of the EEAC method……………………………………………100 
Figure 7.2: Power angle characteristic for OMIB with breaker operation……………106 
Figure 7.3: Measurements needed for calculation in EEAC………………………….107 
Figure 8.1: Updating 
aP   curves of corresponding transformed OMIB system based 
on updating measurements……………………………………………………………110 
Figure 8.2: Flowchart of three-stage strategies for controlled islanding……………...112 
Figure 8.3: Flowchart of online application of SIME in cascading outages for when to 
island…………………………………………………………………………………..113 
Figure 9.1: 10-generator 39-bus New England system……………………………….119 
Figure 9.2: Transiently stable case after Line 4-5 was tripped………………………..121 
Figure 9.3: Transiently unstable case after Lines 4-5 and 4-14 were tripped………....122 
Figure 9.4: Islanding strategy IS1 applies at critical islanding time 2.9 s…………….124 
Figure 9.5: Islanding strategy IS1 applied beyond critical islanding time at 2.95 
s………………………………………………………………………………………..125 
xiii 
 
Figure 9.6: Transient stability status in the first island after controlled islanding scheme 
is assumed to happen………………………………………………………………….127 
Figure 9.7: Transient stability status in the second island after controlled islanding 
scheme is assumed to happen……………………………………………………..…..128 
Figure 9.8: 16-generator and 68-busbar system……………………………………....129 
Figure 9.9: Transiently stable case after Lines 2-3, 2-4, 3-18 and 4-5 were tripped….131 
Figure 9.10: Transiently unstable case after Lines 2-3, 2-4, 3-18, 4-5 and 4-14 were 
tripped…………………………………………………………………………………133 
Figure 9.11: Islanding scheme applies within critical islanding time at 6.5s…………134 
Figure 9.12: Controlled islanding scheme applied beyond critical islanding time at 
7.8s…………………………………………………………………………………….135 
Figure 9.13: Transient stability status in the sick island after controlled islanding 
scheme is assumed to happen beyond critical islanding time………………………...137 
Figure 9.14: Transient stability status in the healthy island after controlled islanding 
scheme is assumed to happen beyond critical islanding time………...………………138 
Figure A.1: Characteristics of different type of IDMT overcurrent relays…………....151 
Figure A.2: Stepped distance protection………………………………………………152 
Figure A.3: Complex R-X diagram for characteristics of DR…………………...……153 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
    List of Tables 
Table 4.1: Database created in 14-busbar system for building DT…………………….62 
Table 4.2: Model details in cascading simulation……………………………………...65 
Table 6.1: Power flow capacity in tie lines in the 39-bus system……………………...93 
Table 9.1: Transient stability indication after Line 4-5 was tripped…………………..120 
Table 9.2: Transient stability indication after Line 4-5 and Line 4-14 were tripped….121 
Table 9.3: Optimal islanding cut sets based on power flow tracing………………......123 
Table 9.4: Transiently stable indication in the island containing G2 and G3 after 
islanding strategy IS1 undertaken..................................................................................126 
Table 9.5: Transiently stable indication in the first island after islanding…………….127 
Table 9.6: Transiently stable indication in the second island after islanding…………128 
Table 9.7: Transient stability indication after Line 2-3, 2-4, 3-18 and 4-5 were 
tripped………………………………………………………………..………………..130 
Table 9.8: Transient stability indication after Line 2-3, 2-4, 3-18, 4-5 and 4-14 were 
tripped…………………………………………………………………………...….....132 
Table 9.9: Transient stability indication in the sick island after fifth line 4-14 was 
tripped beyond critical islanding time……………………………………………..….136 
Table 9.10: Transiently stable indication in the healthy island after controlled islanding 
scheme was implemented beyond critical islanding time………………….…………138 
Table A.1: Relay characteristics and corresponding equations……………...………..150 
 
 
 
xv 
 
  Acronyms and Abbreviations 
AVR                  Automatic Voltage Regulator  
ANN                  Artificial Neural Network  
BAs                    Balancing Areas  
CC                      Corrective control 
CT                      Current Transformer  
CSR                    Critical Splitting Rule  
CIT                     Critical Islanding Time  
CMR                  Critical Machine Ranking  
COA                   Centre of Angles  
DT                      Decision Tree 
DR                      Distance Relay  
DSA                   Dynamic Security Assessment  
EAC                   Equal Area Criterion  
EEAC                 Extended Equal Area Criterion  
EC                      Emergency control 
HVDC                High Voltage Direct Current 
IDMT                 Inverse Definite Mean Time  
IS                        Islanding Strategies  
KE                      Kinetic Energy  
LMP                   Locational Marginal Price 
xvi 
 
MLRM               Multi-Linear Regression Models  
OMIB                 One Machine Infinite Bus 
OBDD                Ordered Binary Decision Diagram  
OC                      Operation Condition  
OEL                    Over Excitation Limiter  
OST                    Out-of-Step Tripping  
PMU                   Phasor Measurement Unit  
PC                       Preventive Control 
PSM                    Plug Scale Multiplier  
PSB                     Power Swing Blocking  
PSAT                  Power System Assessment Tool  
PE                       Potential Energy  
PF                       Power Flow 
RPR                    Reactive Power Reserve  
SIME                  SIngle Machine Equivalent 
SCADA              Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
TSO                    Transmission System Operator 
TDS                    Time Domain Simulation  
UCTE                 Union for Coordination of Transmission of Electricity 
UFLS                  Under-Frequency Load-Shedding 
UVLS                 Under-Voltage Load-Shedding 
xvii 
 
UEL                   Under Excitation Limiter  
ULTC                Under-Load Tap Changer  
VSM                  Voltage Stability Margin  
WAMS              Wide Area Measurement Systems 
WLS                  Weighted Least-Squares  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xviii 
 
Nomenclature 
 A                        The set of all remaining machines 
 a                         Its equivalent of A , aggregated machine 
1A / accA                Kinetic energy 
2A / decA                Potential energy 
 B                         Susceptance 
iE                         Voltage behind d-axis transient reactance 
GE                        Voltage on generator side 
ME                        Voltage on motor side 
 G                         Conductance 
H                         Inertia constant 
I                           Faulted current that relay monitors 
NI                         Nominal current of relay 
2I R                       Power loss 
fi           
               Field current 
J                            Inertia of the turbine/generator set 
iM                         Inertia coefficient 
NPSM I               Pickup current 
eP                          Electrical power 
xix 
 
mP                       Mechanical power 
RP                       Transmitted active power 
gP                       Active power produced by generator 
eOP                      Pre-breaker P   curve 
ePP                      Post-breaker P   curve 
RQ                       Local injected reactive power 
gQ                       Reactive power produced by generator 
S                        The set of machines composing the critical cluster of machines 
s                         Its equivalent of S , aggregated machine 
mT                       Mechanical torque provided by the turbine 
eT                        Electrical torque reacted by the generator 
ST                        Synchronizing torque coefficient 
ST                   Synchronizing torque component 
DT                       Damping torque coefficient 
DT w                  Damping torque component 
ut                        Time to instability 
t                       Time interval 
gV                         Voltage at the generator bus 
RV                         Receiving end voltage 
xx 
 
0ref
v                       Reference voltage of AVR 
0w                        Generator angular speed 
TX                       Overall reactance of generator, transmission line and motor 
x                          Reactive power reserve  
dx                         d-axis reactance of generator 
qx                         q-axis reactance of generator 
y                          Voltage stability margin 
Y                         Reduced admittance matrix to generator nodes 
 ij ijY                  Modulus (argument) of ijth element of Y 
LDZ                      Load demand 
o                        Orginal steady state rotor angle 
m                        Generator rotor angle 
u                        OMIB unstable equilibrium angle 
clear                     Generator angle when protective devices take actions to clear the fault 
                         Best vector of coefficients 
                          OMIB acceleration at  ot t    
                          Transient stability margin 
*                        Measured cascading propagation factor 
                          Estimation errors
1 
 
                                                                                                                               
Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
In recent decades, the reliability of electrical power systems has become more and more 
demanding because the profit-driven maximum utilisation of network and environment-
driven high penetration of generation distribution have reduced the security margin and 
led to the high possibility of blackouts under severe disturbances. In addition, the lack 
of effective communication between neighbouring operators in the transfer of power 
across borders also may jeopardize the system’s security, which caused the blackout 
that occurred in Italy in 2003 [1]. Consequently, the occurrence of blackouts has spread 
around the world in recent decades, most of which were caused cascading outages, such 
as the India blackout in 2012 [2][3] and the US/Canada blackout in 2003 [4]. The 
malfunction of protection and the lack of proper protection integration deteriorated, 
causing cascading outages in these cases. Normally, blackouts are imminent when the 
usual methods in the widely used three-defence-line scheme fail, which are preventive 
control, emergency control and corrective control [5]. Under these circumstances, 
controlled islanding is proposed as a last resort to prevent blackouts and help the system 
to survive [6]-[8]. This controlled islanding scheme has three stages that must be 
considered before action is taken: 1) When to island? 2) Where to island? 3) After 
islanding, the dynamic stability in each island is evaluated.  
1.1 Research Background and Objective 
This research is an engineering project that aims to develop methodologies to prevent 
the occurrence of blackouts by splitting the transmission network into several islands 
when a blackout is imminent. In order to make the controlled islanding scheme perform 
successfully, a few questions have to be properly addressed. Because islanding is 
already a huge disturbance, proper islanding cutsets should be provided without 
worsening the state of the system. In addition, the designed islands should be triggered 
at the correct moment as last resort, and the islands formed after splitting the network 
should maintain a power balance between generation and demand without violating 
2 
 
static and dynamic constraints, such as the thermal current limits of transmission lines 
and transient stability. Based on different spectra of research, the project is accordingly 
divided into three stages [15]: 
 Stage 1: When to island? 
The question of when to island is of crucial importance because islanding too early 
causes an unnecessary, heavy intervention with enormous economic loss. However, 
waiting too long would lead to a blackout [6]. Thus, the early recognition and 
identification of the point of no return before a blackout is very important. Previous 
research in [7][8] used a trained decision tree (DT) based on off-line simulation data 
from a specific system to decide when to island. However, DT-based methods are not 
flexible in their application for different power systems with continuously updated 
system topology [6]. Similarly, in [9] a probability analysis was proposed based on 
measurement data of previous blackout events to decide whether the cascading failures 
would propagate in a network. However, the use of probability theory is still risky in 
real-time operations [6]. 
This thesis aims to answer the question when is “the point of no return” by using the 
single machine equivalent (SIME) method [10]-[14] when controlled islanding has to 
be activated. In this work, we assume that blackouts are caused by cascading outages, 
and the point of no return is the last tripped line, which results in transient instability. In 
fact, blackouts are characterised by several features, such as voltage collapse, frequency 
collapse and transient instability in cascading outages. However, in this thesis, we 
concentrate on transient instability because the majority of the known, previous 
blackouts were preceded by severe power swings. By applying SIME online, we aim to 
find an a priori transient stability indicator during cascading outages and adapt to the 
controlled islanding scheme to support decision making of islanding implementation in 
terms of transient instability. SIME transforms the multi-machine system into a two-
machine dynamic equivalent, and then it is further reduced to a one-machine infinite 
bus (OMIB) system [10]-[14]. The transient stability issue is then reduced to a single 
equation to compare the kinetic energy and the potential energy during dynamic change 
under contingencies, which is based on the well-known equal area criterion. In addition, 
the on-line application of SIME relies on real-time information from wide area 
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measurement systems (WAMS). SIME monitors the system’s status and updates its 
calculation results, so it could predict whether the system is driven to transient 
instability after assuming that the next expected tripped line is actually tripped. The 
identification of the next expected tripped line is based on the thermal threshold of the 
lines and the thermal characteristics of the protection installed on the lines [15]. If 
SIME indicates that the system will be transiently stable after the assumed line is 
tripped, then the order of implementing the controlled islanding has to wait for the 
performance of the other existing control. In the meantime, the status of the system’s 
stability continues to be monitored and assessed after the next expected line is tripped. 
If the a priori transient indicator shows transient instability after tripping the next 
expected line, then the order will be given immediately to split the network into the 
designed islanding cutsets once the next expected line is actually tripped. 
 Stage 2: Where to island? 
In previous research, the ordered binary decision diagram (OBDD), slow coherency and 
spectral clustering-based method were proposed to solve this issue. In [16]-[18] the 
OBDD-based method aimed to provide all the possible splitting strategies to satisfy the 
required constraints, such as synchronisation, power balance and rated limits. In [19]-
[23], spectral graph theory-based islanding methods were proposed. The basic principle 
was to use graph eigenvalue analysis to provide the intrinsic structure of the power 
system and obtain information to identify the transmission lines that led to the creation 
of islands. In [24]-[27], the slow coherency-based method was used to provide 
islanding cutsets by first identifying the coherent generator groups and then searching 
for minimal cutsets having a minimal power flow imbalance in each controlled island. 
However, the identification of coherent groups of machines is based on small-signal 
linearized analysis around a certain operating point. The operating point may shift away 
because of large-scale dynamic changes, and system splitting may follow the invalid 
slow-coherency groups. Even worse, there may be resulting transient instability in each 
formed island after splitting. In this thesis, power flow tracing-based islanding cutsets 
are used, which are then adapted to the three-stage controlled islanding scheme. The 
power flow tracing-based method in [28][29] provides a new approach to splitting 
strategies in controlled islanding. It is based on the proportional sharing principle, 
which starts from disturbed nodes to identify the power flow between any two nodes in 
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the system. When the power flow is known, the nodes with heavier power flow between 
them are regarded as strongly connected, and they should stay connected in controlled 
islanding. Nodes with less power flow in between them or weakly connected nodes are 
considered cut through for islanding. Compared to the slow coherency-based method, in 
the power flow tracing method, the performance of power flow disruption, minimal 
generation-load imbalance and subsequent transient stability in islands is highlighted. In 
real situations, although protection, such as load or generation shedding, helps stabilize 
the formed islands, we do not consider it as the focus of this research.  
 Stage 3: Evaluation of dynamic stability in each island after islanding  
Because islanding is a huge disturbance to the system, intentional splitting has to ensure 
that it will not affect customers in using electrical power in originally healthy islands 
after islanding. Therefore, successful controlled islanding not only relies on splitting the 
entire network into smaller islands with the best possible generation/load power balance, 
but also has to ensure that the selected islanding cutsets are transiently stable before the 
order for intentional splitting order is given to the system operator. As mentioned 
earlier, SIME helps to identify the point of no return in cascading line trips, in which 
the last line trip leads to transient instability and the system’s collapse. When this is 
detected by an a priori SIME indicator, the islanding order has to wait to be activated 
until the last line is tripped. Therefore, another important concern before splitting is to 
make sure that the selected power flow tracing-based islanding cutsets are transiently 
stable by using SIME before the assumed last expected tripped line has been actually 
tripped. If SIME indicates that one or more islanding cut sets are unstable, these 
candidates are discarded and then the power-flow-tracing-based method provides 
another candidate. Subsequently, SIME continues assessing the transient status until the 
newly provided islanding cutsets are determined to be transiently stable. If no possible 
island with transient stability is provided, further actions have to be taken, such as load 
shedding and generator tripping, in order to achieve a power balance in the island and 
bring the sub-system back to a safe operating condition.  
1.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis contributes to the existing knowledge by developing methods to use in three 
different stages to solve the problem and by proposing a framework that closely 
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connects these three stages for an online application that prevents blackouts as a last 
resort of corrective control.  
First and most important, a framework consisting of these three closely connected 
stages in a controlled islanding scheme for online application is proposed. In this 
framework, SIME and the power flow tracing method are used and further developed. 
Subsequently, they are adapted to the three-stage controlled islanding scheme. The case 
study results showed that when to island was determined through the identification of 
the point of no return by using SIME. The calculation results of using SIME matched 
the time domain simulation. In addition, the disturbance could be contained in the sick 
island by using power flow tracing and forming only two islands to stabilise imminent 
blackouts. SIME was also used to assess transient stability in each island after islanding. 
Transient stability assessment tools, such as SIME, are conventionally applied in cases 
of three phase-to-ground faults. In this application, once the multi-machine system is 
transferred to the OMIB equivalent, then the issue of transient stability assessment is 
decided by when the fault is cleared. It is well known that before the fault is cleared, 
some generators keep accelerating to gain kinetic energy, which is stored in the 
generators, and the generator angles continue to increase. Therefore, a critical clearing 
time is essential to decide whether the generators can be brought back to synchronism 
with the other generators when the fault is cleared. The comparison of both kinetic 
energy and potential energy during the three conditions of pre-fault, during-fault and 
post-fault is a dynamic process that is subject to the applied critical clearing time. 
However, in cases of line trip, only the two conditions of pre-trip and post-trip exist 
without the involvement of a contingency clearing action. The occurrence of the gained 
kinetic energy and potential energy is irrelevant to the critical clearing time. In other 
words, the obtained maximal kinetic energy and the potential energy are fixed each time 
a single line is tripped. In this thesis, the novelty of using SIME under such 
circumstances is that SIME is formulated during the line trip cases instead of traditional 
fault application cases, and then it is adapted to cascading line outages, which occur 
shortly before blackouts. Thus, after each line trip, the specific stability margin could be 
computed, and it could tell how far the current operating condition is from the transient 
instability boundary. Based on the obtained a-priori transient stability indicator, 
decisions about islanding can be taken in terms of the transient instability during 
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cascading outages. In addition, in order to increase the accuracy for online application, 
the results of the SIME calculation results are updated every short-time interval, which 
relies on the online WAMS system. In the decision tree (DT) method, the decision to 
island relies on a large number of off-line trained databases. The DT method is time-
consuming and inflexible because it has to be trained every time it is applied to a 
different power system. In this thesis, a new method based on SIME calculates the 
transient stability margin very quickly because it relies on only a single equation based 
on a well-known criterion of equal area. Moreover, it is flexible enough to be applied in 
different power systems to decide when to island in terms of transient instability during 
cascading outages. 
Regarding where to island, a novel method for power flow tracing, which was 
developed in Durham, was applied in [28][29]. The main author was Dr Sean Norris, I 
collaborated as a team member and contributed to this research in our group. 
Contribution in this part is that in order to identify the best optimal islands, three 
constraints consisting of power disruption, power imbalance and voltage change have 
been raised as a team member in developing power flow tracing based islanding 
solution. Based on the islanding cutsets obtained from power flow tracing, SIME will 
be further applied in sub-system to assess the post-islanding transient stability in order 
to successfully delivery this three-stage controlled islanding scheme. The power flow 
tracing method is location dependent and aims to contain the spread of disturbance, 
leaving only two islands in the entire power network. One island contains the 
disturbance, and the other one ensures that the remaining healthy network is intact. The 
method starts by looking at the bus where the disturbance occurs and then identifies the 
cutting boundary around the sick bus. Because power flow tracing allows the 
determination of the power flow contribution on each bus, we know how much the 
neighbouring bus was dependent on the source bus of the disturbance in terms of real 
power. Their dependency was expressed based on the receiving end and the sending end 
of the power around the bus. If the neighbouring bus is heavily dependent on the sick 
bus, then they are strongly connected. The strongly connected bus is contained in the 
island where the sick bus is located until the power flow tracing identifies the most 
weakly connected bus, which is considered the cutting boundary between the sick 
island and the remaining healthy island. Compared with previous methods, the 
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advantage of forming two islands by using power flow tracing is that it avoids 
unnecessary cuts that might lead to an overall reduction in security. In addition, it 
prevents possible asynchronous regions from occurring. It is difficult if too many 
islands need to be resynchronised after islanding. Another advantage of power flow 
tracing is that the input signal relies only on the information about power flow, which is 
easily obtained from the online measurement or the state estimator. 
Furthermore, in this thesis, SIME is applied to each island. It aims to assess the 
operating condition and make sure that the sub-system in each island is transiently 
stable before the islanding can be implemented. Previous research has not investigated 
this issue. Although the system is intended to be split in order to affect the customers as 
little as possible, there is no guarantee that an exact power balance can be achieved 
between the generation and the load in each island. Therefore, under this situation, 
SIME is applied to assess whether the sub-system in each island is transient stable. If so, 
then the order of the controlled islanding scheme could be given subsequently. 
Otherwise, further action in the unstable island has to be taken, such as load shedding or 
generator tripping. 
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Chapter 2:  
Blackouts and Prevention 
Before beginning the research on controlled islanding, it is important and necessary to 
review recent blackouts that have occurred worldwide, such as the India blackout (2012) 
[2][3], the California blackout (2011) [30], the Brazil blackout (2009) [31], the 
US/Canada blackout (2003) [4], the Denmark/Sweden blackout (2003) [32][33] and the 
Italy blackout (2003) [34]. The main objective of this chapter is to investigate how and 
why these blackouts still happen despite the high level of security in the operation of 
power systems. In addition, the chapter addresses the current methods of control used in 
industrial practice to prevent blackouts and discusses whether these measures are 
sufficient and effective in preventing blackouts.  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses our motivation for developing the methods used in the controlled 
islanding scheme to prevent blackouts. It is easily assumed that blackouts rarely happen 
because the current transmission system was designed with high levels of security and 
reliability. A large number of advanced protection schemes have been installed for each 
asset, and preventive or corrective control schemes have been designed to ensure the 
security of the system. This smart design of transmission systems seems to ensure that 
blackouts can be prevented even if faults occur. However, in recent decades, several 
blackouts have happened across the globe, such as the India blackout in 2012, the 
California blackout in 2011, Brazil blackout in 2009 and the US/Canada blackout in 
2003. This chapter begins by reviewing these blackout cases and exploring the reasons 
that these blackouts occurred. 
An interconnected power system has several merits. It can increase the system’s 
robustness to improve frequency stability and reduce its susceptibility to voltage 
oscillation. It also connects high generation areas and high demand areas to improve the 
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management of the power balance. In addition, the deregulated market demands that 
systems be interconnected to optimise the trade of power flow across different regions. 
However, renewable energy development has introduced wide deployment into the 
system, which might have affected the security of power systems. Moreover, because of 
economic development, heavy demands have been placed on power systems that were 
not originally designed for increased loads. In particular, the liberalization of the 
electrical market usually leads to increases in the trade of power flow across the tie 
lines between different systems or the borders between different countries. There often 
is no unified governance of power flow trade across those areas because there are many 
system operators, and each operator considers and assesses the system security in their 
own region, rather than assessing the stability of the entire system [35][36]. Hence, 
traditional closely connected systems are not aware of other operating conditions 
because of the lack of communication and information exchange, such as in the 
disturbance in Germany (2003) [34]. This disturbance caused a frequency separation in 
the European network, which led to three different frequency areas. Circumstances such 
as these cannot facilitate the development of future power systems, and they may lead 
to new problems. When the tie lines across borders are tripped, each region’s power 
imbalance could lead to new cascading outages, causing transient instability before the 
system collapses. This occurred in the recent blackouts across the world, which is 
discussed in the following section. 
2.2 Recent Blackouts in Power Systems  
The most recent blackouts occurred as follows: the Turkey blackout on 31 March 2015, 
the San Diego blackout on 26 December 2014 and the Bangladesh blackout on 1 
November 2014. However, the specific reasons for those blackouts are still under 
investigation, and no full technical reports have yet been published. In this section, we 
discuss the evolution of blackout events and analyse other recent blackouts across the 
globe that occurred from 2012 to 2013, such as the India blackout in 2012, the 
California blackout in 2011 and so on.  
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2.2.1 India blackouts on 30 and 31 July 2012 
The India blackout was a typical cascading case, occurring twice 30 and 31 July 2012 
[2][3]. It affected 600 million people and half of India was without electricity. In July 
2012, the synchronously connected Indian main power network, the NEW Grid, was the 
blackout area, which consisted of the North Region (NR), the East Region (ER), the 
West Region (WR) and the Northeast Region (NER). The South Region (SR) is a 
separate power network run by a different system operator and is asynchronously 
connected with the NEW Grid via a high voltage direct current (HVDC) line. Figure 2.1 
below shows the four affected regions on India’s NEW Grid on 31 July 2012.  
 
Figure 2.1: India’s NEW Grid power system separation on 31 July 2012 [2]. 
NR is a high demand area, and is heavily dependent on the power supply from the WR. 
In fact, the Indian aging power system facilities and network design capacity hardly 
meet the peak load demand annually because of rapid economic development, 
particularly in the summer of 2012. Because of the extremely hot weather and heavier 
demand for power in the agricultural area in the north, the consumption of electricity 
reached a historical record. In four areas (Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab) 
the power consumption was severely over scheduled in the power delivery from WR by 
14%, 18%, 6% and 6%. In this situation, two 400 kV tie lines connecting the NR and 
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WR were overloaded and then were tripped quickly by the overcurrent protection. 
Because a large amount of power flow from the WR had to go to the NR through the 
ER, the NR began to lose synchronism with the WR. Figure 2.2 shows the frequency as 
the NR and WR moved apart at around 2:33:12 in the early morning of July 30. In 
addition, the angular separation between NR and WR started to increase. The remaining 
tie lines connecting the NR and the WR were then tripped incrementally by the distance 
protection in Zone 2 and Zone 3, which was caused by load encroachment or power 
swings. Consequently, the NR was isolated from the WR, and the generators in the NR 
lost synchronism completely. They were tripped immediately until the whole power 
system in the NR collapsed. In the case of the  blackout in India, transient instability 
played a significant role before leading to blackout. Hence, the observation and 
predication of losing synchronism is vital to prevent imminent blackouts.  
 
Figure 2.2: Frequency profile from data measurement of phasor measurement units 
(PMUs) [3]. 
In order to restore the power system in NR, India decided to increase the power 
delivery from the ER to the NR. However, the huge load demand in the NR caused the 
tie lines between NR and ER to overload again. The system operator failed to shed 
some load in the NR before some NR–ER tie lines were tripped. The tripped tie lines 
transferred the burden of power flow onto the other neighbouring lines. Subsequently, 
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the six 400 kV-rating tie lines connecting the NR and the ER were all tripped, leading 
to a complete blackout in the NR, ER and NER on the second day after the first 
blackout. 
The lesson we can learn from the India blackouts is that deregulation requires different 
system operators to work closely and communicate effectively. Especially for tie lines 
across borders, overloading status has to be identified early and cleared immediately.  
 
2.2.2 California blackout on 8 September 2011 
The California blackout on 8 September 2011 is another typical case of a cascading 
blackout [30]. This eleven-minute system disturbance affected around 2.7 million 
people in the Pacific Southwest. On that day, one 500 kV high-voltage transmission 
corridor connecting North Gila and Hassayampa (NG-H) was tripped, which initiated 
the cascading blackout. However, this was not the only reason for the cascading outages. 
Indeed, the system designed by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) 
was capable of surviving under an N-1 contingency condition. Although this NG-H line 
was also tripped, it did not cause cascading outages. However, because the demand in 
San Diego was at the peak level, the sudden trip of a major east-west transmission line 
instantaneously redistributed the power flow across the system. The power flow 
redistribution during the peak demand level in San Diego caused a voltage drop and 
equipment overload to the north of the southwest power link (SWPL), resulting in the 
overloading of three 230/92 kV transformers and a line (Path 44) in Southern California. 
Surprisingly, during the eleven-minute disturbance before the imminent blackouts, the 
system operator in the WECC failed to give an effective order. Consequently, the 
uncontrolled cascading outages spread because of the facilities were overloaded. Finally, 
the trips of the transmission lines caused the transient instability of the system. When 
the generators lost synchronism, they were tripped by the corresponding protection 
devices, which resulted in a cascading blackout in the California area.  
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2.2.3 Brazil blackout on 10 November 2009 
The Brazil blackout in 2009 was a typical incident involving the loss of synchronism in 
the generator angles, which resulted from cascading outages [31]. It happened within 
eight seconds after the first fault, and it lost 24,436 MW of demand, which accounted 
for 40% of the required national load.  
At 22:13 pm on 10
 
November 2009, three 765 kV transmission lines connecting Itabera 
and Ivaipora were tripped incrementally one by one because of the fault applied to them. 
Subsequently, one 500 kV tie line and two 230 kV tie lines between the South Region 
and Southeast Region in Brazilian National Interconnected Power System (NIPS) were 
overloaded and quickly tripped by the distance protection. The power system between 
the South Region and the Southeast Region started oscillating via the 500 kV Londrina-
Becausesisi-Araraquara (L-B-A) tie line. In the next 1 second and 2 seconds after the 
first fault, one 230 kV and eleven 440 kV transmission lines, respectively, inside the 
Southeast Region were tripped by the distance protection because of the power swings, 
The Southeast Region completely lost synchronism with the North Region and the 
Northeast Region. The frequency in the Southeast Region dropped significantly, and the 
load shedding protection scheme started shedding loads in this region while trying to 
bring system frequency back to the nominal level of 60 Hz. However, some lines 
continued being tripped because of the over-voltage protection placed on them after the 
load shedding in Southeast Region. Then eight seconds after the initial fault, the 
generators in the Southeast Region were tripped after completely losing synchronism, 
which led to the blackout. 
The lesson we can learn from the Brazil blackout is that when the system’s generator 
angles start oscillating during uncontrolled cascading outages, such as in the case of the 
L-A-A tie line between the South Region and the Southeast Region, it is uncertain 
whether the system will be transiently stable if further cascading contingency occurs. 
Therefore, it is important that the transient stability assessment indicator is obtained to 
help the system operator deal with this issue before the generators completely lose 
synchronism and are tripped by the protection devices, thereby resulting in the system’s 
collapse. 
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2.2.4 US/Canada Blackouts on 14 August 2003 
This US/Canada blackout occurred in large areas of the northeastern US and 
southeastern Canada, which affected approximately 50 million people [4]. During this 
event, over 400 transmission lines were tripped, and at least 263 power plants with more 
than 531 individual generating units were shut down on that day. The process of the 
blackout was based on cascading events that can be classified into the four typical 
stages [4] described below: 
 Weakened condition: Between 12:05 and 13:31, three generating units, which were 
separately located in Conesville, Greenwood and the Eastlake region, amounting to 
12,757 MW were out of service on August 14 because of routine maintenance. 
Although this was not the direct cause of blackout, to some extent, the unavailability 
of these individual generators caused the power flow in the system to reroute, and it 
probably caused some critical transmission lines to approach their operating limits. 
 Triggering event: At 15:05, a tree flashover occurred in the Harding-Chamberlain 
345-kV transmission line. However, the control room engineers did not know about 
it because the alarm and logging system in the FirstEnergy Corp.’s control room 
failed before the cascade started. Because no action was taken, this line was quickly 
tripped. 
 Slow cascading progression: After the failure of the Harding-Chamberlain line, the 
power flow in this line was shared by the neighbouring lines, which led to 
overloading in the neighbouring parallel lines. The overload was cleared by tripping 
the paralleled lines, which led to further overloads until another four neighbouring 
lines failed at 16:05. Figure 2.3 shows this increased line loading caused by the 
neighbouring line trip.  
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Figure 2.3: Power flow redistribution on FirstEnergy Corp.’s 345-kV lines [4]. 
However, in fact, each of these lines tripped, not because of overloading protection, but 
because the big sag caused by the overload hit overgrown and untrimmed trees. The 
Harding-Chamberlin line, Hanna-Juniper line and Star-South line failed separately with 
power flow at only 44%, 88% and 93%, respectively, of the normal and emergency line 
ratings. The current information on the system, such as active power flow, could have 
been acquired and displayed by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
within a few seconds in a cycle. In this stage, each occurrence of these cascading events 
was dependent on the earlier one or more events. Figure 2.4 shows that the voltages 
declined at the 138-kV buses in five regions during the cascading outages, which could 
also have been measured by SCADA when several 345-kV lines and one 138-kV line 
was tripped before the local blackouts occurred.  
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Figure 2.4: Voltages on FirstEnergy Corp.’s 138-kV lines: impacts of line trips [4]. 
 Fast cascading progression: Fast cascading occurred between 16:09 and 16:12. 
Within no more than three minutes, hundreds of transmission lines and generators 
successively tripped, leading to widespread blackouts. The speed of the cascading is 
shown in Figure 2.5.  
 
Figure 2.5: Rate of line and generator trips during the cascade [4]. 
During this period, power swings and voltage fluctuations caused the transmission lines 
to detect high currents and low voltages. The measured apparent impedance obtained 
might have entered the operating characteristic zone of the protection relays, which 
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were not able to discriminate the impedance change between the faults and the power 
swings. Therefore, the transmission lines were tripped successively by the distance relay 
in zone 3. Meanwhile, the generators were tripped in order to protect themselves from 
severe power swings, which could damage the generators. Moreover, during this fast 
cascading period, because several outages occurred simultaneously in the 
interconnected system, the original protection setting of the relays for the transmission 
lines, generators, under-voltage load shedding and under-frequency load shedding [4] 
might not have been accurately coordinated and integrated, which would have 
accelerated the cascading events. 
Hence, the US/Canada blackout was also caused by cascading outages. The final 
tripping of the generators because of the loss of synchronism resulted in the loss of 
power supply, and the entire system collapsed. The lessons that we can learn from the 
US/Canada blackouts are that in addition to the overloading, the line hit trees that were 
inadequately trimmed. Furthermore, no action was taken after the initial line tripping 
events because of the failure of the FirstEnergy Corp.’s control room, the overreaching 
distance relays in zone 2 and zone 3 [4], and the lack of coordination and integration 
between the generator protection system and the transmission line protection system in 
different areas, which combined to accelerate the widespread blackouts. 
2.2.5 Denmark/Sweden Blackouts on 23 September 2003 
The Scandinavian blackouts affected 5 million people who lost power in Eastern 
Denmark and Southern Sweden. The process of this blackout can also be described in 
four stages [32]: 
 Weakened condition: At 12:30, one 1.2 GW generating unit at the Oskarshamn 
power station, which was located on the southeastern grid, tripped because of 
technical problems. Suddenly, the north-south power flow on the west side of the 
network increased because the power flow was rerouted to satisfy the southern 
demand. 
 Triggering event: At 12:35, one switching device broke apart at the Horred 
substation. 
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 Sequence of events: The triggering even caused four 400 kV lines and two units 
(1,800 MW) at the Ringhals Nuclear Power Station to be tripped. Suddenly, the 
system was operating under the N-7 contingency situation, but the system had not 
been designed to deal with this condition. The heavy loss of generation and 
transmission on the southern grid caused heavy power flows on the remaining 
transmission lines from north to south in Sweden. Consequently, voltages started to 
drop. They then were maintained by the local power plants before they finally 
collapsed, which is shown in Figure 2.6. Because shown in Figure 2.6, oscillation 
existed in both voltage and frequency, which also indicated the oscillation of the 
generator angles. Both voltage and frequency are related to the generator angle, and 
their oscillation is caused by the oscillation of the generator angle itself. The 
measurements of current, voltage, frequency are time-synchronized, which are taken 
as phasor measurement units (PMUs) in WAMS at pre-selected locations and stored 
in the data concentrator every 20 milliseconds. 
 
Figure 2.6: Voltage and frequency acquired by WAMS at 400 kV connection 
between southern Sweden and eastern Denmark [33]. 
 Blackouts: Between 12:35 and 12:37, because of the deficit in generation within the 
southern subsystem, the huge imbalance in generation and demand caused the 
frequency and voltage to drop further. False faults with high current and low voltage 
on the 400 kV transmission lines in southern Sweden were detected during the power 
swings, and they were tripped by distance relays in zone 3. Then the power plants 
Voltage (kV) Frequency (Hz) 
seconds 
Hz kV 
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shut down, and blackouts occurred in southern Sweden and eastern Denmark, 
causing this area to separate from the remaining network. 
Coincidently, several unexpected outages occurred simultaneously after the system was 
operating under the widely used “N-1” security criterion, which deteriorated the 
system’s operating security margin and forced the system to run under the N-7 
contingency, which led to blackouts within two minutes.  
Therefore, the N-k (k>1) security requirements should be adapted in an increasingly 
stressed system to reduce the likelihood of simultaneous and multiple faults. 
2.2.6 Italy Blackouts on 28 September 2003 
Because the power supply is not self-sufficient, Italy imports power from France, 
Switzerland, Austria and Slovenia. Italy’s generation deficit equals 24% of the 
country’s total energy demand. Italy’s blackouts on 28 September 2003 affected the 
entire country, and 57 million people lost 27 GW in power supply [34]. 
 Weakened condition: At 15:00, Italy imported 6.7 GW of power, which was 25% of 
the country’s total load. However, there was 300 MW power more than originally 
scheduled, which caused an overload on the Swiss border in the Silis-Soazza 
transmission line.  
 Triggering event: At 15:01, a major 380-kV tie line between Italy and Switzerland 
was highly loaded at approximately 86% of its maximum capacity, which led to line 
sag caused by the gradual heating process of the conductors. The decreases distance 
between the conductors and the ground violated the security distance and caused a 
tree flashover. After the first tie line was tripped, its load was taken up by the 
neighbouring 380 kV Silis-Soazza line, which then was operating at around 110% of 
its nominal capacity. 
 Sequence of events: (1) At 15:11, the transmission system operator (TSO), Swiss 
ETRANS, informed Italy’s national power grid (GRTN) of the request by phone to 
reduce the importation by 300 MW. GRTN complied with the request within 10 
minutes. Despite several internal countermeasures taken by Swiss, unfortunately, it 
was not enough to relieve the overloads. (2) At 15:25, the overloading Sils-Soazza 
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line tripped after 24 minutes because of tree flashover. Meanwhile, the Italian grid 
lost synchronism with the main grid of the Union for Coordination of Transmission 
of Electricity (UCTE) because of the generation deficit. Because of the overloads, 
the remaining lines connected to Italy were simultaneously tripped by the protection 
devices. Figure 2.7 shows the decrease in frequency with the cascading outages in 
Italy: 
 
Figure 2.7: Frequency behaviour in Italy in the transitory period [34]. 
 Blackout: At 15:27, the Italian system was not able to operate separately from the 
UCTE network because of the deficit in self-sufficiency and the breakdown. The 
entire Italian system collapsed, causing a nationwide blackout. 
Shortly before the blackout occurred, Italy’s power system had a generation deficit and 
lost transient stability with the UCTE network. One of the main lessons learned from 
the Italian blackout is that system-wide analyses and security criteria research in every 
country are required because there is an increasing number of cross-border power 
trading and most contingencies occur in the tie lines between two countries or two 
regions. However, in Europe, countries and regions operate and manage their own grids 
separately subject to individual security criteria. Furthermore, there is a lack of online 
coordination and exchange of information between the interdependent utilities in each 
country.  
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2.2.7 UCTE Disturbance on 3 November 2006 
In the UCTE system, there are high power transfers between countries from east to west 
because northern Germany exports sufficient wind generation to meet the demand in the 
east. 
 Weakened condition: These strong power flows were interrupted during the event. 
On 3 November, the energy supplier E.ON received a request from a shipyard to 
disconnect a double circuit 380 kV Diele-Conneferde line in northern Germany later 
that day. At 21:38, 4 November, E.ON turned off the line without analysing the 
updated N-1 security criterion, which resulted in a significant increase in the power 
flow in the Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line from 600 MW to around 1,300 MW.  
 Triggering event: At 22:07, alarms of high power flows occurred, and E.ON 
decided to couple a busbar to decrease the current without online simulations. 
Nevertheless, the current continued to increase, causing the line to be tripped, which 
led to overloads on other lines. These were tripped simultaneously by the distance 
protection. Before 22:07, attempts at re-dispatch actions failed because the required 
increase in power output at some power plants that were already operating at the 
maximum generation level was impossible to achieve.  
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Figure 2.8: Frequency recordings received by WAMS before and after area split [34]. 
 Disturbance: At 22:10, the UCTE system split into three regions with different 
frequencies. Figure 2.8 shows the variances in the frequencies in the three regions 
before and after the separation of the UCTE network. In the western subsystem, a 
load generation imbalance of about 8.9 GW in the generation deficit led the 
frequency to decline to 49 Hz. In the northeast subsystem, the frequency initially 
increased to 51.4 Hz and then decreased to 50.4 Hz because the over-frequency 
protection tripped the wind generators in order to recover the frequency. Because 
shown in Figure 2.8, the frequency oscillation was equivalent to the oscillation of the 
generator angles in three areas. Therefore, transient oscillation in the UCTE network 
before losing stability also occurred in this disturbance. 
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Similarly, the N-1 security criterion was not fulfilled in the German grid [34] because 
there were an increasing number of power transfers across the borders of the UCTE. 
Therefore, instead of individual grid security, a wide-area system security assessment 
was required. Moreover, the insufficient internal TSO coordination [34] should have 
been enhanced because the time it took to switch off the double circuit line was earlier 
than the scheduled one was, and the other directly involved TSOs were late in 
communicating with the German TSO after switching off, which left insufficient time to 
check the system’s security operation. 
2.2.8 Conclusion to the blackout cases 
Based on the review of the previous blackouts, the time scale in terms of evolvement 
can be divided into four stages [32]:  
 Pre-event conditions: extreme weather, stressful system condition and weakened 
network topology 
 Triggering events: various kinds of N-1 or N-k (k>1) contingencies with internal 
faults, such as tree flashover in the US/Canada blackout (2003), failure of the 
switching device at substation in Sweden/Denmark blackout (2003), another tree 
flashover in the Italy blackout (2003) and mal-operation without simulation before 
taking action in the UCTE disturbance (2006)  
 Pre-collapse events: power swings, overloads, voltage drop, frequency variation and 
transient instability 
 Nature of collapse: cascading tripping of system components 
Based on the review of the causes and process of these previous blackouts, it can be 
confirmed that most occurred when the system was secure but under high stress [37] 
caused by overloads in transmission lines that could be tripped successively. Many 
blackouts are triggered by the simultaneous occurrence of a credible contingency and an 
internal fault [37], such as the mal-operation and malfunction of protection devices, 
which strengthen the effect of the credible contingency in the system. Shortly thereafter, 
one or more healthy components in the grid are tripped without the timely removal of 
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the internal faults. Therefore, one routine incident becomes a major problem that could 
lead to a cascading blackout that is out of control. In all these recent blackout cases, the 
cascading outages that occurred first were caused by overloading on transmission lines. 
The further tripping of the system’s components then exacerbated the disturbances. The 
systems finally collapsed because generating units were tripped because of the loss of 
transient stability. Therefore, transient stability during cascading status is the most 
important factor when a blackout is imminent. In this research project, we mainly focus 
on transient stability during the cascading process. 
 
2.3 Conventional Prevention Methods for Blackouts 
2.3.1 Power system security criteria 
2.3.1.1 N-1 and N-D criteria  
In power systems, N-k contingency analysis has been widely used as the criterion of 
industry practice and fundamental security to govern and assess the operation of a 
network, which allows the system to keep running when components fail. The widely 
used current N-1 security standard requires a system to continue operating satisfactorily 
after any one outage of the system’s N components. Similarly, the N-D security 
criterion allows one system to work healthily without being affected by the loss of 
double circuit line and highly risky paired N components in the power grid [38], which 
is currently used in UK. In order to ensure that all these credible contingencies will not 
lead to cascading outages, which are the main reason for blackouts, such as the typical 
blackouts that occurred in India (2012), California (2011) and US/Canada (2003), 
during outage planning stage, the system operators have to analyse a large number of 
“what-if” contingencies to check for possible intolerances.  
2.3.1.2 Why We Need These Security Criteria  
In the central control room of a power grid, the system operators have to monitor the 
network operating state continuously and ensure that the system works in healthy 
conditions. They also need to implement an economic dispatch to optimize each 
generating unit’s output to achieve the goal of minimising the cost of the power system 
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operation. This economic dispatch allows competitive generators to generate more 
power at the cheapest locational marginal price (LMP). There will be more transactions 
between these generators and demands in long-distance transmission lines, which could 
put more pressure on these transmission lines and even make them operate at the 
maximum capacity, thus threatening the system’s security. Therefore, a balance 
between minimising the cost of operation and the fear of blackouts [37] is essential for 
the secure operation of power grids.  
In order to solve this conflict and help the system operator to better dispatch the 
generating units’ output, organisations such as the Reliability Councils in the USA or 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE) in 
Europe developed rules that the transmission utilities and operators should follow at all 
times. The basic principle of these rules is that the system should operate at a level 
within a sufficient security margin. Moreover, credible contingencies that occur in the 
network should not lead to cascading outages or system instability. This regulation is 
reasonable because power systems are inevitably affected by routine maintenance and 
unpredictable faults and failures. However, it is impossible to ensure that the system is 
able to endure all credible contingencies. Normally, the likelihood that multiple outages 
will occur simultaneously is too low to be considered. Hence, most security rules need a 
system to withstand the loss of any component in the network, such as the N-1 security 
criterion, which was produced in this environment.  
2.3.1.3 Why Blackouts Still Happen Despite Observance of the N-1 Criterion 
The blackouts that occurred in India, California, Brazil and US/Canada raised the 
question of why they happened despite the N-1 security criterion rule. Because 
previously discussed, the current N-1 criterion may no longer be adequate to assess the 
vulnerability of the cascading outages because after the first credible contingency 
occurs, the system may no longer be N-1 secure. However, it is still possible that 
independent and unrelated internal failures would follow the credible outage. These 
internal failures could trigger the cascading failures that lead to widespread blackouts. 
In addition, there could be other contributing factors, such as communication failure 
(e.g., the US/Canada blackout in 2003). Another main reason is that each administrative 
area or state applies the N-1 security criteria within their own territory. Thus, it cannot 
be guaranteed that N-1 security criteria will work on a wide scale. An increasing 
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number of transactions take place across the borders of these balancing areas (BA) [39]. 
Each BA looks no further than its own border to perform the N-1 contingency analysis 
and always ensures that its individual network satisfies the N-1 security criteria within 
each BA. The case of the Indian NEW Grid power system is a typical example. The 
North Region of India required a large amount of power flow from neighbouring areas 
across the tie lines. However, there was no unified system security assessment between 
different operators, and there was lack of information exchange between them. If these 
credible contingencies occurred simultaneously in adjacent BAs, the system in each BA 
would still be secure. However, they ignored the impact of credible contingencies, 
which perhaps violated the N-1 security criterion that every BA should connected to the 
others, which inevitably led to cascading failures.  
Therefore, the system security criteria should be tightened to adapt this deregulation of 
crossing every BA, such as N-2. An even higher-order contingency analysis should be 
conducted in the future because of the increasing capacity of transmission lines. 
Furthermore, simply building more transmission lines without adjusting the contingency 
rule cannot enhance the security level of the power system and reduce the likelihood of 
blackouts [37].  
2.3.2 Three-defence-lines in the power system 
The cascading blackouts that occurred worldwide in recent decades made us reconsider 
the flaws in the current defence against blackouts. These events also raised questions, 
one of which concerns the currently used methods to prevent blackouts and the role 
each method plays in different stages of imminent blackouts. It is useful to review the 
widely used three-defence-lines criteria [5] against blackouts to better adapt the 
controlled islanding scheme. The US/Canada blackout on August 14 is a typical 
example. Figure 2.9 below shows the typical evolution of the US/Canada cascading 
blackouts. 
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Figure 2.9: Typical evolution of US/Canada cascading blackouts [5]. 
In Figure 2.9, the time axis shows that the process was divided into four stages: slow 
cascading, fast cascading, oscillation and collapse, each of which had a time interval. 
Moreover, each period corresponded to the relevant control action, which attempted to 
return the system to the normal operating point. During the slow cascading stage, 
preventive control (PC) was activated, which is an open-loop control and requires the 
operators to make a decision based on the signal alarm received to return the system to a 
renewed stability domain. The protection devices were probably involved in this process. 
However, the PC control stage sometimes fails because of the mal-operation or 
malfunction of the protection devices, such as in the UCTE case in 2003 where 
operators should have limited the line loadings at a level that allowed credible 
contingency to occur without violating the system’s security rule under the pre-
contingency condition. However, they wrongly coupled the busbar after receiving the 
high current alarm. In the case of the US/Canada blackout in 2003, even the operation 
control room failed. During the fast cascading stage, emergency control (EC) came into 
effect, which is a close-loop feed-forward control that automatically switches equipment 
on or off based on the pre-contingency protection design. However, the EC control 
stage sometimes fails because of the lack of coordination and integration between the 
generators and transmission lines’ protection device in complicated power grids. During 
the oscillation stage, corrective control (CC) takes the final steps for the system’s 
survival by using under-voltage load-shedding (UVLS), under-frequency load-shedding 
(UFLS) and out-of-step protection [5], which isolates the affected region. All control 
failures in this three-defence-line may lead to widespread blackouts.  
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It can be confirmed that the performance of the islanding scheme as a last-resort action 
after the failures of the usual preventive means against imminent blackouts has a limited 
window of operation. As shown in Figure 2.9, only 2.2 minutes were left to encounter 
oscillation and collapse and probably even less time in the other cases. Therefore, the 
early and fast recognition of the transformation from disturbances to blackouts is critical 
to decisions about when to island. Moreover, the early detection of variations in some 
signals, such as voltage and frequency, could indicate that blackouts are imminent. 
2.3.3 Voltage collapse prevention 
In these blackouts, some dynamic phenomena occurred during the cascading outages, 
such as voltage drop and frequency oscillation. Frequency oscillation is also related to 
generator angle oscillation. The following section describes the occurrence of these 
dynamic phenomena during the cascading contingencies in the blackouts reviewed in 
this thesis.  
Although voltage collapse occurs in all blackouts, voltage change is a local 
phenomenon, and its collapse occurs only in a small area when there is no efficient 
reactive power supply and the active demand is huge, such as in the cases of 
Denmark/Sweden (2003) and Greece (2004) [40][41]. There are usually several 
precursors before the occurrence of voltage collapse, such as low voltage profiles, 
insufficient reactive power supply and high reactive power flow in transmission lines. In 
most situations, the voltage collapse is accelerated by several unexpected and undesired 
single or multiple contingencies. In order to understand how these precursors satisfy the 
voltage collapse conditions that lead to blackouts, let us begin by explaining the P-V 
and Q-V curves shown in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11.  
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Figure 2.10: Real power-voltage (P-V) curves [4]. 
 
Figure 2.11: Reactive power-voltages (Q-V) curves [4]. 
Generally, the busbar voltage should be maintained at the rating voltage, which is much 
higher than the critical voltage shown as the curved noses in both figures. However, 
when the load increases significantly, causing high power flow and stressing the system, 
the voltage surrounding the high demand area will decrease gradually, as shown in 
Figure 2.10. When the load continues to increase, the voltage decreases and probably 
crosses the critical voltage, leading to the voltage collapse. During that period, if the 
A2 is the highest load level where a transition to 
N-1 contingency (curve B) stable operating 
conditions may be possible. 
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reactive power is adequate in the high demand area, the situation will be relieved, and 
the voltage will increase until it is maintained at a steady state. However, if a 
contingency happens simultaneously, as shown in Figure 2.10, the previously stable 
voltage may cross the critical voltage in the new network, leading to local blackouts and 
affecting the high power flow in the remaining system. This local blackout caused by 
voltage collapse occurred in the Denmark/Sweden blackout (2003). As shown in Figure 
2.6, the voltage collapse in the local area further affect the entire system and resulted in 
more cascading trips because of the power imbalance. 
Therefore, a sufficient reactive source in the high demand area is critical to maintain the 
voltage level. Normally, voltage should be maintained at a level with a large voltage 
margin. In addition, there should be a large reactive power injection margin to prevent 
the consequences of unexpected circuit outages. As shown in Figure 2.11, these voltage 
margins and reactive margins will decrease with the loss of circuits, which causes the 
voltage to approach the critical limit and even exceed it, which leads to local blackouts.  
2.3.4 Frequency collapse prevention 
In addition to significant voltage drops before imminent blackouts, frequencies usually 
also have great variation. Examples are the frequency collapse in the Italian case (2003) 
and the frequency disturbance in the UCTE case (2003).  
Under stable operation, the frequency across the whole network remains at 50 Hz. 
However, this numerical value always varies because of the second-to-second 
imbalance between generation and demand. Therefore, frequency could be an indicator 
of power balance. If there is deficit of generation, the speed (frequency) of the rotor will 
decrease, which triggers the turbine to increase power to drive the rotor automatically 
via feedback control and vice versa. This control action consists of three control 
performances (Figure 2.12): primary control, secondary control and tertiary control [42], 
which prevent the continuous decrease in frequency caused by the deficit in generation 
and maintain it at a stable level.  
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Figure 2.12: Frequency regulation intervals subject to a disturbance [42]. 
However, in extreme conditions, these control actions do not always succeed in 
maintaining the frequency. In situations of under frequency, as a last resort, load-
shedding (UFLS) will come into effect after the region has been isolated. In this formed 
islanding, the frequency drops to 49.3 Hz. UFLS will shed the pre-designated customers 
in steps in order to stabilize the power balance within the island to prevent the local 
blackout. The Italian frequency collapse shown in Figure 2.7 is an example. After the 
outages of all of transmission lines connected to Italy, the Italian system lost 
synchronism and operated separately from the UTCE. Because there was a deficit of 
24% in this island’s generation, the frequency decreased significantly. Concurrently, 
several UFLSs were implemented to maintain the frequency, which was not effective 
because of simultaneously occurring problem, such as electrical instability and voltage 
collapse [34]. When the frequency drops to 47.5 Hz, the under-frequency protection 
relays will be triggered to prevent damage to the generators, thus leading to local 
blackouts within the islands. Because frequency collapses are global phenomena and the 
frequencies at each node are always the same, it could reflect either a total power 
balance or imbalance in the entire system. However, the significant change in frequency 
does not indicate which part of the system has problems until the uncontrolled islands 
are formed. The frequencies within each island are separated, such as in the UTCE 
disturbance case (2006). Moreover, even in a steady state, frequencies change because 
of the electricity consumption behaviour of individuals. Hence, a dynamic power 
balance is rarely achieved. Therefore, frequency is more likely to be a post-event 
reflection signal instead of a precursor.  
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2.4 Summary 
This chapter described a series of blackout incidents that occurred in power systems 
across the globe in recent decades. The analysis included the process of the events that 
lead to blackouts. From the operational point of view, the biggest issue in these blackout 
cases is that there were too many system operators in the interconnected network. 
Moreover, there was a lack of effective coordination, information exchange and overall 
unified system security assessment. The Italy blackout in 2003 is an example. When 
Italy national power grid GRTN identified that in its own power network there were 300 
MW more power imported from Switzerland, it took more than two minutes for the 
Swiss operator to take action after a phone call made by GRTN regarding this issue. In 
addition, there were not enough operators trained to deal with an emergency. In the 
UCTE disturbance in 2006, the E.ON operator disconnected a 380 kV line in order to let 
one shipyard to go through. However, because it was done without a security analysis, it 
caused overloading on the Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line. Subsequently, the system 
operator aimed to decrease the current on the overloading line but wrongly coupled a 
busbar without a pre-event online simulation, triggering cascading outages.  
Moreover, from the technical point of view, the current transmission system has a very 
advanced design. The system’s state can be monitored in the control room through 
direct measurement by using WAMS and indirect calculation. Each facility in the 
system can be protected by various systems to avoid damage. Remote control action can 
also be implemented to adjust the system’s status, such as reactive power adjustment to 
satisfy voltage constraints and loading shedding or generator tripping to satisfy the 
requirement of system frequency. System demand forecasting is planned for both the 
short run and the long run in order to enhance the system’s reliability. However, an 
unexpected lack of coordination always exists in these smart-designed corrective 
controls, especially when the original system configuration changes during cascading 
outages. In addition, hidden faults in the system will become apparent under extreme 
conditions, which also deteriorate the safety of the system. 
This chapter outlined system security criteria and traditional prevention schemes against 
system collapse or blackouts. Also discussion includes methods used to counter voltage 
drop and frequency drop. However, in the blackouts described earlier, the poor 
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operation of traditional controls because of the lack of integration failed to ensure the 
survival of the system in the cascading progress, especially when several faults occurred 
simultaneously. In addition, the malfunction of the distance relays in zone 2 and zone 3 
also contributed to several blackouts, which will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Therefore, under such circumstances, a new three-stage controlled islanding scheme 
against blackouts at the top level of the system is proposed. This scheme will be used as 
a last resort action to prevent blackouts from occurring when the usual means fail. 
In addition, the review of major blackouts in recent decades indicated that they were 
caused by cascading outages. They began when the lines were tripped because of line 
overloading, and they ended when the generator was tripped when synchronism was lost, 
which directly led to the blackouts. Furthermore, because of the dynamic characteristics 
of the cascading process, the voltage oscillation and frequency oscillation that were 
observed through online measurement were caused by the oscillation of the generator 
angle. Therefore, the online assessment of transient stability is the most important 
contribution to preventing blackouts and a vital indicator in predicting imminent 
blackouts. This thesis focuses on the issue of transient stability during cascading 
blackouts.   
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Chapter 3:  
Power System Security Assessment 
In this chapter, the security assessment in the power system is described, particularly 
transient stability because it occurs significantly in the cascading outages before 
imminent blackouts and could be an indicator of when to island. In addition, in order to 
adopt the controlled islanding scheme online, the latter has to align with current systems 
of security assessment. Hence, it is necessary to review security assessment in 
traditional power systems. This assessment aims to detect the degree of risk and test the 
systems’ ability to survive imminent disturbances or contingencies without interrupting 
the customer service. This security assessment usually relates to the robustness of the 
system and its operating conditions. It also depends on the contingent probability and 
severity of disturbances. 
In the past, conceptual terms in [43], such as security, reliability and stability, have been 
used to describe a power system’s capability to survive all kinds of disturbances. The 
overall and long-term objective is reliability, which ensures the satisfactory design and 
operation of a power system. Therefore, in order to be reliable, the system must be 
secure most of the time. In order to be secure, the system must be stable against other 
contingencies that may occur and lead to instability problems in terms of overloading, 
voltage and transient issues. However, in the long run, one fact must be faced: Any 
system with high reliability, security or stability will still be challenged by periods of 
severe insecurity under unexpected disturbances. Therefore, offline outage planning and 
online continuous security assessment according to the security criteria are important 
for the current and future security of power systems. 
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3.1 Power System Security 
3.1.1 Factors affecting system security assessment 
Ensuring secure operation in a safe and economic manner in a power system is already a 
primary objective. However, with the development of traditional electrical power 
industries to operate in the liberalised electrical market, an increasing number of factors 
have become sources of system disturbances that affect the security of system 
operations. These factors not only reduce the robustness of the power system but also 
decrease the secure predictability of system operations. These factors include aging 
transmission infrastructure, large numbers of penetration of renewable generation, 
market-driven electrical power transaction, and so forth.  
3.1.2 Direct method of stability analysis 
Dynamic security assessment (DSA) in a power system requires a correct and timely 
analysis to decide whether the current operating system is able to satisfy the reliability 
and security criteria in both transient and steady-state conditions in all credible 
contingencies [43][44]. In an operating environment, a secure system can assess all 
aspects of the power system that affect system stability issues in both pre-contingency 
and post-contingency states, including thermal loading of power elements (e.g., 
transformer, transmission lines etc.), frequency and voltage variation and other forms of 
stability (i.e., generators’ power angle). Historically, security assessment has been 
conducted in an off-line operating environment where the performance of steady-state 
and transient stability is tested based on all kinds of forecasted contingencies using tools 
such as power flow computation and time-domain simulation. Transient stability 
assessment has been investigated for many decades, such as in research to adapt an 
offline tool to an online tool. Traditionally, time-domain simulation uses numerical 
integration to calculate the during-fault and post-fault trajectories of the generator’s 
behaviour. The generator’s behaviour is then used to decide whether the system’s 
stability can be maintained. This conventional approach is time consuming and can only 
be used in the off-line analysis of transient stability. However, the off-line analysis of 
the current power system is still not desirable in an online operating environment. On 
one hand, an online application based on the results of an off-line analysis is 
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conservative in accuracy and leads to a trade-off between safety and business. On the 
other hand, the amount of offline analysis required can be significantly reduced 
compared with the online analysis using online measurements from the WAMS system.  
Under such circumstances, a direct method [45]-[58] was developed to assess transient 
stability for online application purposes. Compared with the time-domain approach, the 
direct method only integrates in the during-fault system and does not integrate in the 
post-fault system. When the fault is cleared, the direct method determines whether the 
system is transiently stable by comparing the system’s energy with a calculated 
threshold value. In other words, the stability issue involves determining whether the 
initial point of post-fault trajectory is inside the stability boundary, which is formed by 
an acceptable stable equilibrium point (SEP). However, this direct method is subject to 
one assumption [47]: the pre-fault SEP has to be inside the stability region of a desired 
post-fault SEP. Although this energy function-based direct method has advantages 
compared with the conventional time-domain approach, such as fast computation and an 
exact stability margin, some challenges remain. Regarding the simplified transient 
stability model, research has shown that it is too impractical for use in real power 
system applications. In [49], the direct method was used to handle more complicated 
power system models by constructing a numerical energy function.  
The direct method has undergone several stages in its historical development. Initially, 
the famous equal area criterion in one-machine-infinite busbar system was proposed for 
stability analysis. Based on this energy concept, the critical clearing angle could be 
obtained without solving the differential equations in the conventional approach. This 
energy-based concept then was extended to a multi-machine system. Subsequently, 
Lyapunov’s idea, which was associated with LaSalle’s invariance principle [52][53] 
was proposed to estimate the region of stability and critical clearing time. However, the 
difficulty was that in order to obtain the critical clearing time, the threshold value that 
the fault trajectory reaches in the region of stability must be determined. Subsequent 
research proposed finding all unstable equilibrium points around the stable equilibrium 
point in order to estimate the critical clearing time [54]. However, finding all unstable 
equilibrium points is not an easy task. The closest unstable equilibrium point (UEP) 
method and the controlling UEP method [47] were proposed and developed in the late 
1960s and 1980s, respectively. In the closest UEP method, during-fault trajectory is not 
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taken into account. Therefore, this method cannot provide an accurate approximation of 
the region of stability, resulting in severe conservativeness. In order to reduce the 
conservativeness of the closet UEP method, the controlling UEP method was proposed, 
which takes into account the during-fault trajectory and provides an accurate 
approximation of the region of stability. Its stability assessment results are much more 
accurate than the results obtained by the closed UEP method are [47][50]. However, the 
disadvantage of the controlling UEP method is that in some cases, it is still challenging 
to find the controlling UEP associated with the during-fault trajectory [47][50].  
The potential energy boundary surface (PEBS) was proposed by Kakimoto [55] to 
obtain critical energy and estimate critical clearing time without calculating the unstable 
equilibrium points. The critical energy is defined as the first local maximum of the 
potential energy along the fault-on trajectory. The research results in [56] showed that 
the PEBS method yields a good estimation of the critical clearing time. However, in 
some cases, this method produces non-conservative results of the critical clearing time. 
Such results are not desirable because online application systems may have already lost 
transient stability, so it cannot be included in the calculation.  
The boundary controlling unstable (BCU) method, which is the most popular direct 
method, was proposed in 1990s by Chiang [48][57]. The BCU method is based on the 
PEBS method. However, its accuracy is guaranteed by a precise definition based on 
dynamic system theory. Compared with the PEBS method, the BCU method provides 
conservative results of the first swing assessment, and it always guarantees the first 
swing stability.   
In conclusion, many advances have been made in direct methods, but many challenges 
remain. These direct methods are still not suitable for the analysis of multi-swing 
transient stability. Another limitation of the direct method is that the initial condition of 
the post-fault system is essential for online application, and these initial data must be 
available in advance. However, the data can only be obtained beforehand through the 
time-domain approach. Moreover, the limitation of all of these direct methods [45]-[58] 
is that they are based on an inherent characteristic: the pre-fault SEP must be inside the 
boundary of the post-fault SEP. Otherwise, the stability issue has to reply to the 
conventional time-domain approach for verification. Another challenge is the accuracy 
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of the assessment of transient stability. Research on all these direct methods and the 
numerical energy function [59] has attempted to achieve that objective. The reliability 
of the direct method is linked to the reliability of computing the controlling UEP for 
every contingency. All these direct methods have demonstrated uniqueness from a 
theoretical perspective. However, from a practical perspective, the task of computation 
is still challenging.  
In addition, the direct methods face the same issue of finding the Lyapunov functions, 
especially when detailed models are considered, such as realistic generator models and 
load models. Hybrid methods [10]-[14] have been proposed, which aim to take 
advantage of both direct methods and the conventional methods. Direct methods 
guarantee fast calculation speed in building computation algorithms, while the 
conventional method obtains realistic data from a detailed model, which is used in the 
calculation of the direct method. Hybrid methods currently used are EEAC and SIME, 
which will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. Moreover, these 
methods are used in this thesis to assess online transient stability in the controlled 
islanding scheme.  
3.1.3 Online dynamic security assessment 
The off-line DSA approach will be implemented in the outage planning stage. 
Numerous N-1 (N-D applied in UK) contingency analyses and computations need to be 
executed and updated continuously before the forecasted contingent conditions occur. 
However, these forecasted contingent conditions might never happen, and they might 
not include all of possible contingencies because the system’s components and 
configuration may change in the real time phase. Therefore, based on the obtained 
offline DSA results, the online DSA [44] has to be continued in the real time phase in 
the control room. System stability in terms of all security aspects under the current 
updated operation condition (OC) is computed online as it occurs with sufficient time 
and speed either to trigger the control devices automatically or to let the system 
operators take action with enough time left if the analysed contingency is shown to be 
potentially insecure. This approach scans the system continuously for a potential 
problem that results from the analyses of N-1 or even N-k (k>1) contingencies, and the 
planned outages are assessed for maintenance purposes in a process that is similar to the 
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sweeping behaviour of a radar mechanism. Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the 
mechanism of this online DSA approach. Different components have different functions 
in achieving the online security assessment. 
 
Figure 3.1: Online dynamic security assessment system mechanism [44] 
Figure 3.1 shows all components in the DSA system, including measurement, modelling, 
computation, reporting, visualization, other functions and control. In measurement, 
important data in the actual system’s OC, such as voltage, current, phase angle, can be 
obtained from SCADA in real time for use in computation. These signals are received 
as inputs and then implanted in the state estimators and dynamic models for use in the 
power flow and dynamic computation. The analytical solutions will assess the security 
of the pre-fault operating condition if planned outages are undertaken. In addition, in the 
planning stage, post-fault operating conditions also have to be considered if the 
operating condition is changed to assume that a fault happened in order to satisfy the 
system’s N-1 security criteria. In addition, post-fault actions have to be signalled to the 
control room if these assumed faults occur in real time. For example, if the post fault 
indicates an overloading issue, a corresponding decrease in power generation from 
certain generators has to be implemented to alleviate the overloading problem before it 
reaches the post-fault rating of lines and to return the reduced power flow to the pre-
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fault rating. If transient instability occurs between the energy-importing area and the 
energy-exporting area, then the pre-agreed generators in the energy-exporting area will 
be asked by the system operator to decrease their generation in order to solve the 
transient instability issue. Various security criteria regarding the thermal overloading of 
transmission lines, steady-state voltage excursion, voltage change excursion and 
transient stability and so forth are shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 illustrates the security 
region in a two-dimensional nomogram to represent operating margin for a case of two 
generation groups in the interconnected system.  
 
Figure 3.2: Security margin nomogram under current OC [44]. 
The online DSA determines the assumed contingencies or disturbances that will result 
in an insecure condition in the power system. When these events happen, the remedial 
control actions will counter the insecure situation and return the system to another 
secure OC. In addition, other functions are also involved in the online DSA system, 
such as the study mode, archive, system monitoring and maintenance functions. These 
functions could be used to store data periodically and selectively from the on-line 
system for off-line study and post-event analysis. They could also be used to monitor 
the performance of the DSA system. 
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3.1.4 Security in system operations 
Because the demand for electrical power has been increasing in recent decades, in 
addition to the profit-driven incentive, power systems are gradually operating closer to 
their stability limits. Therefore, power system operation has become more challenging. 
In [60], the normal operating state in power system is defined as needing to satisfy the 
following requirements: 
 Power balance between generation and demand satisfied by the capacity 
constraints of individual generators  
 Frequency dynamic variation within a prescribed range 
 Steady-stage voltage limit and voltage change limit satisfied  
 No overloading apparatus 
All these requirements are expressed in the form of a set of equality constraints and a set 
of inequality constraints. The objective of the operators is to keep the system under a 
normal operating condition. They will choose to take preventive control actions to 
achieve this goal. However, in practice, such actions are not enough to maintain the 
system’s security. For instance, a disturbance may cause an emergency that may lead to 
cascading failures, thus deteriorating the security of the entire system. Thus, correct 
control in real time is also important in maintaining a system in a normal operating state.  
3.1.5 Power system security criteria 
Assume that a set of disturbances are given to a system one at a time. If the system 
continues to maintain a normal operating state without any action taken, it is said to be 
secure. Actually, the system cannot avoid being affected by disturbances, such as 
lightning strikes on transmission lines, mechanic failures of the system’s components 
and so on. Therefore, the system has to be designed to withstand these unexpected 
contingencies while continuing to be secure. Currently, the fundamental N-1 and N-D or 
even N-k (k>1) security criteria are widely used. The definitions of these criteria and the 
reasons that are required are explained in Chapter 2. 
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3.1.6 Analysis of power system security 
As previously mentioned, the analysis of system security relates to the robustness of the 
power system, the system’s current operating conditions and the severity of possible 
disturbances. Typically, two important aspects need to be considered in the analysis of 
the power system: static security analysis and dynamic security analysis [43]. For 
example, when a system is subjected to a disturbance, it is important for the system to 
settle to a new operating condition without violating the physical stability constraints 
after removing the disturbance. This also implies that during the transition period to the 
new operating condition, the system has to survive by satisfying all dynamic constraints 
resulting from the disturbance. 
The static security analysis aims to determine the security of the steady state operating 
condition after the disturbances by checking that the system components’ ratings are at 
normal level and determining whether the voltage limits are violated. The dynamic 
security analysis aims to analyse the system’s stability during the dynamic progress, 
including voltage stability, frequency stability and the stability of the generators’ power 
angle, which are integral components of security assessment. 
Both analyses and all stability issues involved in the security of the power system are 
shown in Figure 3.3:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Categories of the power system’s security [61]. 
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3.2 Power System Stability 
3.2.1 Classification of power system stability 
Modern power systems are a high-order and multivariable network with dynamic 
changes that depend on various devices with different characteristics and ratings. 
Stability is just a condition in which several equilibria are not violated. When these 
equilibriums are destroyed by a set of disturbances, a long-sustained imbalance may 
cause instability in its many components, which can lead to the collapse of the system.  
Because of their complexity, power systems are subject to various forms of instability. 
Stability issues can be divided into categories, which are shown in Figure 3.4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Classification of power system stability [43]. 
Figure 3.4 shows an overview of potential instabilities in the power system. These are 
classified based on a few contributing factors that need to be considered, including the 
physical consequences of instability, system variables, severity of disturbances that 
influence the analysis of dynamic modelling, predication of stability, and the time span 
that is used for assessment of stability. Generally, all three kinds of instability could 
happen during cascading blackouts. Transient stability and voltage or frequency 
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oscillation could trip more components of the system and accelerate the speed of the 
cascade. The following section explains the principle of transient stability.  
3.2.2 Rotor angle stability in the generator  
Rotor angle stability is the ability of synchronous generators in an interconnected 
system to maintain synchronism, that is, continue to be “in step” after being subjected to 
a disturbance. Rotor angle stability depends on the ability of synchronous generators to 
maintain or restore the equilibrium between electromagnetic torque and mechanical 
torque to prevent the angular swings of some generators from being increased during 
oscillation to cross a certain limit. Consequently, it causes these generators to lose 
synchronism with the remaining generators in the network, which leads to instability. 
Newton’s famous second law describes three different kinds of torque working against 
each other, which is shown in the following equation [62]:  
                                                     m D t e
d
J T T T
dt

                                                    (2.1) 
where J is the inertia of the turbine/generator set, m  is rotor shaft velocity, tT  is the 
torque provided by the turbine, eT  is the electrical torque reacted by the generator and 
DT  is damping torque accounting for the mechanical loss caused by rotational friction.  
In the steady state, turbine torque tT  is equal to the sum of the electrical toque eT  and 
the damping torque DT . In other words, the net mechanical torque mT  is equal to the 
turbine torque subtracting the damping torque, while the generator’s rotor angular speed 
is the synchronism speed at sm , as shown in the following equations:  
                                          t e DT T T      or    m t D eT T T T                                        (2.2) 
                                                           D d smT D                                                           (2.3) 
where dD  is the coefficient of the damping torque.  
Under a disturbance, the net mechanical torque and the electrical torque will lose their 
45 
 
balance. If m eT T , then the rotor accelerates at a higher rotor angular velocity; if 
m eT T , then the rotor decelerates at a lower rotor angular velocity. Therefore, the 
generator rotor’s angular velocity can be expressed as the sum of the angular 
synchronism speed plus the angular deviation during a disturbance, as shown in the 
following equation:  
                                         m
m sm m sm
d
dt

                                                      (2.4) 
Substituting equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.4) into (2.1) yields 
                                       
2
2
m m
d sm t e
d d
J D T T
dt dt
 

 
    
 
                                         (2.5) 
Based on (2.3) moving d smD   to the right side of (2.5) yields 
                                            
2
2
m m
d m e
d d
J D T T
dt dt
 
                                                   (2.6) 
Because the torque can be expressed as the power over angular velocity, then in terms 
of power, the right-hand side of (2.6) can be given as 
                                          
2
2
m m m e
d
m m
d d P P
J D
dt dt
 
 
                                                 (2.7) 
where mP  is the mechanical power of the rotating shaft produced by the turbine in the 
generator, while eP  is the generator’s electrical power driven by demand. Multiplying 
synchronous angular speed sm  on both sides of (2.7) yields 
                                   
2
2
m m sm sm
sm sm d m e
m m
d d
J D P P
dt dt
   
 
 
                                   (2.8) 
Because the synchronous angular speed sm  is close to the rotor’s angular velocity 
during a disturbance, m sm   could be obtained to make the coefficients of mP  and eP  
in (2.8). The famous swing equation of the generators can then be expressed as follows: 
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2
2
m m
m m e m
d d
M P P D
dt dt
 
                                                  (2.8) 
where 
m smM J  which represents angular momentum of rotor at synchronous speed; 
m sm dD D  which represents damping coefficient.  
The swing equation (2.8) represents the dynamic behaviour of generators during a 
disturbance. It also has subsequence influence on governing the parameters in the 
system because of the change in generator angles, such as power flow and voltage. 
In (2.8), the angular momentum of the rotor can be expressed by the normalized inertia 
constant H . The inertia constant is defined as the ratio of stored kinetic energy at 
synchronous speed in mega joules over generator rating nS  in megavolt-amperes, as 
follows:  
                                                          
20.5 sm
n
J
H
S

                                                        (2.9) 
The unit of H is seconds. The inertia constant physically interprets how long the stored 
kinetic energy in the rotor at synchronous speed takes the generator to reach an 
equivalent amount of electrical energy when operating at its MVA rating power output.  
If electrical radians and electrical radians per second are used to express power angle 
and angular speed, then they can be expressed by associating with number of poles p  in 
the generator as follows: 
                                                
/ 2
m
p

  ; 
/ 2
sm
s
p

                                                    (2.10) 
Substituting (2.9) and (2.10) into (2.8) gives 
                                           
2
2
2 n
m e
s
HS d d
P P D
dt dt
 

                                               (2.11) 
where 2 /mD D p  and D  is defined as the damping coefficient. In addition, the inertia 
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coefficient M and damping power DP  are defined as follows: 
                                            
2 n
s
HS
M

 ,    D
d
P D
dt

                                                (2.12) 
Therefore, the common form of the swing equation can be expressed as 
                                             
2
2 m e D
d
M P P P
dt

                                                        (2.13) 
This aspect of stability is influenced by the dynamics of the generator rotor angles and 
the power-angle relationships, which are shown in Figure 3.5.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Idealized model and power-angle curve [63]. 
In Figure 3.5, the idealized model on the left shows a simple system that can be used to 
determine the power versus the angle relationship, which is shown as the power-angle 
curve on the right in Figure 3.5. The sending and receiving voltages SV , RV  can be 
expressed as follows [62][63]: 
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S GV E   , 0R MV E                                                (2.14) 
where 
GE  represents voltage on the generator side, and ME represents voltage on the 
motor side;   is the generator angle. The current flowing on the circuit I  can then be 
expressed as follows: 
                           
0 cos sinG M G M G
T T
E E E E jE
I
jX jX
      
                               (2.15) 
where T G L MX X X X    and TX denote the overall reactance of the generator, 
transmission line and motor. The sending end real power SP  and reactive power SQ  can 
be obtained as follows: 
                *
cos sin
(cos sin ) G M GS S S G
T
E E jE
P jQ V I E j
jX
 
 
 
   

                (2.16) 
After simplification, (2.16) becomes 
                              
2sin ( cos )G M G G M
S S
T
E E j E E E
P jQ
X
  
                               (2.17) 
Because the line is assumed to be loss less without resistance, the power transferred 
from the generator to the motor P  is equal to the real power dispatched from the 
sending end and the real power received at the receiving end. This is described by the 
following equation [63]: 
                                           sinG MS R
T
E E
P P P
X
                                            (2.18) 
A fundamental factor in rotor angle stability is shown in Figure 3.5, where the power 
output of synchronous generators varies with the change in their rotor angles. In the 
steady-state condition, equilibrium exists between the electromagnetic torque and the 
mechanical torque, and the rotating speed of generators remains constant. When the 
system is disturbed, the equilibrium will be reset to find another balance point. During 
this oscillation process, the rotor will accelerate and decelerate until it achieves a new 
equilibrium between the electromagnetic torque and mechanical torque if it can be 
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found before the loss of synchronism.   
During the process of oscillation, if one generator temporarily runs faster than another, 
the angular position of the rotor relative to that of the slower one will advance. The 
resulting rotor angle difference will then transfer part of the load from the slow machine 
to the fast machine, which tends to reduce speed difference and rotor separation [64]. 
Figure 3.5 shows that the power-angle relationship is highly nonlinear especially 
beyond 90 degrees that the rotor angle reaches to.  The gap of angular separation is 
increased, which is performed by a decrease in power transfer, so this will further 
increase the power separation until the fast-running generator goes across the unstable 
equilibrium generator angle lim  shown in Figure 3.6. The rotor angle cannot go back 
and synchronism with the rest of network is lost.  
 
Figure 3.6: Evolution of the state of the system [63]. 
A critical question about the transient stability of the rotor angle concerns whether it can 
move from one steady state operating point to another without being unstable in a large 
disturbance. One machine and the infinite bus system shown in Figure 3.6 are examples:  
 Before the fault, the power angle of the generator is shown as o . 
 During the fault, which occurs at the terminal of the generator, the electrical 
power eP  suddenly drops to zero, and the voltage is zero.  
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 Consequently, the power angle   increases because the mechanical power is 
much bigger than the electrical power ( mP > 0eP  ). 
 Let the increasing power angle   be equal to clear  when protective devices take 
actions to clear the fault. 
 After the protective devices trip the faulted component, the system configuration 
changes while the impedance in the transmission lines changes. A new post-fault power 
angle curve is produced as shown in Figure 3.6. 
 Power angle   continues to increase because of momentum obtained during the 
fault. In addition, because the electrical power is bigger than the mechanical power 
( eP > mP ), the rate of increase in the power angle gradually slows. 
 Power angle   reaches its maximum value when the momentum is exhausted. 
 Because the electrical power is still bigger than the mechanical power ( eP > mP ), 
the power angle   starts to decrease toward to 1  in order to achieve a power balance. 
 Power angle oscillates around l  until damping lets it settle at l , which means 
that the system obtains another stable operating condition in the post-fault power angle 
curve. 
Based on the description of the transient period of the generators’ power angle, the 
system will be stable if   never exceeds lim , which is shown as follows:  
                                                        
max lim                                                         (2.19) 
Because we know, if the power angle   increases beyond lim , the mechanical power 
will again be greater than the electrical power ( m eP P ). The turbine and generator re-
accelerate infinitely until the generator loses synchronism because there is no chance 
that the electrical power could be bigger than mechanical power once the power angle 
crosses lim . This constraint can be translated into a practical stability criterion, which 
is called the equal area criterion, which was described in [62]-[64]. It is a simple, 
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observed criterion based on the concept of stored kinetic energy, which is illustrated in 
Figure 3.7.  
 
Figure 3.7: Equal area criterion [63]. 
In order to maintain the system’s stability, the increased kinetic energy 1A  during the 
fault must be exhausted by the injected kinetic energy 2A  during the post-fault period 
before the power angle   reaches lim . The largest and most critical value of the power 
angle is clear  to ensure 1 2A A . Therefore, the protective devices have to take action to 
clear the faults before   reaches clear . This angle is called the critical clearing angle 
[62]-[64]. Accordingly, the system will be stable if the actual clearing angle clear  never 
exceeds crit , which is shown as follows:  
                                                         
clear crit                                                    (2.20) 
This equal area criterion provides us with a method to calculate the critical clearing 
angle crit , which can be used to determine whether the system will be stable. However, 
in practice, the power angle cannot be measured and controlled directly. It depends on 
the loading of the system and the characteristics of the fault [64]. Therefore, a more 
practical and feasible way to determine whether the system will be stable or not is to 
compare kinetic energy and potential energy by using the extended equal area criterion 
(EEAC) and the single machine equivalent (SIME), which are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively. EEAC and SIME are also used in the assessment 
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of online transient stability during cascading outages and in decisions regarding the 
correct time to implement the islanding scheme. 
In reality, transient instability is a critical issue in the power transfer between two 
weakly interconnected areas; however, this transient instability can also be improved to 
some extent. For example, in the UK power system, a large amount of power flow needs 
to be transferred to heavily loaded areas in England from Scotland, which is mostly 
produced by renewable energy because of the CO2 emission target set by the UK 
government. However, the Scotland network and the England/Wales network are 
weakly connected by two 400 kV DC along the west and east coasts. The conventional 
generators between both areas often oscillate with each other and even lose synchronism 
if the threshold value of the power transfer across the boundary is violated. A few 
means have been proposed to address the transient stability issue, such as decoupling 
the Scotland-England network using VSC-HVDC [65]. Alternatively, a series of 
braking resistors [66] could be used to improve the stability of low-inertia synchronous 
generators. Currently, series compensators are installed on each 400 kV transmission 
line, and a new HVDC transmission line is under construction to improve the power 
transfer from Scotland to England in order to manage the high penetration of renewable 
energy transfer. However, this could increase the vulnerability of the network to 
transient instability because of the connection to the low inertia of wind farms [67], 
resulting in the reduced inertia of the system. 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter describes the traditional security assessments of the power system and its 
online operation. Every planned outage for asset maintenance or system enhancement 
first has to be assessed offline during the planning stage before its handover to the 
control room in the real time phase. This offline assessment is based on the operation 
condition in which planned outages actually take place; moreover, the worst faults 
happen around these planned outages. This well-known assessment is called the N-1 
security criterion, and it is widely used in industrial practice. In fact, the UK applies the 
N-D security criterion, which takes into account a double circuit fault when assessing 
system security, making the system more secure. Pre/post thermal issue, voltage step 
change, transient stability and fault level will be assessed during offline DSA. The 
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outage planners have to make sure that the security issues in the planned outages under 
the worst fault scenario will not be violated. Otherwise, the system operators may lose 
money in buying generation in order to satisfy the N-1 system’s security criterion. 
When the offline DSA is complete, the assessment results will be delivered to the 
control room a day in advance. In the next 24 hours, the control room will reassess the 
planned outages in real time. Although the assessment is closer to real time, the results 
are more accurate, the operating condition may vary because of changes in system 
configuration, generation and demand forecast. Therefore, in real-time system operation, 
the condition of the system is monitored and DSA is conducted, such as in N-1 
contingency analysis. This N-1 contingency will be updated every few minutes.  
In addition, this chapter outlined the development of the direct method of assessing 
transient stability and highlighted the advantages of new online transient stability 
methods compared with conventional time-domain approach using numerical 
integration. Finally, EEAC and SIME used in direct methods are discussed. In this 
thesis, these are used to assess transient stability in order to decide when to island in the 
controlled islanding scheme. Transient instability has occurred in most blackouts across 
the world in recent decades, such as the US/Canada blackout (2003). The chapter also 
provides background information regarding transient stability, including the well-
known power swing equations, power-delta curve and equal area criterion, shows how 
this equal area criterion works under a fault scenario.  
Based on the fundamental principle of transient stability, the methodology of transient 
stability assessment EEAC and SIME are described in detail in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, 
respectively. These assessments are used in the online transient stability prediction to 
solve the when-to-island issue. EEAC and SIME will be used to extend the application 
of the equal area criterion from a simple single-machine infinite busbar system to a 
realistic multi-machine system.  
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Chapter 4:  
Review of Islanding Methods 
N-k contingency analysis is widely used in power systems because it is the industry 
standard in governing and assessing the operation of a network to allow it to keep 
operating when its components fail. Power systems are usually operated according to the 
N-1 security criteria with a sufficient security margin, which historically has proved to 
deliver a satisfactory level of reliability. In addition, an enormous number of 
conventional protection relays are designed to ensure that their own important 
equipment, such as generators, transmission lines and so on, is not damaged by faults and 
disturbances. However, because of the lack of coordination of protection in different 
interconnected areas and in maintaining widespread system stability, uncontrolled 
islanding occurs in most circumstances through tripping the tie line relays while 
simultaneously separating the system into unplanned out-of-control islands, thus leading 
to blackouts. In this situation, one strategy used to prevent blackout is the proposed 
preventive island scheme. In this scheme, a system is split into smaller islands so that the 
size of the blackout and its effects are minimized. An essential question concerns when 
an islanding scheme should be activated. Islanding too early would mean an 
unnecessarily heavy intervention, whereas waiting too long would mean that a blackout 
could happen. The other question concerns where to island. The proposed scheme aims 
to find boundaries to split the whole network and prevent the cascading contingencies 
from spreading into the remaining areas. In this chapter, we will review previous 
islanding methods regarding these two issues in the controlled islanding scheme. 
 
4.1 When to Island? 
In previous research regarding when to island, controlled islanding [6]-[8],[68] used the 
DT-based method as a strategy to split the network intentionally into pre-designed 
islands based on the characteristics of the predictive signals received to trigger the out-
of-step relays installed on the tie lines. In [7] the power angles of generators and rotor 
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velocities during severe disturbances were selected as predictors to train DT to determine 
whether the system is potentially unstable. In [68] the voltage phase angles, angular 
velocities and accelerations measured at critical high voltage busbars were chosen as 
predictors to train DT to decide when to island. In [8], the inputs of trained DT were 
measured in apparent resistances R and their rates of change Rdot. The output indicated 
the operating condition of the system. A combination of one-shot control actions would 
be triggered if the R-Rdot-based trained DT predicted that the blackouts were imminent. 
Before reviewing these DT-based methods, it is necessary to describe the DT method.  
4.1.1 Decision Tree Method 
The decision tree (DT) technique uses a small number of variables or predictors to 
classify the objective under the identified critical splitting rule (CSR) that could affect 
the objective more directly and efficiently [68]. In power systems, the application of DT 
describes the prediction model of the system stability problem through creating a 
database that consists of a huge number of cases. Each case is described by pre-
designated predictive signals the objectives of which are affected by these predictors. 
Figure 4.1 represents a DT structure with five internal nodes and six terminal nodes. 
Each internal node is usually divided into two successors. During the classification 
process, the CSR will be asked to identify the predictors and decide in which 
classification branch the successor should be placed. In Figure 4.1, the predictors are 
demonstrated by voltage phase angles and angular change velocities. For each terminal 
node that has no successors, a final classification will be obtained based on the majority 
of cases trained previously for the objective. For example, Figure 4.1 shows at the 
terminal node the final number of cases belonging to this classification. The black bar 
represents the percentages of the “stable” systems , and the grey bar represents the 
percentages of the “unstable” systems in this classification. 
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Figure 4.1: A decision tree with five internal nodes and six terminal nodes [68]. 
Thus, in power systems, DT is an effective, simply structured model that offers 
readability in conducting security assessments. The predication results can be obtained 
by comparing the predictors with the threshold of the CSR. Predictors such as voltage 
phase angles can also be read directly from the phase measurement unit (PMU) installed 
on buses. 
4.1.2 DT-based Controlled Islanding Scheme 
The process of training a DT not only determines the predictors affecting the objective 
in known cases but also predicts the objective in unknown cases. Therefore, in order to 
enhance the prediction ability and robustness and accuracy of DTs, several offline 
simulations are required, which enable the DT to be well trained based on simulation or 
historical data before performing the online application. Figure 4.2 shows the DT-based 
controlled islanding strategy. 
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Figure 4.2: DT-based controlled islanding strategy [7]. 
When the trained DT has been built from the current database at a given operating point, 
it has to be updated at certain time intervals to improve its prediction ability and adapt it 
to unknown and unforeseen cases [68]. The offline updated DT then can determine 
when to island by checking whether the predictive signals obtained from the online 
measurement of the wide-area PMU violate the threshold set in CSR. During the 
simulation process of training the DT, software, such as the Transient Security 
Assessment Tool has been used [7][68] to simulate issues in transient stability. 
Powerflow and Short-circuit Analysis have also been used [68] to help generate 
operating conditions. 
The flowchart in Figure 4.3 shows how the DT-based method works in [68] regarding 
when to island in the entire controlled islanding scheme:  
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Figure 4.3: Proposed DT-based controlled islanding scheme [68]. 
As shown in Figure 4.3, there are several stages in the DT-based controlled islanding 
scheme. In Stage A, several second contingencies under the N-1 credible operating 
condition are used to implement time-domain transient simulation and identify the 
critical contingency that may result in the loss of synchronism or cascading outages. In 
fact, because there are thousands of combinations of these contingencies, completing 
these simulations is time consuming. Moreover, some contingencies may have no effect 
to the system. Therefore, only contingencies in [68] that occurred on high voltage 
busbars and transmission lines will be selected for transient simulation. In Stage B, 
predictors will be selected to train the DTs. Because each of these critical contingencies 
leads to different instability problems, it is better to train one DT for each contingency 
in order to enhance accuracy and implement the controlled islanding scheme correctly. 
In Stage C, the final offline trained DTs are used in a real time operation, where a fault 
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detection that occurred in system will be checked to determine whether this contingency 
is on the critical contingency list. A correspondingly trained DT will be checked to 
determine whether the predictor signals received from PMU violate the threshold of 
CSR in this DT. If an unstable assessment is obtained from the output of the DT, then it 
will trigger the pre-designated out-of-step relays to separate the network into the pre-
designed islands. In next three stages—D, E and F—a series of control actions will be 
undertaken to maintain the frequency and voltage stability in each island. After the 
disturbance effect is diminished or disappeared, the tripped transmission lines will 
reconnect the whole system based on the restoration procedure. 
4.1.3 DT building procedure 
In order to build the DT in a certain system, N-k contingency analysis used to build a 
database. The following four-step procedure is used to build a DT:  
1. Implement an N-1 contingency analysis scan to check if the chosen system model 
satisfies the N-1 security criterion. 
 The first contingencies are set to be faults on each bus, and the faulted 
lines are tripped by protection in order to remove the fault. 
 Use the simulation results to check if any N-1 contingency cases will 
cause an out-of-step power swing.  
2. Implement N-2 contingency analysis at the high voltage buses and find the second 
problematic contingency that will lead to out-of-step power swings in the system. Then 
add the critical contingencies to the list. 
 There will be an enormous number of combinations of these two 
contingencies. In practice, it is quite difficult to execute all these cases for 
transient simulations; consequently, this will increase the computation burden. 
Therefore, only high voltage lines are chosen for N-2 contingency analysis 
because they carry higher power flow, and its loss may lead to a critical and 
serious impact on the power system. 
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 In real power systems, the simultaneous occurrence of two line 
contingencies is very rare under the N-1 operating condition. Normally, these 
contingencies happen incrementally. Therefore, the N-2 line contingency is set 
accordingly. First, the first line with a fault is tripped before the time-domain 
simulation. The power flow is then re-dispatched to represent a new operating 
condition. Next, another fault is added on the second line, which should be 
tripped after three cycles. Finally, the time-domain simulation is conducted to 
check whether the system is stable after the two line contingencies. 
3. A database could be built based on the simulation results of all listed critical 
contingencies occurring in different cases, including different operating conditions, 
different sequences of occurrence of two contingency lines, different fault locations on 
lines and so forth.  
 In order to obtain DTs that are correct and robust, a large number of simulation 
cases are required following the critical contingencies. 
 The operating conditions should be provided by the system operators to 
represent the lowest and highest load levels during each month. In addition, the 
provided load levels should be changed within +/- 10% of the original value to 
obtain more operating conditions without changing the network’s topology and 
component status. Therefore, different power flows in the system could be obtained 
based on these operating conditions, which represent a system in different steady 
states.  
 Based on the results (“secure” or “insecure”) obtained from the time-domain 
simulation, the post-contingency phase angles are collected in six-cycle-time after the 
line contingency. Angular velocity and angular acceleration are calculated and recorded 
as predictors in order to build the database.  
4. Find the CSRs from the database form and obtained DT. 
 Each predictor chosen could potential become one CSR. Many CSRs could have 
the same performance in predicting the out-of-step power swings occurring in the 
network. 
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 There will be a large number of predictors because there are six predictive signals 
on each high voltage bus, including voltage phase angle, phase angular speed, phase 
angular acceleration, voltage magnitude, magnitude change velocity and magnitude 
change acceleration.  
4.1.4 Case study of building a DT in a 14-busbar system 
 
Figure 4.4: IEEE 14-busbar system [69]. 
In this case study of offline DT training, an IEEE 14-busbar system (Figure 4.4) is built 
using the MATLAB-based Power System Assessment Tool (PSAT). Finally, the cases 
of N-3 critical contingencies that lead to out-of-step power swings after running the 
time-domain simulation are identified. The data collection is then initiated. Further 
transient cases should be implemented in order to train DT correctly and robustly. This 
could be obtained through changing the sequences of the line contingencies, creating 
more operating conditions by changing the load levels at the +/- 10% range of their 
original values without changing the network topology. Possible predictors in the 14-
busbar system are the voltage phase angle, voltage magnitude change velocity and 
acceleration at each high voltage bus, which are shown in Table 4.1: 
GENERATORS 
 
SYNCHRONOUS  
COMPENSATORS 
 
Gen. 1 
Gen. 2 
Gen. 3 
Gen. 4 
Gen. 5 
62 
 
Table 4.1: Database created in 14-busbar system for building DT. 
Stable (S) or 
Unstable (U) 
U (Line 1-
2,1-5,2-3) 
S (Line 1-
2,2-3,1-5) 
S (Line 2-
3,1-5,1-2) 
U(Line 2-
3,2-4,4-5) 
S (Line 2-
3,4-5,2-4) 
U (Line 2-
4,4-5,2-3) 
Bus1-Angle 1 1.7223 0.25951 0.30463 9.3459 11.112 10.456 
Bus1-Angle 2 2.0935 0.78217 0.83710 12.883 13.472 12.651 
Bus1-Angle 3 2.2304 1.6870 1.7647 17.946 19.019 17.451 
Bus1-V1 3.7115 5.2266 5.3247 35.370 23.601 21.951 
Bus1-V2 1.3693 9.0484 9.2757 50.636 55.465 48.004 
Bus1-a0 -23.442 38.218 39.510 152.65 318.64 260.53 
Bus2-Angle 1 -96.958 -14.609 -17.150 8.2742 10.803 9.6135 
Bus2-Angle 2 -117.85 -44.033 -47.125 11.578 12.146 10.978 
Bus2-Angle 3 -125.56 -94.971 -99.344 16.562 17.528 15.563 
Bus2-V1 -208.94 -294.23 -299.76 33.033 13.427 13.646 
Bus2-V2 -77.089 -509.39 -522.18 49.845 53.825 45.845 
Bus2-a0 1318.5 -2151.5 -2224.3 168.12 403.98 322.00 
Bus3-Angle 1 -126.29 -27.517 -37.340 -46.344 -47.266 -36.174 
Bus3-Angle 2 -152.74 -53.434 -58.772 -68.719 -69.999 -59.384 
Bus3-Angle 3 -169.44 -101.43 -104.32 -91.069 -102.06 -88.812 
Bus3-V1 -264.46 -259.18 -214.32 -223.76 -227.33 -232.10 
Bus3-V2 166.97 -479.97 -455.50 -223.50 -320.64 -294.28 
Bus3-a0 4314.3 -2207.9 -2411.7 2.6120 -933.09 -621.79 
Bus4-Angle 1 -115.52 -21.654 -28.145 -41.502 -43.053 -35.907 
Bus4-Angle 2 -137.17 -50.208 -54.165 -61.041 -63.021 -54.280 
Bus4-Angle 3 -148.75 -100.22 -103.67 -80.734 -91.578 -78.784 
Bus4-V1 -216.49 -286.29 -260.20 -195.39 -199.69 -183.73 
Bus4-V2 -115.80 -500.10 -495.04 -196.93 -285.57 -245.04 
Bus4-a0 1006.9 -2138.1 -2348.4 -15.438 -858.82 -613.12 
Bus5-Angle 1 -113.78 -20.611 -26.727 2.1148 3.0852 2.4102 
Bus5-Angle 2 -134.97 -49.474  -53.275 3.5694 4.0247 3.4101 
Bus5-Angle 3 -145.97 -99.684 -103.20 8.3016 9.8201 7.8399 
Bus5-V1 -211.87 -288.63 -265.49 14.545 9.3954 9.9991 
Bus5-V2 -110.04 -502.09 -499.24 47.322 57.954 44.298 
Bus5-a0 1018.3 -2134.6 -2337.6 327.77 485.58 342.99 
 
Assume that line contingencies occur on high-voltage buses. In the six cases, three cases 
result in unstable systems, which are shown in the simple database provided in Table 
4.1. After the comparison and analysis of these data, the results shown that a few 
predictors were able to be CSRs. Simply, in this case, a single CSR is enough to predict 
the system results (“stable” or “unstable”). These include Bus3-V2>-320, Bus3-a0>-930, 
Bus4-V2>-280 and Bus4-a0>-850. For instance, the first CSR is used to build the DT 
shown in Figure 4.5: 
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Figure 4.5: Decision Tree for 14-busbar system. 
When the DT is built, the question regarding when to island can be decided if the CSR 
is violated. However, this trained DT mainly considers the loss of synchronism in the 
generators. Because we know that cascading outage is the main reason for blackouts, 
the offline trained DT could be adapted online during cascading outages. When the 
critical line is tripped, the DT could identify the point of no return in the system 
network and indicate whether the islanding scheme should be tripped before it is too late. 
However, this method can only be applied to particular systems in which the DT is 
trained based on the simulation data coming from this system. In addition, the DT has to 
be trained offline periodically because of the change in network topology in order to 
improve the robustness of DT. 
4.1.5 Cascading propagation research 
Because of the cascading outage, the case of the US/Canada blackout in 2003 was a 
typical blackout that resulted in the tripping of hundreds of transmission lines and 
generators during cascading outages before the blackout occurred. Therefore, one 
question is raised, which concerns whether the extent of this cascading propagation in 
real time could be estimated correctly. This cascading propagation may die out or lead 
to blackouts. If this information could be obtained, it would be very helpful in deciding 
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if and when the controlled islanding scheme should be implemented. In fact, this 
estimation research method was previously proposed [9][70][71] as a statistical 
estimator to measure the extent of propagation in cascading failures. In [70] a 
mathematical model of branching processes was developed to represent the behaviours 
of cascading failures. The parameter *  stands for the measured cascading propagation 
factor, which helps to analyse the likelihood of cascading blackouts. It was adapted into 
the branching processed model by using prior data on simulated blackouts. A 
probability density function of blackout size could then be generated from the model as 
well as the estimator. The estimator also represents the cascading rate of generators and 
transmission lines during cascade failures. The meaning of *  is explained in Figure 4.6: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Failures produced at stages modelled by branching processes [71]. 
During the cascading process, each failure has an independent, random number of 
offspring; *  is used to represent the ratio of total number of child failures in the current 
stage over the total number of parent failures in a previous stage. Therefore, *  could 
determine the extent of the failure propagation. If * <1, cascading failures would disappear; 
If * >1, cascading failures would proceed to system size. This mathematically obtained 
signal could also be a precursor to possible imminent blackouts in the controlled 
islanding scheme.  
The details of modelling and computation of this cascading propagation processes are 
described in [9][70][71]. The difference is the modelling of the chosen cascading 
failures, because not all elements that the affect power grid are included in each model. 
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Each model then predicts the behaviour of power system in cascading failures. The 
elements considered in each model are shown in Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2: Model details in cascading simulation [71] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using probability theory, this mathematical method is based on data on previous 
blackouts, which are used to decide if the cascading failures will propagate. However, it 
is still risky in real-time operation and may lead to false dismissals or false alarms. 
  
4.2 Where to Island? 
The issue regarding where to island has been widely investigated. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, several methods have been applied to answer this question, such as the 
ordered binary decision diagram (OBDD) method, the spectral partitioning method and 
the slow coherency method. These three islanding methods are explained in the 
following subsections. 
4.2.1 OBDD methods 
OBDD methods provide a splitting technique on a node-weighted graph model to decide 
proper islanding points (or which lines should be tripped) to form the separated islands. 
These islands satisfy the acceptable steady-state operating points after islanding, such as 
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generation/load balance and transmission line thermal limits. However, no transient 
dynamics exist after the system is split. In addition, this method could become a NP-
hard issue in a large and complex system network. In [17], a two-phase method based 
on OBDD was proposed. It aimed to narrow all feasible islanding solutions. In the first 
phase, the power system network was transformed to a node-weighted graph model, 
which ignored all irrelevant power system information but kept the network topology 
and generators or loads. The islanding solution then was obtained by using a highly 
efficient OBDD-based algorithm to satisfy the power balance and synchronization 
constraint in the formed islands. In the second phase, a power flow analysis was 
conducted in the formed islands to determine whether they satisfied the transmission 
capacity constraints and to exclude islanding solutions that violated the constraints. 
However, based on this method, the formed islands could not reach the expected steady-
state operating point without considering the dynamic period during islanding. In [16], 
another OBDD method was proposed, which adopted method in [17] to develop a three-
phase based method. Compared with [17], the difference in [16] is that the proposed 
method simplified the original complex network to achieve a more manageable network, 
which could accelerate the searching process and reduce the search range for the second 
and third phase to continue discarding a greater number of islanding solutions that 
obtained in the first phase. The result of the first phase was remarkable and efficient, 
especially in a large power system network. The remaining two phases were the same as 
described in [17], which are based on the three constraints of synchronisation constraint, 
power balance and transmission thermal limit.  
In [18], the OBDD-based method was further developed in an islanding application by 
considering the transient stability constraint between the steady-state operating 
conditions. The islands formed in [16][17] were only assumed to exist. In order to 
assess the transient stability during islanding, threshold value constraint (TVC) was 
introduced to restrict the degree of transient instability caused by islanding because 
islanding itself is a disturbance in the system. This TVC is set up offline based on the 
analysis of the power flow disruption in all feasible islanding solutions obtained in 
[16][17]. It excluded transiently unstable islands with power flow disruption above TVC.  
In other words, transient stability assessment using the OBDD-based method is based 
on power flow disruption. It is chosen based on two general principles. One is that 
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different obtained islanding strategies could result in different power flow disruptions. 
The other one is that the power system’s robustness could withstand small disturbances 
and maintain transient stability in the formed islands. However, the drawback of this 
approach is that the TVC selected offline can only be trained and used in a particular 
system rather than a general tool for every power system. In addition, it has to be 
updated according to changes in the power system network. In order to increase its 
efficiency and practicality in searching for islanding strategies, in [72] more aspects of 
the OBDD-based controlled islanding method were considered to affect the islanding 
solution and more techniques were involved. First, grid loss was taken into account to 
modify the method by using the zero-weight-sum graph model. The network 
partitioning and parallel processing were then introduced to search for feasible islanding 
solutions in all subnetworks. Finally, TVC was also adopted in this modified OBDD-
based method.  
4.2.2 Spectral partitioning methods 
In [19]-[23], graph theory-based spectral partitioning was also applied to the power 
system islanding issue. In [19], spectral graph theory was used to identify transmission 
lines that result in the formation of islands, which could also deal with cascading 
outages. Compared with other methods, spectral graph theory requires only computation. 
In addition, it can be applied in a large-scale power system network. Spectral graph 
theory allows the deduction of the structure of a graph from its graph spectrum. The 
spectrum of a graph is a set of eigenvalues that are associated with a number of matrices 
to represent the graph. The spectrum of different matrices contain information about the 
power system regarding connectivity, sizing and the degree of nodes. In [19], a 
separator was computed from the eigenvector components to employ global information 
about the graph. A partitioning could be executed by consecutively obtaining the bi-
sectioning of a graph. In [21], a two-stage islanding method based on spectral graph 
theory was proposed. The first stage aimed to find sub-networks offline based on 
spectral graph theory. Spectral graph partitioning was used to identify the set of edges 
that divided the graph into two or more pieces. The graph was broken up by the 
constraints based on the number of edges and weights. In the second stage, frequency-
load control actions were adopted to maintain stable operating condition in each island 
by using under-frequency load shedding (UFLS). Whenever the frequency in the formed 
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islanding was below a pre-determined threshold value and maintained for a while, then 
UFLS was activated to bring the system back above the threshold value. In [22][23], a 
two-step spectral clustering islanding method was proposed based on graph partition. 
However, there were more dynamic assessment elements in this method because power 
flow disruption and generator coherency were included to modify graph weights, which 
narrowed down the subspace solution. Spectral clustering was then applied to find the 
islanding solution. The first step aimed to determine the coherency generator group. It 
constructed a dynamic graph with generator nodes. Normalized spectral clustering was 
then applied to this graph to cluster the generator nodes based on their dynamic 
coupling. Instead of identifying the coherency generators, the key challenge in this 
method was to combine and satisfy the constraints to enforce the coherent generator 
groups during islanding by using k-medoids in clustering the generator nodes. In the 
second step, minimum power flow disruption was used as the objective function to split 
the network while the coherent generator groups were preserved. This was done by first 
constructing a static graph of all nodes. Based on this two-step islanding algorithm, an 
optimal solution to islanding was obtained. 
4.2.3 Slow coherency methods 
Among these three methods, slow coherency [73]-[76] is commonly used and widely 
studied. The method is used to identify the coherent generator groups in the power 
system. The splitting boundary can then be obtained based on areas where the coherent 
generator groups are located. The coherent generators can be identified as follows: 
observation of the generator angle, phase angle measurement and model analysis. In 
particular, modal analysis is used in slow coherency research. The advantage of modal 
analysis is that the calculation results of the eigenvalue analysis can be speedily 
obtained. However, it can only be applied to a small disturbance in a certain power 
system operating condition, not to various disturbances under different load conditions. 
When the coherency generator groups are identified, the next step is to search for 
optimized cutsets to split the whole system network into several islands based on the 
obtained coherent generator groups. Therefore, the second step involved in the slow 
coherency method is an optimization problem. The objectives of determining optimized 
the islanding cutsets could be either the minimal generation-load imbalance or the 
minimal generation-load disruption. Thus, the slow coherency-based controlled 
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islanding scheme, which is used to decide where to island in the procedure, is described 
as follows: 
 Step 1: Identification of coherency generator groups using modal analysis 
 Step 2: Identification of splitting boundary in coherency generator areas using 
graph theory, such as the K-means technique, K-way partitioning and minimal 
cut set with minimum net flow 
Slow coherency is based on the observation of the oscillations in large-scale power 
systems. Oscillation in power systems can be classified into two categories. One is the 
local mode with frequencies ranging between 1 Hz and 3 Hz. The other one is the inter-
area mode with frequencies less than 1 Hz. When fast local dynamics under a 
disturbance finish decaying, the generators in the same area swing together again with 
those in the other area, so they are coherent with respect to the slow modes. Slow 
coherency can group generators based on their participation in the selected inter-area 
modes of oscillation. In [76], the dynamic reduction program (DYNRED) in the Power 
System Analysis Package (PSAPAC) was used to determine the slow-coherency groups 
of generators based on eigenvalue analysis. Therefore, this method is based on model 
analysis. However, there are two assumptions in using the slow coherency method, 
which are explained as follows: 
 The slow coherency method is used to determine whether coherent groups of 
generators are based on a linearized model of the system network. Therefore, the 
formed coherent generators are independent of the fault location and disturbance 
severity.  
 The coherency groups of generators are obtained based on classical generator 
modelling. 
Therefore, the dynamic characteristics in the power system, especially during cascading 
outages, may not be considered in the islanding scheme.  
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4.3 Summary 
This chapter reviews the previous research on the controlled islanding scheme regarding 
when to island and where to island. However, no previous research has conducted a 
dynamic analysis after islanding in each island. Regarding when to island, DT has been 
used in controlled islanding scheme to solve this issue. The DT technique is a 
computing tool that can be applied in every field. In power systems, DT is trained 
offline to build a database according to the requirements of a specific power system. 
The aim is to find all system collapse scenarios and then collect information from these 
blackout scenarios in order to find a rule that indicates cases that may happen again in 
the future. When the same case happens again in the real system, the DT matches it in 
the built database and compares the required data with the rule identified in training the 
DT in order to tell the system operator whether the system will lead to blackouts. 
However, the DT technique is time consuming offline because it requires a large 
number of offline simulations and computations under different operating condition and 
different disturbances, including different contingencies, contingency orders, 
combinations and contingency locations. In addition, it is trained for a specific system 
and can only be applied in that system. In a real power system, this DT might have to be 
updated every time the system configuration changes because the distribution 
generation penetrates the system. In addition to the DT method, the cascading 
propagation research was also reviewed to determine whether cascading outage could 
spread using probability analysis based on historical data, which is used to build the 
model. However, in real power systems, probability analysis is still quite risky in online 
application. 
Regarding where to island, three different methods were reviewed according to their 
application to the controlled islanding scheme, including OBDD, spectral partitioning 
and slow coherency. These three methods yielded insight into the criteria that should be 
used to split the whole network. These criteria or constraints could be generator 
synchronism, transmission thermal capacity or the power balance in the formed islands. 
However, based on these constraints, a larger system usually is split into many pieces. 
Some pieces may not need to be isolated from the others. In a real power system, if 
faults or cascading outages happen, normally the sick area is isolated in order to prevent 
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the cascading outages from spreading to the healthy area. In addition, when used to find 
islanding strategies, these methods only consider the static system model before and 
after contingencies or a small-signal system model. This might lead to an invalid 
islanding solution if a severe disturbance happens, such as cascading outages. Based on 
the insights provided by the previous research regarding when to island and where to 
island, this thesis aims to use novel methods to improve and enhance the feasibility of 
the controlled islanding scheme. In the three-stage controlled islanding scheme 
proposed in this thesis, power flow tracing will be adopted to solve the issue of where to 
island, and SIME will be used to solve the issue of when to island in transient stability 
and assess whether the formed islands are transiently stable after islanding. The 
following chapters will discuss these aspects in detail.  
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Chapter 5:  
Power Flow Tracing 
Since the formation of the decentralized electricity market, generation, transmission and 
energy suppliers have been unbundled by suppliers, who run their own businesses in 
transporting electricity from generators to area suppliers. However, in this vertically 
integrated system, there is little incentive for each electricity sector to reduce the power 
losses in the network. Consequently, the cost of these losses is charged to the end users. 
Under these circumstances, a power flow tracing algorithm [77]-[81] was originally 
designed as an economic tool and used to charge energy suppliers and generators for 
their own contribution to the losses. For instance, if a power plant were built in a remote 
location, there would be large number of losses on the transmission path to the network 
because of the distance. Power flow tracing is proposed as an approach to clarify the 
contribution of losses to each electricity sector and motivate all parties to perform 
efficiently or be penalized. Power flow tracing was developed in [28][29]. It aims to 
trace the flow of electricity in the power system from the generators to all loads in order 
to determine the amount of power produced by each generator to each load. In this 
chapter, we will review the power flow tracing method, which is used in the three-stage 
controlled islanding scheme to decide where to island. It is also applied in the controlled 
islanding scheme proposed in this thesis. In this application, it mainly attempts to find 
the boundary around the source of the disturbance, which is weakly connected between 
the sick and healthy islands. Only the sick part of network is cut out, leaving the 
remaining healthy network running.  
 
5.1 Proportional Sharing Principle  
The main principle used in the power flow tracing method is proportional sharing in a 
meshed network to determine how the power flow is distributed. It is based on the fact 
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that the outflows from a bus share the same proportional inflows to that bus. The only 
requirement for the input data is that the solution of Kirchhoff’s current law must be 
satisfied for all the nodes in the network. Kirchhoff’s voltage law is taken into account 
because the power flows are taken from the state estimator, or they are calculated using 
a power flow algorithm. Figure 5.1 provides an example of how this proportional 
sharing principle works. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Proportional sharing principle. 
In Figure 5.1, there are two inflows from A and B, and there are two outflows to C and 
D. The total inflow going to the node from A and B combined is 100 MW (30 MW + 70 
MW). In the inflows coming to the bus, 30% of 100 MW comes from A and 70% of 
100 MW comes from B, based on the assumption that each MW leaving the node to the 
outflow contains the same proportion of the inflows from the total flow into that node. 
Therefore, the 60 MW outflow going to D consists of 18 MW (60 MW x 30%) supplied 
from A and 42 MW (60 MW x 70%) supplied from B. Similarly, the 40 MW outflow 
going to C consists of 12 MW (40 MW x 30%) supplied from A and 28 MW (40 MW x 
70%). Based on this basic proportional sharing principle, we can determine exactly how 
much power inflow is distributed into the outflows. However, this proportional sharing 
principle can neither be proved nor disproved although it can be rationalised [78]-[81]. 
The algorithm for power flow tracing can be divided into two categories: the 
downstream-looking algorithm, which looks at the nodal balance from the point of view 
of the outflow; the upstream-looking algorithm, which looks at nodal balance from the 
point of view of inflow. In the following section, these two algorithms will be explained 
based on a lossless network in terms of real power flow. 
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5.2 Tracing Methodology 
5.2.1 Upstream-looking algorithm 
The total inflow power iP  going through node i can be expressed as follows [78]: 
                                 
( )u
i
i i j Gi
j
P P P



   ; i =1, 2, … , n                             (5.1) 
where 
( )u
i
 is the set of nodes supplied directly from node i  via the relevant lines; i jP  is 
the line inflow into node i  in line i j ; and GiP is the generation at node i . Because we 
ignore power losses, i j j iP P   can be obtained. Therefore, the line power flow in line 
i j  can be related to nodal flow at node j  by substituting i j ji jP c P  . Equation (5.1) 
can be derived as 
                                         
( )u
i
i ji j Gi
j
P c P P

                                                (5.2) 
Where, /ji j i jc P P . If we rearrange (5.2), then we have  
                                  
( )u
i
i ji j Gi
j
P c P P

     or  u GA P P                             (5.3) 
where Au is the (n x n) upstream distribution matrix; P is the vector of nodal through-
flows; and PG is the vector of nodal generations. The element (i, j) in matrix Au can be 
shown as  
                   
( )
1
/
0
u
u ji j i i iij
for i j
A c P P for j
otherwise

 

    


                     (5.4) 
Au is sparse and nonsymmetric. If 
1
uA
  exists, then 1u GP A P
  and its i th element is 
shown as  
                                 
1
1
[ ] 1,2,...,
n
i u ik Gk
k
P A P for i n

                    (5.5) 
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Equation (5.5) shows the power flow contribution from the kth system generator to the 
ith nodal power; Pi consists of two parts, one is load demand LiP  on node i and the other 
is the outflows in the lines leaving node i. Therefore, the pure line outflow in line i l  
from node i can be calculated based on the proportional sharing principle as follows: 
1 ( )
,
1 1
[ ]
n n
i l i l G d
i l i u ik Gk i l k Gk i
k ki i
P P
P P A P D P for all l
P P
   
 
      (5.6) 
where 
1
, [ ] /
G
i l k i l u ik iD P A P

   and 
( )d
i  is the set of nodes supplied directly from node i. 
Similarly, the load demand LiP  can be calculated from Pi in (5.5) as 
                     
1
1
[ ] 1,2,...,
n
Li Li
Li i u ik Gk
ki i
P P
P P A P for i n
P P


                   (5.7) 
Equation (5.7) shows the power flow contribution from the kth generator to the ith load 
demand. It can be used to trace the origin of the power flow of a specific load.  
5.2.2 Downstream-looking algorithm 
The mathematical modelling of the downstream-looking algorithm is similar to 
upstream-looking algorithm. The only difference is that the downstream-looking 
algorithm considers outflow on the nodal power, which includes load demand instead of 
generation, as in the upstream-looking algorithm. In the downstream-looking algorithm, 
the sum of outflows iP  on a node can be expressed as 
                             
( ) ( )d d
i i
i i l Li li l Li
l l
P P P c P P
 

 
     ;   i = 1, 2, …, n              (5.8)  
where 
( )d
i  is the set of nodes supplied directly from node i via relevant lines, and 
/li l i lc P P . Equation (5.8) can also be rewritten in terms of load demand as 
                           
( )u
i
i li l Li
l
P c P P

     or   d LA P P                                 (5.9) 
where Ad is the (n x n) downstream distribution matrix, and PL is the vector of nodal 
demand. The (i, l) element in Ad can be shown as 
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where Ad  is like Au and is also sparse and nonsymmetric. However, adding Ad and Au 
gives a symmetric matrix. If 1dA
  exists, then 1d LP A P
  and its ith element can be 
shown as 
                               
1
1
[ ] 1,2,...,
n
i d ik Lk
k
P A P for i n

                           (5.11) 
Equation (5.11) shows how nodal power is distributed among the loads in the system. 
The nodal power here contains a generation at node i and all the inflows in lines going 
to node i . Therefore, the inflow into node i on line i-j can be expressed as 
   
1 ( )
,
1 1
[ ]
n n
i j i j L u
i j i d ik Lk i j k Lk i
k ki i
P P
P P A P D P for all j
P P

  
 
 
      (5.12) 
where 1, [ ] /
L
i j k i j d ik lD P A P

  . Similarly, the output of the ith generator used to supply k 
th load demand can be expressed as (5.13), which can be used to determine the direction 
of the power from a particular generator:  
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Gi Gi
Gi i d ik Lk
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P P A P for i n
P P


         (5.13)   
By comparing (5.7) and (5.13), a simple relationship between 1dA
  and 1uA
  can be 
obtained through the ratio of the two equations: 
                                                      
1
1
[ ]
[ ]
u ik i
d ki k
A P
A P


                                                   (5.14) 
In a lossless network, it is enough to trace power flow among generation, load demand 
and transmission lines and to determine how the power flow comes and goes by using 
either 1dA
  or 1uA
 . Next, we will demonstrate this downstream-looking algorithm in the 
simple system shown in Figure 5.2: 
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Figure 5.2: Tracing example in a 6-busbar network [29]. 
Based on this six-bus network, (5.9) can be formed as: 
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 20 / 55 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 25 / 25 15 / 30 0 15 / 20 0
0 0 1 5 / 30 10 / 25 0 10
0 0 0 1 15 / 25 0 15
0 0 0 0 1 5 / 20 20
0 0 0 0 0 1 20
P
P
P
P
P
P
     
      
    
     
    
     
    
    
     
   
Based on the above downstream distribution matrix on the left of the equation, it is easy 
to obtain the inversed tracing matrix 1dA
  as follows: 
1
1 0.3636 0.3636 0.2424 0.2909 0.3455
0 1 1 0.6667 0.8 0.95
0 0 1 0.1667 0.5 0.125
0 0 0 1 0.6 0.15
0 0 0 0 1 0.25
0 0 0 0 0 1
dA

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
When the tracing matrix 1dA
  is obtained, then based on (5.13), we can determine how 
much power is produced by the generator to contribute to the load demand. For example, 
the generation with 20 on node 1 contributes to load demand on node 3 with 3.636 (10 x 
0.3636), on node 4 with 3.636 (15 x 0.2424), on node 5 with 5.818 (20 x 0.2909) and on 
node 6 with 6.91 (20 x 0.3455). The total amount on these nodes supplied by the 
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generator on node 1 is equal to the generation on node 1, which is 20 
(3.636+3.636+5.818+6.91).  
 
5.3 Application of Tracing in Controlled Islanding 
This controlled islanding scheme is aimed to find the affected area boundaries that 
contain the disturbance, cut out the sick network and leave the remaining network  
running, which is demonstrated in Figure 5.3 [77]. In the tracing method, the source of 
disturbance is called the seed node. The disturbance in the network could be a line 
outage in cascading blackouts. Therefore, the seed node in this case consists of both 
nodes connecting the beginning and terminating point of that contingency line. The 
tracing method starts tracing power flow at the seed node. It tries to find weakly 
connected lines around the seed node where the power flow is relatively low. In other 
words, a relatively low power flow means a small contribution in terms of power flow 
between those two nodes. In the tracing method, the level of contribution is called the 
threshold value flow. If its contribution is less than the chosen threshold value, it is 
weakly connected. Hence, the tracing method provides an approach to reducing the 
scope of search for the islanding boundary by identifying the weakly connected lines 
around the seed node. Suitable measures, such as minimal power flow disruption or 
minimal power imbalance, will then be used to choose the best islanding strategy to use 
in deciding where to island.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Tracing method application in controlled islanding [77] 
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In addition, in order to identify easily the weakly connected lines in tracing matrix 1
dA
 , 
the unified p.u. value is required. For example, in the tracing matrix obtained in the 6-
busbar system shown in Figure 5.4, the base value of each column j in tracing matrix 
1
dA
  is their nodal power jP  on node j. Therefore, we need to convert all p.u values 
based on the same base value. We choose 100 MW as the base value in the new p.u 
value system. The new converted tracing matrix 
dT  then can be done by first 
multiplying its nodal power jP  in 
1
dA
  and then dividing it by the new base value of 100 
MW. Therefore, the tracing matrix 
dT  using the single unified base value is shown as 
follows:  
0.2 0.2 0.0909 0.0727 0.0727 0.0691
0 0.55 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.19
0 0 0.25 0.05 0.125 0.025
0 0 0 0.3 0.15 0.03
0 0 0 0 0.25 0.05
0 0 0 0 0 0.2
dT
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This new tracing matrix dT  will be used to find the islanding boundaries that form the 
islands. The objective is to let the strongly connected lines around the seed node stay in 
the sick island and then continue this iteration process from the identified adjacent 
strongly connected nodes as a new seed node until the weakly connected lines are found. 
These will be considered the boundaries that form the controlled islanding cutsets. The 
criterion used to decide if the connection is weak or strong is the threshold value. Next, 
we demonstrate the procedure of applying the tracing algorithm using the six-busbar 
system as the example. Figure 5.4 shows the tracing matrix in the first iteration of the 
tracing algorithm. 
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Figure 5.4: Tracing method in first iteration based on seed node 5 [29] 
 Choose a seed node. In this case, it is node 5, which is shown in red in Figure 5.4. 
 Set a threshold value of 0.2 p.u., which is arbitrary. 
 Start from node 5 to downstream. Downstream trace the value equal to or larger than 
0.2 p.u. in the tracing matrix by examining row 5 and column 5. 
 One identified element of 0.2 is located in row 2 and column 5 and shown in green, 
which means that node 2 is strongly connected with node 5. Therefore, node 5 and 
node 2 should stay together in the formed islanding cut set. 
 After the first iteration of the tracing algorithm, node 2 was found as the new seed 
node. It is shown in red in Figure 5.5.  
 Start from node 2 to search for a value equal or larger than 0.2 p.u. in row 2 and 
column 2. Four elements in green and blue are provided in Figure 5.5. 
 After the second iteration of the tracing algorithm, nodes 1, 3, 4, 5 were found to be 
strongly connected with node 2. The five nodes should stay in the sick island, leaving 
node 6 in the healthy sub-network. 
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Figure 5.5: Tracing method in second iteration based on newly identified seed node 2 
[29]. 
This simple 6-busbar system was used to demonstrate how the tracing method works in 
the application for islanding purposes. The iteration process in the tracing method 
should continue until no more nodes connect to the seed node, and the tracing matrix 
element is above the threshold value. Figure 5.6 illustrates the process of the tracing 
matrix algorithms which is applied in the 6-busbar system. In [25][26], it was shown 
that smaller threshold values increased the size of the sick island, while larger threshold 
values decreased the size of the sick island. Therefore, the tracing method highly 
depends on the selected threshold value, and different threshold values will provide 
different islanding cutsets. The selection of threshold values can be decided by the 
introduction of optimization objective for islanding scheme, which will be detailed in 
next section in this Chapter.  
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Figure 5.6: The process of the tracing matrix algorithms which is applied in the 6-
busbar system. 
Next, the IEEE 39-busbar system shown in Figure 5.7 is used to demonstrate the 
formation of useful islands. Power flow tracing starts from the seed node in bus 26, and 
a small threshold value is selected as 0.8 p.u. The tracing method continues the iteration 
procedure until all elements in the tracing matrix with updated seed nodes are smaller 
than 0.8 p.u.. Figure 5.7 shows that the identified sick island in green larger than the 
remaining healthy island. Because the green nodes in Figure 5.7 are strongly connected, 
they have to stay in the sick island to prevent the disturbance from spreading from seed 
node 26. This demonstrates that the smaller threshold value will isolate sick islands that 
are larger.  
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Figure 5.7: Tracing example in 39-busbar system with seed node on bus 26 and with 
threshold value of 0.8 p.u. [29] 
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Figure 5.8: Tracing example in 39-busbar system with seed node on bus 26 and with 
threshold value of 1.6 p.u. [29] 
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We then chose a different threshold value of 1.6 p.u. in the 39-busbar system. The 
tracing method started at the same seed node as in bus 26. In Figure 5.8, the tracing 
results show that the sick island in blue is quite small and has a selected bigger 
threshold value. Therefore, another important issue concerns how we select the 
threshold value to obtain the best islanding solution. In order to deal with this issue, 
optimization in terms of power flow interruption, power flow imbalance and voltage 
stress are included in this tracing method for the purpose of islanding.  
 
5.4 Optimization Objective for Islanding Scheme 
In the online application of the controlled islanding scheme, the optimal solution based 
on the tracing method has to be provided for the use of the system operator. Therefore, 
the optimization objectives need to be introduced in islanding scheme in order to decide 
the best islanding strategy. 
In order to choose the best islanding solutions by using the tracing method, three 
optimization objectives have to be achieved: minimise power flow disruption and 
minimise power imbalance. 
5.4.1 Minimal power flow disruption 
In [23][82], minimal power flow disruption was used to find the best islanding solution 
based on the slow coherency method. This could be also used in the tracing method as 
an objective function to identify the best islanding strategies. This objective function 
can be expressed as follows: 
                                       1 _min ( )tripped lineF P                                     (5.15) 
The objective function (Eq. 5.15) aims to minimize the power flow in the tripped lines 
that connect to the formed islands. To some extent, this objective could reduce the 
possible loss of transient stability in the formed island while splitting the entire network 
because islanding is already a huge disturbance. We have to prevent this disturbance 
from deteriorating the operating conditions.  
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5.4.2 Minimal power imbalance 
The other objective function is to minimize the power imbalance in the formed islands, 
which can be expressed as follows in [23][82]:  
                              2min max i jI Ii
j
F P                                    (5.16) 
where iI  and jI  represent ith and jth formed islands; i jI IP   shows the power transfer 
between ith and jth islands. This objective function aims to achieve the lowest possible 
difference in the power imbalance in the formed island. This will decrease frequency 
instability or transient stability caused by the imbalance between generation and load 
demand. 
5.4.3 Minimal voltage stress  
Voltage collapse exists in some cascading blackouts that occur after a large change or 
incremental drop in voltages. Therefore, this objective is to minimize the voltage change 
in order to minimize the possibility of a local blackout collapse. In addition, because 
voltage relates to reactive power, the voltage stress during forming islanding cutsets can 
be minimised [29][77] as follows: 
                                           3min max ( )qF abs T                                      (5.17) 
where qT  is the vector of all changes in the reactive power bus throughput. 
Based on any one of these three optimal objective functions, the power flow tracing-
based islanding method not only determines the threshold value for the tracing method 
but also provides the best solution to determine where to island. Figure 5.9 represents a 
flow chart to illustrate the steps to find the threshold value with best islanding solutions. 
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Figure 5.9: Flow chart to illustrate the steps to find the threshold value with best 
islanding solutions 
 
5.5 Islanding Solution for Decisions  
The tracing method obtained several islanding solutions. Each seed node may have 
different islanding strategies. Different optimization tools could be used to identify the 
optimal islanding solutions among the different islanding strategies. There also may be 
different optimal islanding strategies, which highly depends on the aspect that is 
focused on, such as minimal power flow disruption, minimal power imbalance or 
minimal voltage stress. In real power systems, if the optimal islanding strategies 
provided could not guarantee transient stability in an island after splitting the network, a 
different optimal islanding strategy would be required, which would be achieved by 
changing the threshold value in order to ensure that the formed islands were transiently 
stable.  
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Figure 5.10: Full solution set in 39-busbar system in terms of transient weight, voltage 
weight and frequency weight [29] 
Figure 5.10 shows a 3D plot of a full solution set in a 39-busbar system in terms of three 
indices: transient weight, voltage weight and frequency weight. Transient weight 
represents the transient stability margin in the formed island, which can be obtained by 
minimizing the power flow disruption. Voltage weight represents the voltage change 
during islanding, which can be gained by minimizing the voltage stress through 
minimizing the reactive power flow. Frequency weight represents the frequency margin, 
which can be derived by minimizing the power imbalance in the formed islands. In 
Figure 5.10, each optimal islanding strategy is represented by a black spot, which 
contains different information about the three indices. For example, the optimal 
islanding solution close to the blue spot is obtained by minimizing the voltage stress 
during islanding; in the example, the voltage weight is quite small. However, the 
transient weight is quite large, which could lead to transient instability in the formed 
island. Hence, this optimal islanding should be discarded, and another islanding strategy 
with a satisfactory transient weight should be used for islanding. When we move the 
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islanding solution from the blue spot to the red spot, the formed island has a lower risk 
of transient instability because of the lower transient weight.  
 
5.6 Summary 
The power flow tracing method is introduced in this chapter. The concept is based on 
the proportional sharing principle. Initially, it was used as an economic tool to solve 
issues in the electricity market. In this thesis, it is adopted in the three-stage controlled 
islanding scheme in order to determine where to island. Specifically, in order to split the 
entire network safely and optimally, the application of power flow tracing aims to 
identify the weakly connected lines between the sick island containing disturbance and 
the remaining healthy sub-network. In the power flow tracing method, the weakly 
connected line has less power flow contributed by the seed node. This is observed by 
obtaining the tracing matrix, which however is subject to the chosen threshold value. 
The appropriate threshold value must be identified, and the best islanding solution must 
be selected from several strategies provided by the tracing method. Optimization 
objectives are involved in this tracing algorithm, such as minimal power flow disruption 
and minimal power imbalance in formed islands. Both help to solve this problem and 
decide the best islanding strategy. In addition, the tracing algorithm is applied to 6-
busbar system and a 39-busbar system for demonstration purposes. In real application 
during cascading blackouts, when the tracing methods give the islanding solution, 
before the order to implement the islanding strategy can be given, transient stability in 
each island still must be considered to avoid an unstable formed island. The assessment 
of transient stability should be dealt with based on the best islanding solution provided 
by the tracing method. However, the optimal islanding solution could be subject to 
different optimization indices, such as minimal power disruption, minimal power 
imbalance and minimal voltage stress. If the provided optimal islanding solution does 
not satisfy the requirement of transient stability in the formed island, another optimal 
islanding solution with a better transient stability should be used. This can obtained by 
changing the threshold value of the power flow in the tracing method.  
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Compared with the previous slow coherency method, power flow tracing is disturbance-
dependent. The islanding solution obtained links to where the disturbance occurred. It 
then cuts out the sick island and prevents the spreading of disturbance to the remaining 
healthy sub-network, instead of creating several unnecessary islands which would 
complicate the re-synchronism effect required at the end. By tripping the lines, islanding 
is already a huge disturbance to the entire network. However, the tracing method is able 
to trace the power flow on each line and ensure that the power flow disruption is 
minimized, which results in a better transient stability safety margin in the formed 
islands. Therefore, in this thesis, we will adopt the tracing method in the three-stage 
controlled islanding scheme in order to decide where to island. The islanding cutsets 
provided will be assessed for transient stability status before islanding action is 
eventually taken.  
90 
 
 
Chapter 6:  
Cascading Outage Simulation 
In this chapter, the cascading outage scenarios before the imminent blackouts are 
simulated in order to understand dynamic behaviours in power system. Different types 
of modelling and protection for generators are described in Appendix A. Different 
devices used to protect network circuits, such as overcurrent, distance are also attached 
in the Appendix. Because the protections were improperly coordinated, such devices 
contributed significantly to the widespread cascading blackouts that have occurred 
during the past decade. Typically, in the US/Canada blackout (2003), at least 265 power 
plants with more than 508 generators shut down during the process of the cascading line 
tripping. It is necessary to know the protection devices that caused the generators to be 
tripped during cascading outages. The reasons [4] are summarized into a few categories 
as follows:  
 Before uncontrolled islanding:  
 The generators were tripped by protective relays that responded to the 
overloaded transmission lines, such as the under-voltage and over-current 
protection relays installed in those lines to connect the generator buses. 
 Uncontrolled islanding was formed not because of internal problems in the plant 
but because of outside conditions in the grid. 
 In some islands, generation was overwhelmed, so the generators shut 
down in response to the over-speed and/or over-voltage protection schemes. 
 In contrast, some islands where generation was deficient were tripped by 
under-frequency and/or under-voltage protection schemes. 
 The over-excitation protection scheme tripped the plant because the field 
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windings and coils were overheated under the effect of AVR when low voltage 
occurred in the generator bus. 
 The under-excitation protection scheme tripped the generators because it 
tried to protect them from exciter component failures. This is controversial 
because it can operate in stable as well as transient power swings. 
 Reverse power flow and loss of fuel supply 
 Failure of plant control systems or actions taken to trip plants in order to 
protect them. 
In addition, in the Italian blackout case (2003), the main causes of the tripping of the 
relevant thermal generating units [1] were as follows:: 
 Boiler failure: The power supply from the grid could not make the 
auxiliary equipment work properly because of the voltage collapse. 
 High temperature of exhaust gas: When the frequency dropped and the 
generator slowed down, during dynamic periods the inadequate air mass flow in 
the compressor might increase the temperature of the exhaust gas, resulting in 
the turbine being shut down. 
 Loss of excitation: Increased voltage oscillation under extended fault 
tripped the excitation system. Subsequently, the loss of excitation activated 
protection to trip the generators. 
 Loss of synchronism: When power swings and oscillation occurred in the 
grid through weakly connected lines, some generators may have lost 
synchronism, and the corresponding protective relays tripped these generators. 
 Under-frequency relay operation: In order to avoid the improper 
operation of generators and auxiliary equipment, the condition of under-
frequency tripped the generator when the frequency crossed the threshold of 
47.5 Hz 
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 Under-impedance relay operation: The under-impedance relay protects 
the generator against faults on the output terminals. However, increased current 
and decreased voltage caused by disturbance can be regarded as low impedance 
detected by the relay, which causes the mal-operation to trip the generator. 
 Under-voltage relay operation: If the installed AVR is not sufficient to 
maintain the generator terminal voltage, then the low-voltage condition will trip 
the generator when the generator terminal voltage drops below the threshold.  
 The gas turbine protection tripped the turbines. 
 
6.1 Simulation Results for Cascading Outages 
In order to create a cascading environment in which to observe the dynamic process of 
cascading blackouts, we apply overcurrent protection on each line in the IEEE 39-
busbar system to demonstrate how current, voltage and frequency change in the 
cascading line trips. We also demonstrate the malfunction of distance protection. The 
39-busbar system is shown in Figure 6.1. The generators used in this system are fourth- 
order models. A turbine governor, automatic voltage regulator and over excitation 
limiter are installed in each generator. The three different areas shown in Figure 6.1 
define the power flow transfer in tie lines. 
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Figure 6.1: The 39-busbar system. 
Note that in Figure 6.1, a power unbalance exists in each of the three areas. Area 1 and 
Area 3 have inadequate generation, so both need to import power from Area 2 by 460 
MVA and 111 MVA separately through the tie lines connecting each other, as shown in 
Table 6.1. Therefore, these tie lines may become a cause of the system’s collapse.  
Table 6.1: Power flow capacity in tie lines in the 39-bus system. 
Area Connection 
Line Connection Line Capacity  
(MVA) Bus Bus 
Area 1 Area 3 
25 26 160 
17 27 62 
Area 1 Area 2 
16 15 684 
16 17 458 
 
In order to simulate cascading outages in the test network, some line contingencies are 
applied to make the system become stressful in a weakened condition. These lines are 
easily overloaded if their neighbouring lines are tripped because the power flow in the 
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adjacent lines has to be shared by them. This process could lead to further cascading 
outages until uncontrolled islands are formed. the N-1 security scan showed that the 39-
busbar system satisfies the N-1 security criterion. Hence, we focus on two-line or 
greater simultaneous contingencies.  
6.1.1 Study case A 
Study case A demonstrates the frequency changes in the uncontrolled formed islands. 
Two tie lines (Line 15-16 and Line 16-17) connecting Area 1 and Area 2 were initially 
and manually tripped at 2 s. This caused Area 1 and Area 3 to be isolated from their 
generation import source in Area 2, and generation in Area 1 and Area 3 becomes 
deficient. Then Line 14-15, 9-39, 17-27 and 3-18 in Area 1 become overloaded because 
of the connection with the high demand areas. They are successively tripped by 
overcurrent protection. Because two main islands have been formed, the frequency in 
Area 1 and Area 3 is decreased because of the deficient generation, and the frequency 
level is maintained at 49.9 Hz, as shown in Figure 6.2. In contrast, the frequency in 
Area 2 increased at the beginning because generation was sufficient. However, 
Generator 4 in Area 2 exceeded the high frequency threshold value of 52 Hz at around 8 
s. It was tripped by the over frequency protection installed in the generator. The 
generation in Area 2 also became deficient because of the loss of generator 4. The 
frequency in Area 2 started to decrease, and the frequency was maintained at 49.8 Hz. 
 
Figure 6.2: Frequency changes in islanded Areas 1 and 3 and Area 2. 
            Frequency in islanded Area 1 and 3 
            Frequency in islanded Area 2 
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6.1.2 Study case B 
Study case B demonstrates that the tripping of the initial lines caused overloading in 
other parallel lines. In order to stress the system and trigger the cascading outages 
caused by protection, we tripped first two lines, Line 13-33 and 20-34, simultaneously 
at 2 s. The loss of these two lines caused the power flow to be redistributed across the 
network, resulting in the overloading of some lines. As shown in Figure 6.3, four 
neighbouring lines, Line 14-15. 17-27, 16-24 and 3-18, were overloaded immediately at 
the same time as the first two lines were tripped. Then at around 16 s, the overloaded 
Line 14-15 was tripped by the overcurrent protection, which led to further overloading 
on Line 17-27, 16-24 and 3-18. When the time reached 23 s, Line 17-27 was tripped 
after its current reached threshold value set for overcurrent protection, which led to 
further overloading on Line 3-18. This process continued until Line 3-18 was finally 
tripped because of overload, and the system collapsed in the cascading outage. 
 
Figure 6.3: Cascading redistribution of power flow after Line 19-33 and 20-34 were 
tripped 
6.1.3 Study case C 
In study case C, the three lines that connect to Generator 6 and Generator 8 were 
manually tripped, which caused a power unbalance in the whole system. Several lines, 
Line 14-15, 9-39, 3-18, 17-27, 16-24, 1-2, 4-5 and 14-15, became overloaded and then 
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were automatically tripped by the overcurrent protection. Figure 6.4 shows the power 
flow redistribution during the cascading tripping, which is the same as shown in Figure 
6.3. When one line was tripped, the power flow on the tripped line was shared 
instantaneously by the adjacent lines or the remaining network, which may have caused 
them to overload, thus triggering cascading outages until uncontrolled islands were 
formed. 
 
Figure 6.4: Cascading redistribution of power flow after Line 21-22, 22-23 and 25-37 
were tripped 
Figure 6.5 shows the effects of line trips on voltages. The voltages were depressed 
gradually with the loss of lines under continuous contingency operating conditions. The 
loss of transmission lines meant that relatively insufficient active power flow could not 
be delivered to the relatively high demand areas. Therefore, the previous stable voltage 
decreased and even might have crossed the critical voltage (shown in Figure 6.5) in the 
new contingency operating condition, causing the voltage to collapse. 
IBUS-9   BUS-39 
IBUS-14 BUS-15 
IBUS-17 BUS-27 
      IBUS-5  BUS-4 
IBUS-14 BUS-13 
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Figure 6.5: Voltage drops and collapses during cascading tripping. 
Before the system collapsed, Lines 26-29 and 26-28 were tripped by distance protection. 
As shown in Figure 6.6, the significant increase in current in Line 26-29 and the 
decrease in voltage in bus 26 caused the distance relay installed on Line 26-29 to detect 
high current and low voltage. The measured apparent impedance was entered into the 
operating characteristic zone of the protection relays. It was not able to discriminate the 
changes in impedance between the faults and the power fluctuations. Therefore, Line 
26-29 was tripped at 25.4 s by distance relays, which led to nine islanded networks and 
the collapse of the entire system. This case showed that the malfunction of distance 
protection also contributed to the cascading blackouts. 
 
Figure 6.6: Line 26-29 is tripped by distance protection. 
       VBUS-4 
       VBUS-14 
       VBUS-15 
       VBUS-17 
       VBUS-27 
       VBUS-26 
       IBUS-26 BUS-29 
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6.2 Summary  
This chapter first describes the reason that generators are tripped by their relevant 
protection during cascading outages. The reasons for the US/Canada blackout (2003) 
and the Italy blackout (2003) are summarized. The associated generator models are 
introduced in Appendix A. The classical generator model and the fourth-order generator 
model are used in the case studies to simulate the dynamic process in a system under 
disturbance. In addition, the existing conventional protection systems for both 
generators and transmission lines were also described in Appendix A. They are 
designed to protect the system components against the occurrence of contingencies. 
However, the design of the protection particularly focuses on individual components. 
The lack of coordination and malfunction of the protection systems in severe 
contingency situations has contributed significantly to cascading blackouts, such as the 
India Blackout (2012) and US/Canada Blackout (2003). In the case studies, in order to 
simulate the performance of the protection devices to create cascading outages, we 
installed various kinds of protection in the generators, such as under/over frequency 
protection and under/over voltage protection. We also installed protection on the 
transmission lines, such as overcurrent protection and distance protection. The 
performance of the installed protection led to cascading outages in the 39-busbar system 
until the system collapsed. During the cascading outages, important scenarios were 
observed in the deteriorating cascading environment, such as increased overloading on 
adjacent lines because the neighbouring lines were tripped, the voltage drop and the 
malfunction of distance protection in the cascading environment.  
Therefore, this chapter provides a detailed discussion of the reasons that cascading 
blackouts occur. The findings also help to understand the concept of cascading outage. 
In this thesis, this research provides the foundation on which online transient stability 
assessment is based. In the next chapter, we will explain the EEAC and SIME 
methodologies and their online application in the cascading environment.  
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Chapter 7:  
Extended Equal Area Criterion 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 address the question of identifying “the point of no return” by 
using the single machine equivalent (SIME) method when controlled islanding has to be 
activated. In cascading outages leading to blackouts, the point of no return is the last 
tripped line, which results in transient instability. SIME is applied to find an a priori 
transient stability indicator during cascading outages. This indicator is adapted into the 
controlled islanding scheme to support decision making regarding its implementation to 
correct transient instability. The extended equal area criterion (EEAC), on which SIME 
is based, is introduced first in this chapter.  
 
7.1 Introduction of EEAC 
In the cascading environment, the continuous tripping of lines and generators pushes the 
system towards the boundary of stability. Therefore, after each line or generator trip, the 
transient stability indicator should be used to analyse the signal changes in order to 
know in advance if the system will remain stable after the next expected overloading 
line is tripped. EEAC was built as a method for online transient stability assessment. It 
simply transforms the multi-machine system to a two-machine dynamic equivalent and 
then further reduces it to an OMIB system. The stability issue is then reduced to a single 
algebraic equation based on the well-known equal area criterion (EAC) which serves in 
deciding whether the system is transiently stable. The EEAC aims to enhance the 
advantage by obtaining the derivation of a simple analytical expression. It allows a one-
shot stability analysis without any trial procedures, and it provides stability margins that 
can be quickly expressed analytically. In order to achieve this objective, the successful 
application of EEAC is subject to the following assumptions and approximation points 
[93]: 
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 Whenever the loss of synchronism in a multi-machine system occurs 
under critical contingencies, it is triggered by two irrevocably separated groups 
of generators. The angles of the two groups of generators move apart after 
swinging against each other. 
 The modelling of the generator angles in each group is represented by 
their centre of angles (COA) in order to assess dynamic behaviour that is 
equivalent to the OMIB system. 
 The angle trajectories of corresponding generator for the equivalent 
OMIB system and the individual generators are described by the truncated 
Taylor series expansion. 
The principle of the EEAC method with another technique involved is implemented 
based on the procedures shown in Figure 7.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Principle of the EEAC method [93]. 
Figure 7.1 shows that the successful application of the EEAC method relies on a two-
part technique: the identification of a critical cluster of generators; and the 
transformation from a multi-machine system to the equivalent OMIB system. The 
individual generator angle trajectories must be known in advance to identify the critical 
cluster of generators that can be obtained through the critical machine ranking (CMR) 
method based on the initial measurement obtained by WAMS. When the critical cluster 
Multimachine 
Power 
system 
Identification of 
the group of 
critical machines 
Assumed 
contingency 
Group of 
critical 
machines 
Remaining 
machines 
Equvalent 
machine s 
Equvalent 
machine a 
OMIB Taylor 
series 
Equal-Area 
Criterion 
Twofold stability assessment: 
 critical clearing time 
 stability margin 
101 
 
of generators is found, then the successful transformation from a multi-machine system 
to the OMIB system can be conducted. In the static EEAC, network topology is the only 
variable that is sensitive to this transformation, which changes during cascading outages. 
Consequently, transient stability can be assessed and the stability margin can be 
obtained based on EAC in this equivalently transformed OMIB system. 
7.1.1 General OMIB formulation 
A. Multi-machine system 
For each generator in an n machine system, the motion and electrical power of i-th 
generator are given by [94]: 
                                         i i    ;      i i mi eiM P P                     1,2,...,i n                   (7.1)              
                                            
2
1,
cos cos( )
n
ei i ii ii i j ij i j ij
j j i
P E Y E E Y   
 
                       (7.2) 
and the notion used above is as follows: 
i : Rotor angle 
iM : Inertia coefficient 
miP ( eiP ): Mechanical input (electrical power) 
iE : Voltage behind d-axis transient reactance 
Y : Reduced admittance matrix to generator nodes 
 ij ijY  : Modulus (argument) of ijth element of Y 
iM , miP  and iE  are assumed to be constant, and all loads are modelled as constant 
impedances. 
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B. Equivalent two-machine system 
In the SIME method, two assumptions are made in order to transform the multi-machine 
system to an equivalent two-machine system. One assumption is that in a severe 
contingency situation, the generator angles move apart to form two groups. In a multi-
machine system, transient stability is controlled by generators that are responsible for 
the system separation whenever the equivalent generator angle of the machines passes a 
corresponding unstable equilibrium point. These are called critical generators or a 
critical cluster; the critical generator is sometimes a single generator. The other 
assumption is that the COA is used to model the generator angles in each group. The 
two-machine system model can be given using following notions: 
S : the set of machines composing the critical cluster of machines 
s : the equivalent of S , aggregated machine 
A : the set of all remaining machines 
a : the equivalent of A , aggregated machine 
In order to model the equivalent machine of A, COA is used. Because there are only (n-
S) machines of A with machines S excluded, we obtain [94]: 
                                                                  
a l
l A
M M

                                                              (7.3) 
                                                  1
a a l l
l A
M M 

      ;      a a                                            (7.4) 
The motion of A is now obtained by summing the corresponding (n-S) equation (7.1). It 
then can be shown as 
                                                         ll ml elM P P        l A                                            (7.5) 
by using the relationships in (7.3) and (7.4), we obtain 
                                                     aa ml el
l A
M P P

                                                 (7.6) 
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In the above equations (7.5) and (7.6), elP  is of the form described in (7.2). An 
additional simplification may be obtained by setting 
                                                          
j a    j A                                                  (7.7) 
In this case, elP  is expressed by 
             2
1, ,
cos cos( ) ...... cos
n
el l ll ll l a la a s ls l j lj lj
j j i j A j l
P E Y E E Y E E Y    
   
         (7.8) 
The above assumption (7.7) is physically sound and well validated in practice. If the 
critical generators are a critical cluster, the modelling of the equivalent machine of S  
and its motion is the same as the modelling of A. If the critical generator is a single 
generator, the motion of machine s is modelled by  
                                                        s s ms esM P P                                                       (7.9) 
where esP  is expressed by an equation similar to (7.2), where the assumption (7.7) has 
been taken into account. esP  is expressed by 
                                2 cos cos( )es s ss ss s j sj s a sj
j A
P E Y E E Y   

                              (7.10) 
C. Equivalent OMIB System 
To derive the OMIB system, we have to consider the relative rotor angle and the 
corresponding relative rotor acceleration between two groups of generators. They are 
defined by [94] 
                                                  s a        ;     s a                                         (7.11) 
By substituting (7.6) and (7.9) into (7.11), we obtain 
                                                            m eM P P                                                  (7.12) 
where 
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Using (7.13), (7.8) and (7.10) allows the transformation of (7.12) into the familiar 
expression of the equivalent OMIB equation of motion: 
                                              [ sin ]m C MAXM P P P v                                       (7.16) 
where 
                                      
2 1
,
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
  
      
     
                        (7.17) 
                                         2 2 1/2( )MAXP C D  , 
1tan ( / )v C D                                  (7.18) 
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l A
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s l sl
l A
D E E B

                                                   (7.20) 
where B (G) stands for the susceptance and the conductance, respectively. 
7.1.2 Critical machine ranking 
CMR in [93]-[95] is used to identify the critical cluster of the machine(s) in order to 
transform a multi-machine system into the corresponding OMIB system. For any 
contingencies of concern in the multi-machine system, truncated Taylor series 
expansion in (7.21) is applied to the individual generator’s angle revolution with time 
by choosing a large constant step size (i.e., 0.1 s) from the starting point until the 
oscillation ceases after the breaker operation at 0( )t 

. 
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where   denotes the OMIB acceleration at ( )ot t 
 : 
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 
              (7.22) 
In (5.21), o  represents the original steady state rotor angle. The successive derivatives 
(2)  and (4)  are obtained at ( )ot 
 . The trajectories of each individual generator angle 
can be plotted using the Taylor series expansion-based CMR. Critical machines are 
observed and identified when the predicted generator angle trajectory surpasses the 
unstable equilibrium point. The machines are then sorted in decreasing order of their 
generator angles. The candidate critical cluster is determined from the top in the list 
through angle clustering between the two biggest gaps in successive generator angles. 
Equation (7.21) is quickly calculated to give this signal for the stability margin 
calculation.  
7.1.3 EAC in OMIB system 
The reduced admittance matrix and the identification of the critical cluster of machines 
allow the multi-machine system to be transformed to the OMIB system. Taylor series 
expansion provides a rapid computation procedure that is based on the initial generator 
angles to determine the critical generator cluster. However, this methodology has only 
been used in fault cases [95]. In this research project, the transient problem is 
formulated in terms of line trip cases rather than fault cases in order to check in advance 
whether the last line trip would result in the loss of stability. An additional problem is 
that the initial condition in terms of generator angles will not be a steady stable 
equilibrium point because it is derived from the intersection of the pre-breaker power 
angle characteristic and mechanical power and the system will not be in equilibrium. 
The intersection is shown as “A” in Figure 7.2. In addition, the initial generator speed 
deviations will not be zero because the generator angles will be swinging.  
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Figure 7.2: Power angle characteristic for OMIB with breaker operation [96]. 
In the case of line tripping without the fault application in the system, only pre-breaker 
and post-breaker periods exist, instead of pre-fault, during-fault and post-fault periods in 
the fault cases used in [93]-[95], [97][98]. Therefore, it is necessary to redraw the P   
curves under the line tripping case in the OMIB system, which is shown in Figure 7.2. 
eOP  and ePP  represent the pre-breaker and post-breaker P   curves. Because the 
breaker operation, or line tripping, increases the line reactance between the aggregated 
generator and the equivalent infinite busbar, it could decrease the peak value of 
electrical power in the P   curve and force the generator angle to move from o  to 
c , resulting in increasing kinetic energy (KE) and decreasing potential energy (PE). 
The more lines that are tripped, the more that the gap between KE and PE will be 
reduced and the closer to transient instability. In addition, the existence of transmission 
line resistances means terms such as 
CP  in (7.17) and v  in (7.18) are still included in the 
calculation of accA  and decA . There is no during-fault curve in the line tripping case; 
therefore, the post-breaker curve in this case is equivalent to the during-fault and post-
fault curves in the fault case. Accordingly, the expression of accA  and decA  are described 
as follows [94]-[102]: 
                   ( )( ) cos( ) cos( )Pacc m cP c o eMAX c P o PA P P P v v                        (7.23) 
               ( )( 2( )) 2 cos( )
P
dec cP m c P eMAX c PA P P v P v                      (7.24) 
KE Injected PE Margin 
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7.2 Measurement Data Required in EEAC Application 
In this work, the EEAC method is applied in the cascading environment. Continuous 
cascading line tripping will push the system further to the boundary of instability. 
Therefore, after each line trips, EEAC will be adapted and used to analyse and indicate 
the transient stability margin by comparing accA  and decA . In order to obtain a stability 
margin in running the EEAC, some measurement data are required for calculation.  
Figure 7.3 below represents a flowchart of the calculation used in EEAC. As shown in 
Figure 7.3, two key parts of the measurement data are involved in running the EEAC: 
the reduced admittance matrix and the CMR. In the cascading environment, as the 
network topology changes with line tripping, the reduced admittance matrix also 
changes. In [103] the reduced admittance matrix included three parts: the original 
network admittance matrix Y, the generator transient reactance x
’ 
and the load 
equivalent impedance (PL, QL).  
                   
 
 
 
          
   
Figure 7.3: Measurements needed for calculation in EEAC.  
In CMR, the initial generator angles are used to predict the future trajectory of the 
generator angle in order to identify the critical machines. Based on the identified critical 
generator(s), multi-machine systems are transferred to the OMIB system with a few 
parameters, such as generator terminal voltage, inertial, electrical power and mechanical 
power.  
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7.3 Summary 
This chapter describes the methodology of EEAC, which is used online in the transient 
stability assessment of fault scenarios and cascading line tripping. This online 
application aims to support the decision to island during cascading outages to indicate 
transient stability. EEAC extends the well-known EAC theory applied in the single 
machine infinite busbar system to the application in multi-machine system. In order to 
achieve this goal, the transformation from a multi-machine system to a single machine 
infinite busbar system is required. The original network admittance matrix has to be 
reduced in correspondence with the equivalent infinite busbar system. The transient 
stability issue in the multi-machine system then becomes a single algebraic equation 
that it can be formulated by comparing kinetic energy and potential energy. Based on 
the online WAMS measurement, EEAC obtained a one-shot stability margin. However, 
in this online transient stability assessment, there is a trade-off between accuracy and 
calculation speed. Although the Computation of EEAC is very fast, it lacks the ability to 
update during the dynamic process after one line is tripped, which may give unreliable 
results. In particular, this might happen during fast dynamic oscillation immediately 
after line contingency although the duration time might be quite short. Compared with 
EEAC, SIME updates the transient stability assessment results in short time intervals 
based on the measurement data obtained from the online WAMS system. The calculated 
results of SIME are more reliable. Although the results of SIME might take longer to 
obtain than the one-shot results from EEAC, it is still fast enough to indicate the 
imminent loss of transient stability before it actually occurs. The methodology of SIME 
is explained in the next chapter. EEAC and SIME are based on the same fundamental 
principle, which is described in this chapter. Based on the same fundamental principle, 
the difference between SIME and EEAC in yielding accurate results will be discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 8:  
Single Machine Equivalent and its 
Application for Preventive Islanding 
SIME [103]-[108] is based on the same principle as the static EEAC method described 
in Chapter 7, that is, it is used to transform a multi-machine system to a two-machine 
equivalent, which is then reduced to the OMIB system. However, in the SIME method, 
transient stability assessment is based on the successive monitoring of generator angles 
according to real-time measurements taken at very short time intervals. In other words, 
SIME considers the dynamic changes in generator angles in certain time intervals. 
Because the stability margin obtained is continuously updated, the SIME method is 
more accurate than the static EEAC. However, it is more time-consuming than the static 
EEAC method. Regarding the prediction of transient stability, a trade-off exists between 
accuracy and computation speed. Largely, SIME satisfies both requirements in the 
online application to predict transient stability in a cascading environment.  
 
8.1 Introduction of SIME 
In SIME, stability assessment relies on the prediction of the OMIB’s system structure 
and the P   curve. The OMIB’s system structure is predicted by the identification of a 
critical cluster of generators using Taylor series expansion, which is the same as in the 
EEAC method. OMIB system’s P   curve is predicted by using a weighted least 
squares (WLS) estimation, which is used to refresh the dynamic generator angles 
continuously during the dynamic changes after the line contingencies. It aims to correct 
the unstable equilibrium generator angles of OMIB in order to guarantee the accuracy of 
transient stability assessment. The mathematical formulation of transformation from a 
multi-machine system to the OMIB system is the same as in equations (7.1-7.20) in 
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Chapter 7. To refresh the P   curve in the equivalent OMIB system, the procedure in 
the SIME method is as follows [13]: 
1) At a time 
it shortly after the line contingency occurs at et , three incoming data 
measurements of individual generator angles are obtained at three consecutive time 
2it t  , it t , it . Then the Taylor-series-extension-based CMR is used to predict the 
future trajectories of individual generator angles. The machine sorts the future generator 
angles in decreasing order. The angles above the largest angular distance between two 
successive machines are considered candidate critical generators. 
2) When the candidate critical machines are identified, the corresponding OMIB 
system can be constructed. Based on the data of the generator angles and the 
corresponding parameters of the individual generators, three data of the corresponding 
OMIB system at time 2it t  , it t , it  are obtained and the aP   curve (Figure 8.1) 
is approximated by solving the following quadratic function [13] to obtain the 
coefficients of a, b, c:  
                                                    
^
2( )aP a b c                                                     (8.1) 
When these coefficients are obtained based on three sets of data measurement, the 
aP   curve can be derived. 
 
Figure 8.1: Updating 
aP   curves of corresponding transformed OMIB system based 
on updating measurements [13] 
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3) When the coefficients of the quadratic function (8.1) are found, then the OMIB 
unstable equilibrium angle 
u  can be calculated by letting the equation be zero. 
4) Based on all the required parameters calculated above, the stability margin  , 
which represents the subtraction of the PE from the KE, can be computed as 
                                                  
21
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u
i
a iP d M


                                               (8.2) 
 
5) If   is found to be negative or close to zero, the system can be declared to be 
unstable and control actions are taken. 
6) If the system is declared unstable, then the time to instability ut , or the time for 
the OMIB to reach its unstable equilibrium angle 
u , are computed as follows:  
                                    
22
u
i
i
u i
a i
d
t t
P d
M

 


 
 
 


                                (8.3) 
7) A new set (three data) of measurement is acquired after the next time interval 
t  and continues monitoring the system for transient stability. 
 
8.2 Application of SIME in the Preventive Islanding Scheme 
8.2.1 Framework of three-stage controlled islanding 
A successful controlled islanding scheme not only has to consider the dynamic state 
before islanding but also has to satisfy a secure state in each islanded system after 
splitting. Figure 8.2 shows a flowchart of the three-stage controlled islanding scheme 
before the islanding order is given. As shown in Figure 8.2, these three stages are 
closely connected, and they form the controlled islanding scheme. In order to be 
successful, the three stages have to co-operate in their individual performances.  
The research in this project concentrates on Stages 1 and 3. Stage 2, that is, the 
islanding methodology, is independent of Stages 1 and 3. In this project, we use power 
flow tracing to identify the suitable islands. In stage 1, SIME is applied online in 
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cascading outages to predict transient stability to support the decision to implement the 
islanding strategy. In Stage 3, SIME is used to assess the dynamic stability in each 
island after islanding based on the formed islands produced by power flow tracing. All 
stages have to be implemented before the islanding strategy is actually undertaken in 
order to ensure that the performance of the controlled islanding scheme is satisfactory.  
 
  
                Stage 1: 
                When to Island? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Stage 2: 
 
                Where to Island? 
 
 
 
 
 
               Stage 3: 
               Dynamic Stability      
               Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Flowchart of three-stage strategies for controlled islanding. 
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8.2.2 Stage 1: When to island 
Based on the adoption of SIME, transient stability is assessed during cascading outages. 
Decision making also can be conducted regarding when to island before losing 
synchronism. Figure 8.3 shows a flowchart of the SIME application in cascading 
outages which is used to decide when to island.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Flowchart of online application of SIME in cascading outages for when to 
island 
Current line is tripped 
Collect data from WAMS 
Run PF and decide next 
expected tripped line 
Assume next line is tripped 
and run TDS for a very short 
time (around 0.1 s) 
Based on initial generator angles 
obtained from TDS and identify 
critical cluster using CMR 
Run SIME based on 
measurement-equivalent 
data coming from TDS 
Stable Unstable 
Move to Stage 3 
expected line is tripped 
Do nothing 
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When a line is tripped because of a fault, the online transient stability assessment begins 
immediately to predict the status of transient stability based on the assumption that the 
next expected tripped line is actually tripped. This is done in order to determine whether 
the next line tripping will cause transient instability and whether preparations for the 
preventive islanding (i.e., selecting islands and checking their stability status) should be 
initiated. During this period, online WAMS data are used to run the power flow (PF) 
and identify the next expected tripped line based on the thermal threshold of the lines 
and the thermal characteristics of the overcurrent protection on the lines. Assuming that 
the next expected tripped line does trip, then the time domain simulation (TDS) runs for 
a very short period (e.g., 0.1 second). This TDS allows SIME to collect the initial 
generator angles and the required calculation data, such as electrical power and 
generator angular velocity (as in (8.2)), which are used to calculate the stability margin. 
The delay in obtaining these required parameters (e.g., 0.1 second) is to avoid the 
collection of unreliable data during the fast dynamic oscillation process immediately 
after the line trip. Because it is also based on these initial generator angles, CMR can 
identify the critical cluster of a machine(s) using (7.21). If the computed stability 
margin is positive or indicates that the operation is stable, the diagnostic system will 
wait until the next expected tripped line. If the computed stability margin is negative or 
indicates an unstable operation, Stage 2 is activated. SIME is used to calculate the 
amount of time left to instability, and the scheme proceeds to Stage 2 to obtain formed 
islands.  
Compared with the use of the conventional TDS in transient stability assessment, SIME 
has the advantage of detecting cascading tripping within a very short period (e.g., 0.1 s). 
The utilization of TDS as an initialization of computation has two points. First, the 
computation of SIME using the data acquisition of 0.1-second TDS is dramatically 
faster than the conventional TDS. Because transient instability could happen a few 
seconds after a severe disturbance, saving time is a priority for the system operator to 
respond and undertake actions based on the predicted stability. Second, the stability 
margin provided by SIME alerts the system operator when transient stability moves 
towards the instability boundary. Hence, the operator is made aware of the distance 
from transient instability after the next line trips.  
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8.2.3 Stage 2: Where to island 
In Stage 2, an islanding algorithm is used to identify the islands that, when disconnected 
from each other, prevent transient instability. In this research, we use power flow 
tracing [28][29], but any other islanding scheme could be used. 
Tracing is used to isolate the area in which a disturbance starts. It identifies the closely 
connected nodes by calculating the contributions of power flowing through a given node 
to all the other nodes upstream and downstream in the directed graph of flows. If the 
contributions are below a chosen threshold value, the nodes are deemed closely 
connected, and they should remain in one island. Hence, choosing a different threshold 
value will result in different islands, and if a particular islanding scheme is found to be 
transiently unstable, an alternative islanding scheme can be chosen based on a different 
threshold value. 
The advantage of tracing-based islanding is that it attempts to find the cut set lines 
connecting the islands in which the power flowing through them is minimized. This has 
the effect of maximizing the power balance in each island and minimizing the shock to 
the system caused by islanding, thereby helping to maintain dynamic stability. Tracing 
is very fast because it is based on the simple analysis of static power flows.  
8.2.4 Stage 3: Dynamic stability evaluation 
In Stage 3, before islanding, another important concern is to ensure that the selected 
islanding candidate will be transiently stable after islanding. The selected islanding 
candidate will be the best islanding strategy chosen from all tracing candidates in terms 
of minimal power flow disruption through the optimization process. Assuming that the 
next expected line is tripped, if SIME indicates that all the formed islands are stable, 
then it confirms that the final island solution can be used. On the other hand, if SIME 
indicates that one or more islands are unstable, another islanding scheme has to be used. 
In the case of the tracing methodology we applied, finding alternative islands is made 
possible by changing the threshold value of the contributions or changing the weights 
associated with different deciding factors, as shown in Figure 5.8. SIME will then 
continue to assess the stability of the newly provided islands until they prove to be 
transiently stable. If no stable islands can be found, additional actions have to be taken, 
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such as generator tripping in generation-rich islands and load shedding in islands with 
generation deficits. SIME can also be used to identify which generation or load to shed 
[10]-[14]. 
It should be noted that time is crucial in any controlled islanding scheme; therefore, the 
identification of the candidate islands should be done in advance. The transient stability 
assessment can only be done online. The use of SIME makes it possible to execute the 
entire three-stage process quickly before a blackout occurs.  
 
8.3 Summary  
This chapter describes in detail the use of the SIME method for online transient stability 
assessment, which is based on the same fundamental principle as EEAC (Chapter 7). 
The difference between the two methods is that EEAC provides a one-shot transient 
assessment based on an online WAMS measurement, whereas SIME updates the results 
of the assessment of transient stability. This updating is necessary because initial fast 
dynamic changes after contingencies could yield unreliable results. SIME’s updating 
results are converged to a fixed range, which is reliable in indicating whether the system 
is transiently stable or not. In addition, in SIME, a quadratic function is used to update 
the 
aP   curves, which are used to transform a multi-machine system to a single 
machine infinite bus system in order to obtain the transient stability margin. 
In this chapter, the framework of the three-stage controlled islanding scheme is 
proposed, and SIME is adapted to the first stage and the third stage in the scheme. It 
connects these three closely connected work packages, including when to island, where 
to island and the dynamic stability evaluation after islanding. Only when these three 
work packages are completed, online islanding is able to be ordered the implementation 
of the islanding scheme. In particular, the question of when to island is critical in this 
controlled islanding scheme because it has to be known in advance whether the 
system’s collapse is imminent. Therefore, a flowchart of the implementation procedure 
use to decide when to island is also proposed. In order to predict transient stability, the 
next expected tripped line during a cascading outage and the post-fault initial data are 
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required before the line contingency actually occurs. In the proposed procedure, the 
thermal characteristics of the protection on the lines are used to decide the next line that 
will be tripped during a cascading outage. In addition, the time-domain approach is also 
required for a very short interval in order to obtain initial post-contingency data, which 
is used to calculate the stability margins in SIME. In the next chapter, SIME will be 
adopted for use in the controlled islanding schemes in both the 39-busbar system and 
the 68-busbar system. 
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Chapter 9:  
Simulation Results of the Controlled 
Islanding Scheme 
In this chapter, two test systems are evaluated in the case study of the online three-stage 
controlled islanding scheme: the 39-busbar system, which uses classical models of 
generators, and the 68-busbar system, which uses fourth order generator models and 
Type-2 standard IEEE exciter models. In the first stage of the evaluation, the dynamic 
characteristics will be analysed during cascading outages. Then SIME is adopted to 
assess the status of transient stability and decide when to island in terms of transient 
instability, which would lead to the system’s collapse. In the second stage of the 
evaluation, before the order to island is given, power flow tracing provides the system 
operator with islanding cut sets. SIME is then used in the formed island to assess 
transient stability condition by assuming the islanding cut sets have been applied in the 
system. When transient stability can be guaranteed in the formed island, the controlled 
islanding order is given in islanding mode for the survival of the system in a healthy 
operating condition. 
 
9.1 Case Study of a 39-busbar System 
The 10-generator 39-bus New England system [109] shown in Figure 9.1 will be used to 
demonstrate the methodology. It includes transient stability prediction using SIME to 
identify the point of no return to facilitate decisions to implement islanding, and it 
assesses the status of transient stability in power flow tracing-based, pre-designed 
islanding cut sets before splitting. The IEEE 39-bus New England system with classical 
models of generators was modelled using the MATLAB-based Power System Stability 
Tool (PSAT) software. In the following case studies, the time-domain results are also 
shown in order to check the SIME calculation results. 
119 
 
 
Figure 9.1: 10-generator 39-bus New England system   
In order to stress the used system model to simulate to create a cascading environment, 
PQ loads were increased up to 1.14 times the original level. To simulate a cascade, two 
neighbouring lines, 4-5 and 4-14, were tripped in 2-s intervals until transient instability 
occurred. The online SIME application for transient stability assessment not only relies 
on WAMS measurement for power flow calculation but also needs post-line-trip data to 
predict transient stability. These input data, such as generator angle and generator 
electrical power, are obtained by running a short-time TDS for 0.1 s, assuming the next 
expected line is actually tripped. SIME also needs data on the reduced system 
admittance matrix to help transform multi-machine system to OMIB system. This 
matrix changes as the network topology changes when the line is tripped. This reduced 
system admittance matrix can be obtained through calculation using network data. It is 
independent of both the WAMS measurement and the time-domain simulation. 
9.1.1 Transient stable case for 39-busbar system 
After the PQ load was increased, the power flow was redistributed, and some lines were 
overloaded. Assuming that Line 4-5 was the first to be tripped, the system moved to 
another operating condition but maintained transient stability. 
 IS1 
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After Line 4-5 was tripped, the TDS ran for 0.1 s, which is approximately equivalent to 
1 s in real time. The diagnostic system started collecting data 100 ms after the line 
contingency in order to wait for the initial oscillation to cease. The rate of collecting 
data was 20 ms, and SIME started assessing the transient stability status 140 ms after 
the line contingency. The first set of three data was collected at 100 ms, 120 ms and 140 
ms after Line 4-5 was tripped. The unstable equilibrium angle was initially estimated by 
SIME at 1.945 rad with a positive stability margin of 2.64 (radsec)
2
. These values were 
continuously updated, resulting in 1.768 rad and 2.05 (rad/s)
2
, respectively, after 740 
ms. Hence, the PE was greater than the KE, and the system was still transiently stable. 
Table 9.1 below shows the updated predictions of transient stability using SIME after 
Line 4-5 was tripped. The stability margin shown in the last column is defined as the 
subtraction of PE from KE, and it can be calculated by using (8.2) in Chapter 8.  
Table 9.1: Transient stability indication after Line 4-5 was tripped. 
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
140 1.845 2.64 
220 1.829 2.55 
300 1.812 2.44 
380 1.797 2.33 
460 1.786 2.23 
540 1.778 2.15 
620 1.772 2.10 
700 1.769 2.06 
740 1.768 2.05 
During the stable scenario, critical generator(s) do not exist because generator angles 
are oscillating instead of splitting from each other. However, based on the oscillation 
groups, which are G2 and G3 in one group and the rest in the other group, the system 
can still be transferred to the corresponding OMIB system in order to calculate the 
stability margin. The calculation results were confirmed by time-domain simulations, as 
shown in Figure 9.2, where the calculation results regarding the stability margins 
obtained using SIME match the status of the system’s stability.  
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Figure 9.2: Transiently stable case after Line 4-5 was tripped. 
9.1.2 Transient unstable case for 39-busbar system 
We assumed that the neighbouring Line 4-14 was tripped by protection 2 s after Line 4-
5 was tripped. Although calculations were made every 20 ms, the results in Table 9.2 
are for every fourth time step.  
Table 9.2: Transient stability indication after Line 4-5 and Line 4-14 were tripped.  
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Time left to 
instability after 
tripping Line 
4-14 tu (ms) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
140 1.581 406 0.19 
220 1.580 475 0.17 
300 1.579 540 0.14 
380 1.579 601 0.10 
460 1.579 657 0.06 
540 1.579 707 0.01 
620 1.580 747 -0.05 
700 1.580 773 -0.09 
Generator G2 was identified as a critical generator. Table 9.2 shows that the stability 
margins were initially close to zero and gradually became negative from 560 ms. When 
Line 4-5 tripped at 0 
s 
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the stability margin was negative or close to zero, the system was declared transiently 
unstable. The calculation results were confirmed by the time-domain simulations shown 
in Figure 9.3. After the second Line 4-14 was tripped at 2 s, the generator angles did not 
split immediately and significantly into two groups, which were observed from 1.5 s to 
3.5 s. During this period, several swings might have occurred in the system until the 
oscillation developed to asynchronism, which could explain why initially no negative 
stability margins were obtained during the swing period. 
Note that the third column of Table 9.2 contains an estimate of the critical islanding 
time (CIT), which is time remaining to execute preventive islanding to ensure that the 
system remains in a stable condition. 
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Figure 9.3: Transiently unstable case after Lines 4-5 and 4-14 were tripped. 
9.1.3 Assessment of transient stability of the islands in a 39-busbar 
system 
In this section, we show how SIME is used with the tracing-based islanding 
methodology [29] to assess the transient stability of the selected islands. 
When the second Line 4-14 was tripped, and SIME indicated that the system was going 
Line 4-5 tripped at 0 s 
 
  Line 4-14 tripped at 2s 
 
 
G1, G3-G10 
G2 
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to lose synchronism, in Stage 2 of the methodology, the power flow tracing-based 
method was used to identify possible islands. In Figure 9.1, the dashed lines show the 
borders of the resulting island, denoted as IS1, and indicate that the cut set consists of 
lines 9-39, 3-4 and 15-16. 
When an islanding scheme has been identified, SIME is used to predict whether the 
system will be transiently stable following islanding (Stage 3 of the methodology) 
assuming that islanding is executed before the critical islanding time (CIT as shown in 
the third column in Table 9.2). In other words, islanding is assumed to be executed in 
0.77 s after Line 4-14 is tripped in order to assess the transient stability status in each 
island.  
Table 9.3: Optimal islanding cut sets based on power flow tracing 
Seed Nodes 
(buses) 
Optimal                
Threshold for 
Tracing (p.u.) 
Optimal Islanding Cutsets 
Islanding 
Strategy    
No. 
4-8, 10-11, 13-
15 
1.3 9-39 / 3-4 / 15-16 IS1 
 
There are four islanding strategies (IS) and corresponding optimal cut sets that are based 
on different seed nodes (buses), that is, points where a disturbance started and optimal 
thresholds. These optimal islanding cutsets are obtained based on the pre-first 
contingency power flow data because the objective is to minimize the power flow 
disruption and after islanding returns the system to the pre-first-contingency operating 
condition, in which the system is stable. This also ensures that the cascading line 
contingencies are contained in one sick island without affecting the other healthy islands. 
The assumed unstable case was caused by a line contingency occurring in bus 4; 
therefore, the system was islanded using the IS1 strategy shown in Table 9.3. 
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Figure 9.4: Islanding strategy IS1 applies at critical islanding time 2.9 s 
Figure 9.4 shows the results of the time-domain simulation that confirmed the SIME 
predictions when islanding was executed 0.9 s after line 4-14 tripped (2.9 s after the 
start of simulations in Figure 9.4). After splitting the network at 2.9 s, the generator 
angles were separated into two groups to form two islands. One island contained two 
generators (G2, G3) while the other island contained the remaining generators (G1, G4, 
G5, G6, G7, G8, G9, G10). The two islands remained stable as the generator angles 
stayed close to each other in both islands although obviously both groups of angles 
separated following islanding. 
The simulations shown in Figure 9.3 indicate that G2 separated from the other 
generators in the unstable case. Figure 9.4 shows that when the preventive islanding was 
implemented, one island consisted of G2 and G3, and the other consisted of the 
remaining generators. Hence, the analysis of the transient stability analysis in Stage 1 
did not always correctly match the optimal split of the generators between the islands in 
Stage 2, which is decided by the optimal cutsets obtained by power flow tracing. It also 
has to satisfy power and demand balance.  
The islanding time of 0.9 s was close to the maximum (critical) islanding time of 0.77 s 
obtained using SIME (Table 9.2). This result indicated that SIME tends to be 
Line 4-5 tripped 
at 0 s 
 
Line 4-14 
tripped at 2s 
 
Islanding Strategy 
 SI 1 tripped 
at 2.9 s 
 
 
 
G2, G3 
G1, G4-G10 
in one island 
in the other island 
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conservative, which is a positive feature in power system security. Being conservative is 
better than being overly optimistic, especially in real-time operations. Being overly 
optimistic could result in the occurrence of transient instability without advance notice. 
However, being overly conservative is not good because it could result in overly wide 
security margins, or islanding decisions may be taken too quickly. Therefore, 
conservativeness should be contained within an acceptable limit without an overly wide 
security margin when action is taken.  
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Figure 9.5: Islanding strategy IS1 applied beyond critical islanding time at 2.95 s. 
Figure 9.5 illustrates the results of the time-domain simulations when the islanding 
strategy IS1 was used to split the network into two islands at 2.95 s, that is, 0.95 sec 
after line 4-14 was tripped. Consequently, G2 and G3 lost synchronism because the 
islanding was undertaken too late. The loss of stability was predicted using SIME, as 
shown in Table 9.4, which shows that the calculated stability margins were first close to 
zero and then became negative from the fourth updating. 
 
 
 
Line 4-5 
tripped at 0 s 
 
Line 4-14 
tripped at 2s 
 
Islanding Strategy  
IS 1 tripped 
at 2.95 s 
 
G2 
G3 
 
G1, G4-G10 
G2 and G3 lost 
synchronism in 
the same island   
 
126 
 
Table 9.4: Transiently stable indication in the island containing G2 and G3 after 
islanding strategy IS1 undertaken.  
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Time left to 
instability after 
islanding IS1 
tu (ms) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
140 2.959 1121 2.67 
200 2.996 1172 -1.02 
280 3.101 1226 -3.68 
360 6.286 ------ -12.9 
440 6.316 1391 -3.74 
520 9.253 1494 -0.24 
620 12.49 ------ -9.12 
660 12.60 1609 -3.74 
740 15.65 1693 -3.70 
 
9.1.4 Stability evaluation of each island in a 39-busbar system 
When SIME predicts that the system is transiently unstable, and the power flow tracing 
also provides pre-designed islanding cut sets, the controlled islanding scheme enters 
Stage 3. Before the controlled islanding scheme is activated, the status of transient 
stability in each island has to be assessed. Assuming that the optimal islanding cut sets 
were tripped before CIT, the measurement data collected from the 0.1 s TDS were used 
to assess the transient stability in each island. The stability margin in the first (sick) 
island was initially (140 ms after islanding) 7.01 (rad/sec)
2
 and reduced to 2.59 
(rad/sec)
2
 after 740 ms. The unstable equilibrium angle was initially 3.099 rad, which 
reduced to 2.995 after 740 ms. The second larger island was found to be very stable. 
The stability margin increased from 14 (rad/sec)
2
 to 160 (rad/sec)
2
 after 740 ms.  
The first island contained two generators (G2 and G3). Table 9.5 shows the transient 
stability in the first island after islanding. The stability margins obtained were 
continuously positive and then decreased to converge to the value of 2.6. The stable 
indication also matched the time-domain simulation shown in Figure 9.6. In Figure 9.6, 
G3 is the reference angle, and G2 and G3 are coherent and slightly oscillating. 
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Table 9.5: Transiently stable indication in the first island after islanding  
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
140 3.099 7.01 
220 3.031 5.85 
300 2.989 4.84 
380 2.967 4.03 
460 2.957 3.42 
540 2.954 2.98 
620 2.954 2.76 
700 2.954 2.61 
740 2.955 2.59 
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Figure 9.6: Transient stability status in the first island after controlled islanding 
scheme is assumed to happen. 
The second island contained the remaining generators (G1, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8, G9, 
G10). Similarly, Table 9.6 and Figure 9.7 show the status of transient stability in the 
second island. The stability margins obtained using SIME are shown in Table 9.6. They 
were constantly positive and indicated that the system was stable. Figure 9.7 also shows 
the status of stability. The entire group of generators were coherent. and G10 oscillated 
with the remaining generators. 
  Islanding 
Strategy SI 1 
tripped 
at 2.9 s 
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Table 9.6: Transiently stable indication in the second island after islanding  
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
140 3.051 14.0 
220 3.110 14.8 
300 3.229 16.4 
380 3.441 19.1 
460 3.808 24.0 
540 4.446 33.6 
620 5.592 54.6 
700 7.750 108 
740 9.542 166 
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Figure 9.7: Transient stability status in the second island after controlled islanding 
scheme is assumed to happen. 
 
9.2 Case Study of a 68-busbar System 
The 68-busbar system shown in Figure 9.8 is based on the 39-busbar New-England 
system. It was extended to a much larger system that includes 16 generators and 68 
transmission lines. In this system model, fourth-order generator models with dynamic 
  Islanding 
Strategy SI 1 
tripped 
at 2.9 s 
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details were used to assess the performance of the three-stage controlled islanding 
scheme. In addition, Type-2 exciters (standard IEEE model 1) [83][84] were installed in 
each generator. The same procedure was followed as in the case study on the 39-busbar 
system. The time-domain simulation was used to test the SIME calculation results in 
Stage 1 and Stage 3. Figure 9.8 also shows the islanding cut set provided by the power 
flow tracing method based on the disturbance location, which was required in Stage 2. 
The transient stability issue was further assessed by using SIME in Stage 3, which 
aimed to satisfy the post-island stability requirements of the sub-systems.  
 
Figure 9.8: 16-generator and 68-busbar system. 
To create a cascading environment in the 68-busbar system (similar to that in the 39-
busbar system) several neighbouring lines had to be tripped after the initial line was 
tripped, which resulted in a transiently unstable scenario. In real time, the application of 
this controlled islanding scheme was based on the flowchart shown in Figure 8.2. After 
one line was tripped, the power flow calculation was conducted based on the 
measurement obtained by WAMS. In the case study, we used time-domain simulation 
data to represent the WAMS measurement. Assuming that the next expected tripped line 
was actually tripped, the post-contingency data was collected from the time-domain 
simulation, which was run for 0.1 s in order to transform the multi-machine system to 
OMIB system. SIME was used to calculate the stability margin. The entire procedure in 
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the transient stable case and the unstable case during cascading line outages will be 
demonstrated. 
 
9.2.1 Transient stable case in a 68-busbar system 
In this transient stable case, initially Line 2-3 was tripped at 1 s. The neighbouring lines 
were assumed to be tripping continuously in order to push the system to the boundary of 
transient instability. After Line 2-3 was tripped at 1 s, Line 2-4 was tripped at 2 s, Line 
3-18 was tripped at 3 s, and Line 4-5 was tripped at 4s. Until the fourth line 4-5 was 
tripped at 4 s, the system was still transiently stable. However, it was approaching 
transient instability because the stability margin calculated by SIME was positive but 
close to zero. Table 9.7 shows the updating transient stability indications using SIME 
after Line 4-5 was tripped at 4 s. The transient stability assessment started at 140 ms 
after Line 4-5 was tripped. It used the first set of three data collected at 100 ms, 120 ms 
and 140 ms after Line 4-5 was tripped at 4 s. The updating SIME calculation results 
gave the unstable equilibrium angle of 0.191 rad and a positive but close-to-zero 
stability margin of 0.27 (radsec)2. These results showed that the potential energy 
obtained by the generator was greater than the kinetic energy. When the oscillation of 
the generator angle is nearly ceased, another operating condition is gained.  
Table 9.7: Transient stability indication after Line 2-3, 2-4, 3-18 and 4-5 were tripped 
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
140 0.822 0.57 
220 0.719 0.62 
300 0.544 0.61 
380 0.296 0.43 
460 0.075 0.14 
540 0.011 0.03 
620 0.191 0.27 
 
Although the system was still transiently stable with oscillation and the two groups of 
generator angles did not split, a critical cluster of generators was identified based on the 
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oscillation group, which transformed the multi-machine system into the OMIB system. 
In this test case, the oscillation groups were classified as G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, 
G8, G9, G10, G11, G12, G13, G14, G15 and G16, which started oscillating at 4 s, as 
shown in Figure 9.9. Figure 9.9 shows that the time-domain simulation matched the 
transient induction, which was calculated using SIME.  
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Figure 9.9: Transiently stable case after Lines 2-3, 2-4, 3-18 and 4-5 were tripped 
9.2.2 Transient Unstable Case for 68-busbar system 
Because the system was still transiently stable after four lines were tripped, the next 
neighbouring Line 4-14 was assumed to be tripped at 5 s in order to push the system to 
the boundary of transient stability. The first set of three data with a time interval of 0.2 s 
was collected from the time-domain simulation 0.7 s after Line 4-14 was tripped at 5 s 
in order to avoid an initial, fast dynamic oscillation. The results of the SIME calculation 
are shown in Table 9.8.  
 
 
 
The fourth Line 4-5 tripped at 4 s 
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Table 9.8: Transient stability indication after Line 2-3, 2-4, 3-18, 4-5 and 4-14 were 
tripped 
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Time left to 
instability after 
tripping Line 
4-14 tu (ms) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
700 0.742 1140 -6.0 
760 0.734 1200 -3.0 
800 0.731 1240 -1.0 
860 0.729 1304 -1.0 
900 0.729 1339 -1.0 
960 0.729 1400 -3.0 
1000 0.730 1440 -7.0 
1060 0.724 1500 -9.0 
1100 0.725 1540 -9.0 
1160 0.746 1600 -9.0 
1200 0.781 1640 -10.0 
 
In this case, nine generators (G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8, G9) were chosen as the 
critical generators, which is shown Figure 9.10. The results of the updating SIME 
calculation shown in Table 9.8 indicate that 1.2 s after Line 4-14 was tripped, SIME 
obtained the unstable equilibrium angle of 0.781 rand and converged the stability 
margin of -10.0 (rad/s)
2
. Because the stability margin obtained was negative, the system 
was declared transiently unstable. The SIME calculation results indicating the system’s 
transient status also matched the time-domain simulation, as shown in Figure 9.10. 
After the fifth Line 4-14 was tripped at 5 s, nine critical generators were not easily 
recognized until 5.7 s because 0.7 s after Line 4-14 was tripped, the critical generators 
started accelerating against the decelerated generators. As shown in Figure 9.10, at 5.7 
s, the generator angles of the critical generator started to increase. The generator angles 
of the critical generators started increasing from 5.7 s and the first-swing instability 
further developed into asynchronism. This also explains why SIME obtained a negative 
stability margin directly from the transient stability assessment at 5.7 s. 
In Table 9.8, the third column shows the time remaining to instability after Line 4-14 
was tripped. As shown in Table 9.8, the final updating calculated time was 1.64 s, which 
indicated the critical islanding time. If the islanding scheme was implemented within 
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this time, the system might survived through controlled islanding. Otherwise, the 
system would lose its synchronism with no point of return even when controlled 
islanding was executed. 
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Figure 9.10: Transiently unstable case after Line 2-3, 2-4, 3-18, 4-5 and 4-14 were 
tripped. 
9.2.3 Assessment of the transient stability of islands in a 68-busbar 
system 
It was assumed that when Line 4-14 was tripped, the system would lose transient 
stability. The controlled islanding scheme then entered Stage 2, in which the best 
islanding cutsets using power flow tracing method were identified. The sick island was 
used to contain the cascading and identify the weakly connected boundary lines with the 
remaining healthy island. The blue dashed line in Figure 9.8 represents the cutting 
boundary. The cut set lines include three lines 1-2, 1-27 and 8-9, which were also 
identified as weakly connected lines with less power flow. The disruption of power flow  
by cutting the boundary lines also indicated that the system would be less effected by 
transient instability.   
 
G1- G9  
 
G10- G16 
  Fifth Line 4-14 tripped at 5s 
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In Stage 3, SIME was used to assess the transient stability in each island when the 
islanding cut sets were identified in Stage 2. The assessment was conducted by 
assuming that the islanding scheme was implemented and that both islands were 
formed. However, the islanding scheme had to be implemented within the critical 
islanding time of 1.64 s after the fifth Line 4-14 was tripped. Otherwise, the system or 
the islands formed after islanding would lose transient stability anyway.  
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Figure 9.11: Islanding scheme applies within critical islanding time at 6.5 s. 
Figure 9.11 shows the time-domain simulation results when islanding scheme was 
implemented 1.5 s after the fifth Line 4-14 was tripped. Figure 9.11 shows that two 
islands were formed with two separated groups of generators. The sick island contained 
nine generators (G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8, G9). The healthy island contained 
the remaining seven generators (G10, G11, G12, G13, G14, G15, G16). Each cluster of 
generators in both islands was coherent without moving apart, which indicates that the 
formed islands did not lose transient stability in their sub-systems because of the 
disturbance of the controlled islanding. In addition, the results of the time-domain 
simulation results (Figure 9.11) confirmed the SIME predictions in Stage 1 regarding 
the calculated critical islanding time before transient instability occurred. The system 
was split 1.5 s after the last tripped line of no return, which was within the critical 
 
 
G1-G9 
G10-G16 
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in healthy island 
Fifth Line 4-14 
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islanding time of 1.62 s obtained in SIME, the formed islands were still transiently 
stable. However, if the controlled islanding were implemented beyond critical islanding 
time, then the formed islands, especially sick island, might not be transiently stable. In 
this test case, we used a step-by-step trial in the time-domain simulation to determine 
that the actual critical islanding time was 2.5 s. Compared with the 1.62 s obtained by 
SIME, the results of the SIME calculation were  relatively conservative.  
In this case, the islands consisted of the same generators that were previously shown to 
remain coherent when the transient stability was analysed in Stage 1 (see Figure 9.10). 
However, this may not always the case, as shown in the results of simulations in the 39-
bus system.  
Figure 9.12 shows the results of the time-domain simulation of the generator angle 
trajectories when the controlled islanding scheme was implemented 2.8 s after the fifth 
Line 4-14 was tripped at 5 s, which is beyond the determined critical islanding time. 
Hence, it was too late to conduct the controlled islanding scheme because, as shown in 
Figure 9.12, generator G9 lost synchronism with the remaining generator cluster (G1, 
G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8) in the sick island, whereas the healthy island maintained 
transient stability after splitting. This result is shown in Figure 9.13.  
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Figure 9.12: Controlled islanding scheme applied beyond critical islanding time at 7.8 
s 
G9 
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9.2.4 Stability evaluation in each island in the 68-busbar system 
SIME was used in real time to assess the status of transient stability in each island after 
islanding was implemented. Assuming that the islands were formed using the islanding 
cut sets provided by the power flow tracing method in Stage 2, the measurement data 
obtained by the 0.1 s TDS were used to run SIME to calculate the stability margin. If 
the islanding scheme were conducted beyond the critical islanding time, SIME would 
assess transient stability before it actually happened. For example, the calculation 
results are shown as follows. The sick island contains two groups of generators: G9 and 
the larger group (G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8). Table 9.9 presents the updating 
results of the SIME calculation, which indicate that the transient stability status in the 
sick island after the fifth Line 4-14 was tripped beyond the critical islanding time. The 
calculation was started 1 s after the fifth Line 4-14 was tripped in order to wait for the 
oscillation to cease and identify the critical cluster of generator, which was G9 in this 
case. The stability margin obtained for the sick island converged at -1.0 (rad/sec)
2 
after 
1,400 ms. The unstable equilibrium angle of 3.849 rad was obtained after 1,400 ms. 
Table 9.9: Transient stability indication in the sick island after the fifth line 4-14 was 
tripped beyond critical islanding time.  
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Time left to 
instability after 
tripping Line 
4-14 tu (ms) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
1000 3.864 1224 -6.0 
1060 3.150 1264 -1.0 
1100 3.105 1300 -1.0 
1160 3.223 1357 -1.0 
1200 3.419 1407 -1.0 
1260 2.972 1369 -1.0 
1300 4.169 1493 -2.0 
1360 4.039 1534 -1.0 
1400 3.849 1526 -1.0 
 
Figure 9.13 shows the results of the time-domain simulation of the generator angle 
trajectory in the sick island. The generator angle of G 6 was chosen as the reference 
angle. Figure 9.13 shows that G9 lost synchronism with the other cluster of generators 
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in the sick island shortly after the controlled islanding scheme was implemented at 7.8 s. 
This time-domain simulation also matched the SIME indication result if the islanding 
scheme was implemented beyond the critical islanding time. 
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Figure 9.13: Transient stability status in the sick island after controlled islanding 
scheme is assumed to happen beyond critical islanding time. 
 
The healthy island contained the remaining generators (G10, G11, G12, G13, G14, G15, 
G16). Table 9.10 shows the results of the updating calculation by SIME 0.4 s after 
islanding was implemented at 7.8 s. The obtained stability margin was found to be 1.69 
(rad/sec)
2
, which indicates a transiently stable status in the healthy island. The unstable 
equilibrium angle was calculated as 2.381 rad. The transient stability assessment using 
SIME also matched the results of the time-domain simulation, which are shown in 
Figure 9.14. As shown in Figure 9.14, the generator angle of G11 was chosen as the 
reference angle. Although it oscillated with the remaining generators in the healthy 
island, it maintained its transient stable status. 
 
G9 
G1-G8 
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Table 9.10: Transiently stable indication in the healthy island after controlled islanding 
scheme was implemented beyond critical islanding time.  
Time after Last 
Contingency 
ti (ms) 
Unstable 
Equilibrium 
Angle (rad) 
Stability Margin 
  (rad/sec)
2
 
400 2.250 6.44 
460 2.225 0.84 
500 2.222 1.14 
560 2.220 2.45 
600 2.214 4.33 
660 2.285 9.28 
700 2.319 5.57 
760 2.381 1.69 
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Figure 9.14: Transient stability status in the healthy island after controlled islanding 
scheme is assumed to happen beyond critical islanding time. 
 
9.3 How Long Does It Take to Execute the Three-Stage 
Procedure?  
The analysis and calculation in the proposed three-stage procedure must be conducted 
as quickly as possible in order to leave enough time for the islanding process. Therefore, 
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SIME was used because it calculates only the stability margin based on the transformed 
OMIB system. In the case study on the 39-busbar system, using an Intel Core 2.93 GHz 
processor with 4 GB of RAM, the time consumed by using SIME in both Stage 1 and 
Stage 3 to predict transient stability was 0.33 s. This included running the power flow 
(0.03 s) to identify the next expected tripped line, the short-time TDS (0.1 sec) 
assuming the next line was tripped, and running the SIME codes (0.2 sec) to obtain the 
stability margin. In addition, 0.03 s were required to obtain the islanding cut sets, which 
included finding the islanding candidates based on tracing and identifying the best 
islanding solution through optimization in terms of minimal power flow disruption. 
Thus, the total amount of time consumed in the three-stage controlled islanding scheme 
was 0.36 s, which is less than the 0.9 s identified as the time margin, that is, as CIT.  
In the case study on the 68-busbar system, the total time used to predict transient 
stability was 0.98 s in the three-stage controlled islanding scheme. This included the 
power flow calculation (0.04 s), the short-time TDS (0.1 s), running the SIME codes 
(0.8 s) and identifying the islanding cut sets (0.04 s). This total amount of time 
consumed was 0.98 s, which was less than that identified by CIT, which was 1.62 s. 
Therefore, in this controlled islanding scheme, the amount of time used to predict 
increased with the size and complexity of the system. Moreover, even if SIME was run 
after the last expected tripped line was actually tripped, the time used by SIME to 
indicate transient instability was still less than that identified by CIT. In the proposed 
controlled islanding scheme, SIME runs by assuming that the identified last expected 
tripped line is tripped, which to some extent gives enough time to run the SIME before 
it actually tripped at some point.  
 
9.4 Summary  
This chapter proposes a framework for the adaptive three-stage controlled islanding 
scheme used as a last resort action to prevent widespread blackouts. The framework 
includes when to island, where to island and the evaluation of dynamic stability. The 
SIME method is used in this controlled islanding scheme to predict transient stability 
status in order to determine when to island. In addition, SIME is used to evaluate the 
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dynamic stability in each island that is identified by the controlled islanding scheme, 
which uses the power flow tracing method. Power flow tracing provides islanding cut 
sets that are used in SIME to assess issues in stability. The framework using SIME in an 
online application with measurement data from SCADA is also demonstrated. The IEEE 
10-generator 39-bus system with classical generator models and 16-generator 68-bus 
system with fourth-order generator models and Type-2 exciter installed are used to test 
the three-stage controlled islanding scheme during cascading line outages. The results of 
the calculation of transient stability using SIME in the two test systems demonstrated 
that they matched the time-domain simulation. Regarding calculation speed, the total 
amount of time used in the three stages in the controlled islanding scheme was less than 
critical islanding time. In other words, when the stability margin was identified, there 
was time remaining before system lost synchronism between the generator groups. 
Regarding accuracy, SIME was relatively conservative in a small number of cases when 
the cascading lines were tripped. When the second from the last line was tripped, SIME 
showed instability before the last line was actually tripped. However, in most cases, 
SIME gave accurate results that aligned with those obtained in the time-domain 
simulation when the last line was tripped in both case studies.  
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Chapter 10:  
Conclusion and Future Work 
In this thesis, the controlled islanding scheme was investigated as a last resort action to 
prevent blackouts. The idea for this research arose from recent events in which the usual 
control methods failed and blackouts occurred around the world, such as the India 
blackout in 2011 and the US/Canada blackout in 2003. The controlled islanding scheme 
consists of a framework of three closely connected work packages: when to island, 
where to island and the dynamic evaluation of each formed island. This thesis 
contributes to the analysis of the dynamic characteristics of cascading outages. The 
SIME method was used online to predict the system’s collapse in terms of transient 
instability, giving time to respond and support decisions to implement controlled 
islanding scheme as a last resort when system collapse or blackout is imminent. In 
addition, the power flow tracing method was adopted to determine the islanding cutsets. 
The power flow tracing method was used to isolate the sick islands and prevent the 
disturbance from spreading to the remaining healthy network. In this method, power 
flow tracing divides the entire network into two parts through the cut lines. The cut lines 
are identified as weakly connected lines in which the power flows are relatively low. 
When the islands were identified, SIME was adopted to assess the transient stability of 
both the sick island and the healthy island to ensure that they were stable before the 
islanding scheme was implemented. Because islanding is a disturbance, it might cause 
subsequent instability in the formed islands.  
10.1 Conclusion 
Chapter 1 introduced the research background and objectives. Because blackouts have 
occurred in recent decades although control methods were used, environmentally 
controlled islanding methods were proposed as a last-resort action. A framework of 
controlled islanding was proposed, including when to island, where to island and the 
evaluation of dynamic stability in each island after islanding. The previous research on 
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this topic was briefly described. Our contribution to knowledge was compared with the 
previous research on the controlled islanding scheme.   
Chapter 2 begins by describing blackouts that happened in recent decades, including the 
India blackout (2011), the California blackout (2011), the Brazil blackout (2009), the 
US/Canada blackout (2003), the Denmark/Sweden blackout (2003), the Italy blackout 
(2003) and the UCTE disturbance (2003). This thesis focused on dynamic stability 
during cascading outage. In addition, conventional prevention methods in the three-
defence lines scheme were also described, particularly when the usual means failed in 
the relevant cases of blackouts. 
Chapter 3 focused on the assessment of power system security. It began with factors 
that affect system security assessment and then introduced online dynamic security 
assessment. It reviewed the previous research on the development of direct methods to 
assess transient stability in order to get rid of the time-consuming numerical integration 
approach. The criteria for the security of the power system and the classification of 
power system’s stability were explained. The well-known swing equations of 
generators and equal area criterion in power-angle curve were presented. This is the 
fundamental principle of the methodologies of EEAC and SIME, which are explained 
in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.  
Chapter 4 reviewed the previous islanding methods in terms of when to island and 
where to island. Regarding when to island, the decision tree was proposed previously. It 
was built offline using offline simulation data on a system’s collapse. A case study of 
14-busbar system was used to demonstrate training a decision tree offline for online 
application. However, decision tree based methods are too inflexible for use in power 
systems with continuously updating system topology. In addition, regarding where to 
island, the OBDD, spectral graph theory and slow coherency-based methods were 
reviewed.  
Chapter 5 proposed the novel approach of power flow tracing. This method is practical 
because it isolates the sick island, leaving the remaining healthy island intact without 
any further splitting and unnecessary disruption. It also identifies the cut lines with the 
least power flow, causing the least impact on the system. In terms of transient stability 
in the formed islands, power flow tracing-based methods identify reliable islanding 
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cutsets. Specific details regarding the power flow tracing method and its application in 
39-busbar system are explained. In addition, islanding solutions using different indices 
are also discussed, such as different transient weight, voltage weight and frequency 
weight.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the reasons that the generators in the US/Canada blackout (2003) 
and the Italy blackout (2003) were tripped. The protections for the generators are 
specified as well as protection used on the lines. Different generator models are 
introduced. The case study of a 39-busbar system is conducted to simulate a cascading 
line trip environment, in which important scenarios are observed, such as increased 
overloading on adjacent lines caused by the tripping of neighbouring lines, voltage drop 
and the malfunction in distance protection in the cascading environment.  
In Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, the methodology of EEAC and SIME are described in 
detail. They are based on the same fundamental principle to transform a multi-machine 
system to a single-machine-infinite-busbar system. The final proposed approach using 
SIME was applied in the three-stage controlled islanding scheme to support decisions 
about when to island. The novel contribution of this research is that it uses SIME to 
formulate and assess transient stability during cascading line trips instead of the 
conventional fault applied on a line. In addition, this thesis proposes a framework for 
three-stage controlled islanding. In deciding when to island, the framework used SIME 
online to predict transient stability. In the case study, the cascading line trip 
environment is simulated. Assuming that the next expected tripped line is known, SIME 
was used online to predict transient stability status and decide whether the next 
expected line was at the “point of no return”. If so, SIME was used to assess the 
transient stability status in each island after the islanding cut sets were provided by the 
power tracing method. If not, SIME continued monitoring the system’s transient 
stability status after each line was tripped.  
Chapter 9 presents the results of the case studies of the 39-busbar system and the 68-
busbar system. Both sets of results showed that SIME matched the time-domain 
simulation. In addition, the time left to instability was obtained by SIME when the last 
line of “point of no return” was assumed to be tripped. The time left to instability was 
the critical islanding time that remained to respond and take islanding actions, which 
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also matched time left to instability in the time-domain simulation in the study case. 
The critical islanding time was obtained before the next expected line was tripped. 
However, it was subject to the cascading speed.  
 
10.2 Future Work 
In this thesis, the online application of SIME used to decide when to island was based 
on certain assumptions. The online transient stability assessment in the predictive mode 
was based on the assumption that the next expected tripped line could be predicted in 
advance. In some low-voltage-rating transmission networks, this could be obtained 
based on the thermal characteristics of the overcurrent protection installed in each line. 
In control rooms, N-1 contingency analysis is implemented every ten minutes, so the 
system operators know which line will overload if a particular fault happens, and the 
relevant line is assumed to be tripped. However, in high-voltage-rating transmission 
networks, distance protection is normally installed in each line. Therefore, it is difficult 
to know in advance. In addition, the network configuration in the transmission network 
is not radial; instead, it is a complicated meshed power network. The back-up Zone 3 
distance protection, which is a two-line distance away from the faulted line, may 
operate because of the inappropriate integration of distance relays in a meshed power 
system, especially across the borders between two areas or two countries. This could 
accelerate the speed of cascading outages. Future research should investigate how 
distance protections are affected by cascading line outages. 
Voltage stability is another issue for future research. It is well known that voltage 
collapse leads to the collapse of local systems. However, this thesis mainly focused on 
online transient stability assessment during cascading outages, which could result in 
global system collapse. Currently, voltage stability assessment is based on small-signal 
stability analysis. However, during the dynamic process the operating condition keeps 
varying, so small-signal stability analysis would not satisfy the accuracy of voltage 
stability assessment. Online dynamic voltage stability assessment is still being 
investigated for its online application. Future research should investigate online voltage 
stability assessment during cascading outages to check the voltage cross the threshold 
145 
 
value or assess the distance from the monitored voltage to the threshold value. The 
more online assessment tools that we have, the more reliable and supportive 
information we can gain about the operation of systems and the better we will be able to 
implement the controlled islanding scheme in a reliable manner.  
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Appendix A:  
Modelling and Protection 
 
A.1 Generator Modelling 
Power system generators play a significant role in dynamic change under a contingency 
situation. Any dynamic behaviour in the power system is linked to generator modelling, 
particularly any oscillation occurs in variables in the network is caused by the 
oscillation of the generator angle. Therefore, different generator models have different 
effects on the system’s dynamic behaviour under disturbance. The generator models in a 
power network within the scope of this research. They will be used to test the 
methodology implemented to achieve the research objective. Some generator models 
are listed in the following section, including classic second-order, fourth-order and 
sixth-order generator modelling. Different orders of generator models represent 
different numbers of state variables that are used to describe the generator’s dynamic 
behaviour. These three generator models are described as follows: 
 Second-order generator model 
In the second-order model, the state variables used to describe the generator’s dynamic 
behaviour are generator angle   and angular speed  . In [83][84], the two state 
variables were described by two differential equations as follows:  
                                                1b 

                                                                   (A.1) 
                                                 1 /m eP P D M 

                                           (A.2) 
where, b  is the angular speed coefficient; D is the damping coefficient; M is the 
mechanical starting time; mP  is the mechanical power; eP  is the electrical power; and 
eP  is defined as follows: 
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                                                  e q a q q d a d dP v r i i v r i i                                  (A.3) 
where qv  and qi  are q-axis voltage and current; dv  and di  are d-axis voltage and current; 
and ar  is armature resistance. The generator terminal voltage and current relationship is 
described as 
                                                 ' '0 q a q q d l dv r i e x x i                                      (A.4) 
                                                 '0 d a d d l qv r i x x i                                             (A.5) 
where lx  is leakage reactance; 
'
dx  is d-axis transient reactance; 
'
qe  is q-axis transient 
voltage, which is constant because in the classic generator model, no field current is 
introduced into the modelling, which helps adjust the generator terminal voltage. 
 Fourth-order generator model 
In the fourth-order generator model, there are four state variables, which are expected to 
change during the transient process. In addition to the generator angle and angular speed, 
the q-axis transient voltage 'qe  and d-axis transient voltage 
'
de  are introduced into the 
generator modelling, which are used to form q-axis and d-axis inductances because of 
the field winding effect. In [83][84] the four variables were described by the four 
following differential equations: 
                                                1b 

                                                                   (A.6) 
                                                 1 /m eP P D M 

                                           (A.7) 
                                               
' ' ' * '
0( ( ) ( ) ) /q s q d d d f de f e x x i v T

                               (A.8) 
                                               
' ' ' '
0( ( ) ) /d d q q q qe e x x i T

                                             (A.9) 
where dx  and 
'
dx  are d-axis synchronous reactance and transient reactance; qx  and 
'
qx  
are q-axis synchronous reactance and transient reactance; ' 0dT  and 
'
0qT  are d-axis and q-
axis open circuit transient time constant; and 
*
fv is the field current, which is controlled 
by the AVR to adjust generator voltage. The remaining variables are the same as those 
in the second-order generator model. The generator terminal voltage and current 
relationship with the introduced transient components can be expressed as follows: 
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                                               ' '0 q a q q d l dv r i e x x i                                      (A.10) 
                                               ' '0 d a d d q l qv r i e x x i                                      (A.11) 
 Sixth-order generator model 
Compared with the fourth-order model, the sixth-order model is more accurate and it 
introduces extra sub-transient components, which link to the effect of damper winding. 
It introduces more sub-transient inductance into the d-axis and the q-axis of the circuit, 
which can be presented by the d-axis and q-axis sub-transient voltage ''de  and 
''
qe . 
Therefore, the six state variables can be expressed as follows [83][84]: 
                             1b 

                                                                                    (A.12) 
                              1 /m eP P D M 

                                                            (A.13) 
                           
'' ''
' ' ' ' '' * '0
0' ' '
0 0
( ( ) ( ( )) (1 ) ) /d d AAq s q d d d d d f d
d d d
T x T
e f e x x x x i v T
T x T

        (A.14) 
                           
'' ''
0' ' ' ' '
0' '
0
( ( ( )) ) /
q q
d d q q q q q q
q q
T x
e e x x x x i T
T x

                                    (A.15) 
                           
'' ''
'' '' ' ' '' ' * ''0
0' ' '
0 0
( ( ( )) ) /d d AAq q q d d d d d f d
d d d
T x T
e e e x x x x i v T
T x T

               (A.16) 
                           
'' ''
0'' '' ' ' '' ' ''
0' '
0
( ( ( )) ) /
q q
d d d q q q q q q
q q
T x
e e e x x x x i T
T x

                              (A.17) 
where ''dx  and 
''
qx  are the d-axis and q-axis sub-transient reactance; 
''
0dT  and 
''
0qT  are d-
axis and q-axis open circuit sub-transient time constant. The remaining state variables 
are the same as those in the fourth-order generator model. The generator terminal 
voltage and the current relationship with both transient and sub-transient components 
introduced can be expressed as follows: 
                                         '' ''0 q a q q d l dv r i e x x i                                            (A.18) 
                                         '' ''0 d a d d q l qv r i e x x i                                            (A.19) 
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A.2 Generator Protection 
The safe operation of the generator cannot be guaranteed without the installation of 
corresponding protection. The most widely used devices used to protect generators are 
as follows: 
 Under-voltage protection: Under-voltage protection is used as low voltage protection 
at the generator terminal in case of the failure of the AVR. The setting of under-voltage 
relays in [87] could be either inverse time characteristics when the voltage drops to 
90% of the rated voltage after a 9-s delay, or it could respond instantaneously when the 
voltage decreases to 80% of the rated voltage.  
 Over-voltage protection: Normally, over-voltage protection is provided for hydro 
generating units and combustion turbine units. When no AVR or backup protection is 
required, overvoltage relays are used. The setting of overvoltage relays [62] could either 
have a pickup of value at above 110% of rated voltage with a time delay of about 5-10 s 
based on inverse time characteristics or respond instantaneously performance when the 
voltage exceeds the value of 130%-150% of the voltage rating. 
 Under-frequency protection: In order to achieve a power balance in system, under-
frequency load shedding will take action before the frequency reaches 47.7 Hz [1]. 
When the frequency drops to 47.5 Hz, which is the minimum frequency setting for 
under-frequency protection, the latter intervenes and trips the generators. 
 Over-speed (over-frequency) protection: Normally, the detection of high frequency 
can be an indication of unintended island operation, in which the generation is more 
than the demand. This may cause additional mechanical stresses or even damage to the 
rotor. Hence, the installed over-frequency relay aims to protect and trip the generator. 
Normally, the threshold is set at +2 Hz of the nominal frequency [1]. 
 Loss-of-field protection and overloading field protection: In the excitation system of 
generators, the OEL is generally sleeping unless the field current is required to increase 
and exceeds its thermal limit. The limiter is then activated, and it sends a signal to the 
reference voltage of AVR to prevent it from trying to provide more field current. 
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Meanwhile, the field current is maintained at its maximum value without violating the 
threshold.  
A.3 Transmission Network Protection 
 Overcurrent Protection 
In the network, the fundamental and most often used type of protection is the 
overcurrent relay. The settings of overcurrent relays have to coordinate with the other 
relays located in the network so that under fault conditions, the relays that are required 
to be tripped actually trip. At present, most overcurrent relays are inverse time 
overcurrent relays, which are advantageous in adapting to the increasing size and 
complexity of power systems.  
In addition, overcurrent relays monitor the primary current in a network by monitoring 
the secondary current obtained via the current transformer (CT) whose primary winding 
is connected in high-voltage distribution lines. Typically, the secondary current is rated 
at either 1A or 5A, which can also be adjusted by the plug scale multiplier (PSM) to 
match the rated primary current of CT the current setting of the relays. IEC 60255 
defined standard characteristics of IDMT relays that have different time/current tripping 
characteristics. These are according to the following defined standard equations shown 
in Table A.1. 
Table A.1: Relay characteristics and corresponding equations [89]. 
Relay Characteristic Equation (IEC60255) 
 
Standard Inverse (SI) 
0.02
0.14
1r
t TMS
I
 

 
 
Very Inverse (VI) 
13.5
1r
t TMS
I
 

 
 
Extremely Inverse (EI) 
2
80
1r
t TMS
I
 

 
 
Long time standard earth fault 
120
1r
t TMS
I
 

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where, 
r
N
I
I
PSM I


, I  is the faulted current monitored by the relay; NI  is the 
nominal current of the relay; PSM is the plug scale multiplier, which is used to adjust 
the setting of the relay current. Normally, in order to achieve both sensitivity and 
operation reliability, it is usual to set the pickup current (which is equal to NPSM I ) 
well above twice the maximum of the load current expected in the network and below 
half the minimum fault current, which also can be shown as max2pickup loadI I   , 
min
1
2
pickup faultI I   . In Table A.1. TMS is the time multiplier setting, which is used to 
obtain time discrimination between the main relay located near the fault area and the 
back-up relays on the same line in order to achieve better selectivity.  
    
Figure A.1: Characteristics of different type of IDMT overcurrent relays [89]. 
In Figure A.1, the relay characteristics are inverse ratio curves. The larger the 
overcurrent is, the less time the circuit breaker needs to clear the faulted line. 
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 Distance Protection 
The primary advantages of overcurrent protection are simplicity, reliability and low cost. 
However, in complicated high-voltage transmission, the sensitivity, rapidity and 
selectivity of overcurrent protection cannot be guaranteed. Under this circumstance, 
distance protection is used in transmission networks. It determined the location where 
faults occur, and it is not susceptible to operation status and network topology [15]. 
Figure A.2 shows three zones of distance protection in transmission lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2: Stepped distance protection [15].      
In Figure A.2 the under reaching Zone-1 is set between 80% and 90% of the first line 
length. The distance relay (DR) in this zone operates instantaneously. The overreaching 
Zone-2 is set at 120%-150% of the first line length AB as the back-up operation, which 
is beyond the remote terminal of the first line. The DR operates after a coordination 
time delay of 0.3 seconds. Zone-3 is set at 120%-180% of the second line BC as the 
back-up protection for the entire line BC. Similarly, the DR has a delayed tripping time 
of 1 s.  
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Figure A.3: Complex R-X diagram for characteristics of DR [87]. 
Figure A.3 shows a complex R-X diagram using the impedance characteristics of DR, 
which is a circle with a circumference that passes through the origin of coordinates. 
This indicates that the impedance element is directional. The DR only operates for the 
faults in the forward direction on the straight line, not in the reverse direction. In 
addition, the impedance characteristic can be adjusted by setting the impedance, which 
is the diameter of the circle, to finish the reach control. When a fault occurs and the 
value of the fault impedance is a characteristic, the DR will operate. The characteristic 
equation of the DR is as follows: 
                                                 
1 1
2 2
measure set setZ Z Z                                              (20) 
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Appendix B:  
System data for simulated network 
Appendix B consists of the system data used for 39-busbar and 68-busbar systems’ 
simulation in Chapter 9. The date are represented in MATLAB-based PSAT fomat [83]-
[84], including all of components and devices, such as busbar, line, slack bus, PQ bus, 
PV bus, synchronous generator, excitor and governor.   
B.1 39-bus system 
Bus.con = [ ... 
   1    1.00  1.048    -0.1646   1 1;  
   2    1.00  1.0505  -0.1203   1 1;  
   3    1.00  1.0341  -0.1698   1 1;  
   4    1.00  1.0116  -0.1838   1 1;  
   5    1.00  1.0165  -0.1637   1 1;  
   6    1.00  1.0172  -0.1515   1 1;  
   7    1.00  1.0067  -0.1892   1 1;  
   8    1.00  1.0057  -0.1979   1 1;  
   9    1.00  1.0322  -0.1946   1 1;  
  10   1.00  1.0235  -0.1101   1 1;  
  11   1.00  1.0201  -0.1243   1 1;  
  12   1.00  1.0072  -0.1246   2 1;  
  13   1.00  1.0207  -0.1225   3 1;  
  14   1.00  1.0181  -0.1511   4 1;  
  15   1.00  1.0194  -0.1581   5 1;  
  16   1.00  1.0346  -0.1337   6 1;  
  17   1.00  1.0365  -0.1510   7 1;  
  18   1.00  1.0343  -0.1656   8 1;  
  19   1.00  1.0509  -0.0531   9 1;  
  20   1.00  0.9914  -0.0777   1 1;  
  21   1.00  1.0337  -0.0918   1 1;  
  22   1.00  1.0509  -0.0143   2 1;  
  23   1.00  1.0459  -0.0178   3 1;  
  24   1.00  1.0399  -0.1316   4 1;  
  25   1.00  1.0587  -0.0962   5 1;  
  26   1.00  1.0536  -0.1182   6 1;  
  27   1.00  1.0399  -0.1532   7 1;  
  28   1.00  1.0509  -0.0571   8 1;  
  29   1.00  1.0505  -0.0089   9 1;  
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  30   1.00  1.0475  -0.0780   1 1;  
  31   1.00  0.9820  -0.0308   1 1;  
  32   1.00  0.9831   0.0284   2 1;  
  33   1.00  0.9972   0.0380   3 1;  
  34   1.00  1.0123   0.0129   4 1;  
  35   1.00  1.0493   0.0723   5 1;  
  36   1.00  1.0635   0.1192   6 1;  
  37   1.00  1.0278   0.0220   7 1;  
  38   1.00  1.0265   0.1143   8 1;  
  39   1.00  1.0300  -0            9 1;]; 
 
Line.con = [ ... 
1    2   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00350  0.04110  0.69870  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
1    39 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00100  0.02500  0.75000  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
2    3   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00130  0.01510  0.25720  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
2    25 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00700  0.00860  0.14600  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
2    30 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.025   0     0.01810  0.00000  1.02500  0  0   0  0  1; 
3    18 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00110  0.01330  0.21380  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
4    5   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00080  0.01280  0.13420  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
4    14 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00080  0.01290  0.13820  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
5    8   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00080  0.01120  0.14760  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
6    5   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00020  0.00260  0.04340  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
6    7   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00060  0.00920  0.11300  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
6    11 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00070  0.00820  0.13890  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
7    8   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00040  0.00460  0.07800  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
8    9   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00230  0.03630  0.38040  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
9    39 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00100  0.02500  1.20000  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
10  11 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00040  0.00430  0.07290  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
10  13 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00040  0.00430  0.07290  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
10  32 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.07  0        0.02000  0.00000  1.07000  0  0   0  0  1; 
12  11 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.006  0.00160  0.04350   0     1.00600  0  0   0  0  1; 
12  13 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.006  0.00160  0.04350   0     1.00600  0  0   0  0  1; 
13  14 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00090  0.01010  0.17230  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
14  15 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00180  0.02170  0.36600  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
15  16 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00090  0.00940  0.17100  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
16  17 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00070  0.00890  0.13420  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
16  19 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00160  0.01950  0.30400  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;   
16  21 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00080  0.01350  0.25480  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;     
16  24 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00030  0.00590  0.06800  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;       
17  18 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00070  0.00820  0.13190  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;         
17  27 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00130  0.01730  0.32160  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;           
19  33 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.07  0.00070  0.01420    0      1.07000  0  0   0  0  1; 
19  20 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.06  0.00070  0.01380    0      1.06000  0  0   0  0  1; 
20  34 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.009 0.00090  0.01800   0      1.00900  0  0   0  0  1; 
21  22 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00080  0.01400  0.25650  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;   
22  23 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00060  0.00960  0.18460  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; 
22  35 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.025  0      0.01430         0      1.02500  0  0   0  0  1;  
23  24 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00220  0.03500  0.36100  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;    
23  36 100.00   1.00 60 0  1  0.00050  0.02720         0      1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;      
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25  26 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00320  0.03230  0.51300  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;      
25  37 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.025 0.00060  0.02320   0      1.02500  0  0   0  0  1;      
26  27 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00140  0.01470  0.23960  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;        
26  28 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00430  0.04740  0.78020  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;          
26  29 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00570  0.06250  1.02900  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;            
28  29 100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00140  0.01510  0.24900  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1;             
29  38 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.025 0.00080  0.01560   0      1.02500  0  0   0  0  1; 
6    31 100.00   1.00 60 0  1.07     0     0.02500         0      1.07000  0  0   0  0  1;   
3    4   100.00   1.00 60 0  0  0.00130  0.02130  0.22140  1.00000  0  0   0  0  1; ]; 
 
SW.con = [ ... 
 39 100.0   1.00  1.0300    0    15   -10     1.1 0.9  10 1;]; 
 
PQ.con = [ ... 
   1  100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
   2  100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
   3  100.0   1.00  3.2200   0.0240  1.1  0.9 1; 
   4  100.0   1.00  5.0000   1.8400  1.1  0.9 1; 
   5  100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
   6  100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
   7  100.0   1.00  2.3380   0.8400  1.1  0.9 1; 
   8  100.0   1.00  5.2200   1.7600  1.1  0.9 1; 
   9  100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  10 100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  11 100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  12 100.0   1.00  0.0850   0.8800  1.1  0.9 1; 
  13 100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  14 100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  15 100.0   1.00  3.2000   1.5300  1.1  0.9 1; 
  16 100.0   1.00  3.2900   0.3230  1.1  0.9 1; 
  17 100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  18 100.0   1.00  1.5800   0.3000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  19 100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  20 100.0   1.00  6.2800   1.0300  1.1  0.9 1; 
  21 100.0   1.00  2.7400   1.1500  1.1  0.9 1; 
  22 100.0   1.00  0.0000   0.0000  1.1  0.9 1; 
  23 100.0   1.00  2.4750   0.8460  1.1  0.9 1; 
  24 100.0   1.00  3.0860   -0.922   1.1  0.9 1; 
  25 100.0   1.00  2.2400   0.4720  1.1  0.9 1; 
  26 100.0   1.00  1.3900   0.1700  1.1  0.9 1; 
  27 100.0   1.00  2.8100   0.7550  1.1  0.9 1; 
  28 100.0   1.00  2.0600   0.2760  1.1  0.9 1; 
  29 100.0   1.00  2.8350   0.2690  1.1  0.9 1; 
  39 100.0   1.00  11.040   2.5000  1.1  0.9 1;]; 
 
PV.con = [ ... 
  30 100.0   1.00  2.5000   1.0475  8     -5    1.1 0.9 1; 
  31 100.0   1.00  2.0000   0.985    8   -5    1.1 0.9 1; 
  32 100.0   1.00  6.5000   0.9831  8     -5    1.1 0.9 1; 
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  33 100.0   1.00  6.3200   0.9972  8     -5    1.1 0.9 1; 
  34 100.0   1.00  5.0800   1.0123  4     -3    1.1 0.9 1; 
  35 100.0   1.00  6.5000   1.0493  8     -5    1.1 0.9 1; 
  36 100.0   1.00  5.6000   1.0635  8     -5    1.1 0.9 1; 
  37 100.0   1.00  5.4000   1.0278  8     -5    1.1 0.9 1; 
  38 100.0   1.00  8.3000   1.0265  8     -5    1.1 0.9 1;]; 
 
Syn.con = [ ...  
30  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0125  0.00014  0.1000  0.0310   0     10.20  0    0.0690  0.0310  0    
1.500  0    84.000     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
31  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.035   0.00270  0.2950  0.0697    0     6.560  0    0.2820  0.170    0    
1.500  0    60.600     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
32  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0304  0.000386 0.2495  0.0531  0     5.700  0    0.2370  0.0531  0    
1.500  0    70.600     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
33  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0295  0.000222 0.2620  0.0436  0     5.690  0    0.2580  0.0436  0    
1.500  0    57.200     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
34  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0540  0.00014  0.6700  0.1320   0     5.400  0    0.6200  0.1320  0    
0.440  0    52.000     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
35  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0224  0.00615  0.2540  0.0500   0     7.300  0    0.2410  0.0500  0    
0.400  0    69.600     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
36  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0322  0.000268 0.2950  0.0490  0     5.660  0    0.2920  0.0490  0    
1.500  0    52.800     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
37  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0280  0.000686 0.2900  0.0570  0     6.700  0    0.2800  0.0570  0    
0.410  0    48.600     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
38  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0298  0.00030  0.2106  0.0570   0     4.790  0    0.2050  0.0570  0    
1.960  0    69.000     0  0  0  1  1  0.002; 
39  100.0  1.0  60  5  0.0030  0.00010  0.0200  0.0060   0     7.000  0    0.019   0.008     0    
0.700  0    1000.0     0  0  0  1  1  0.002;]; 
 
B.2 68-bus system 
Bus.con = [ ... 
   1         1          1              0; 
   2         1          1              0; 
   3         1          1              0; 
   4         1          1              0; 
   5         1          1              0; 
   6         1          1              0; 
   7         1          1              0; 
   8         1          1              0; 
   9         1          1              0; 
  10        1          1              0; 
  11        1          1              0; 
  12        1          1              0; 
  13        1          1              0; 
  14        1          1              0; 
  15        1          1              0; 
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  16        1          1              0; 
  17        1          1              0; 
  18        1          1              0; 
  19        1          1              0; 
  20        1          1              0; 
  21        1          1              0; 
  22        1          1              0; 
  23        1          1              0; 
  24        1          1              0; 
  25        1          1              0; 
  26        1          1              0; 
  27        1          1              0; 
  28        1          1              0; 
  29        1          1              0; 
  30        1          1              0; 
  31        1          1              0; 
  32        1          1              0; 
  33        1          1              0; 
  34        1          1              0; 
  35        1          1              0; 
  36        1          1              0; 
  37        1          1              0; 
  38        1          1              0; 
  39        1          1              0; 
  40        1          1              0; 
  41        1          1              0; 
  42        1          1              0; 
  43        1          1              0; 
  44        1          1              0; 
  45        1          1              0; 
  46        1          1              0; 
  47        1          1              0; 
  48        1          1              0; 
  49        1          1              0; 
  50        1          1              0; 
  51        1          1              0; 
  52        1          1              0; 
  53        13.8    1.045        0; 
  54        13.8     0.98         0; 
  55        13.8    0.983        0; 
  56        13.8    0.997        0; 
  57        13.8    1.011        0; 
  58        13.8     1.05         0; 
  59        13.8    1.063        0; 
  60        13.8     1.03         0; 
  61        13.8    1.025        0; 
  62        13.8     1.01         0; 
  63        13.8        1           0; 
  64        13.8    1.016        0; 
159 
 
  65        13.8    1.011        0; 
  66        13.8        1           0; 
  67        13.8        1           0; 
  68        13.8        1           0]; 
 
Line.con = [ ... 
1     2 100 1   60 0    0 0.0035      0.0411 0.6987     0      0 0; 
1    30 100 1   60 0    0 0.0008      0.0074 0.48     0      0 0; 
2     3 100 1   60 0    0 0.0013      0.0151 0.2572     0      0  0; 
2    25 100 1   60 0    0 0.007      0.0086 0.146     0      0 0; 
2    53 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.0181 0     1.025    0 0; 
3     4 100 1   60 0    0 0.0013      0.0213 0.2214     0      0 0; 
3    18 100 1   60 0    0 0.0011      0.0133 0.2138     0      0 0; 
4     5 100 1   60 0    0 0.0008      0.0128 0.1342     0      0 0; 
4    14 100 1   60 0    0 0.0008      0.0129 0.1382     0      0 0; 
5     6 100 1   60 0    0 0.0002      0.0026 0.0434     0      0 0; 
5     8 100 1   60 0    0 0.0008      0.0112 0.1476     0      0 0; 
6     7 100 1   60 0    0 0.0006      0.0092 0.113     0      0 0; 
6    11 100 1   60 0    0 0.0007      0.0082 0.1389     0      0 0; 
6    54 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.025 0     1.07      0 0; 
7     8 100 1   60 0    0 0.0004      0.0046 0.078     0      0 0; 
8     9 100 1   60 0    0 0.0023      0.0363 0.3804     0      0 0; 
10  11 100 1   60 0    0 0.0004      0.0043 0.0729     0      0 0; 
10  13 100 1   60 0    0 0.0004      0.0043 0.0729     0      0 0; 
10  55 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.02 0     1.07      0 0; 
12  11 100 1   60 0    0 0.0016      0.0435 0     1.06      0 0; 
12  13 100 1   60 0    0 0.0016      0.0435 0     1.06      0 0; 
13  14 100 1   60 0    0 0.0009      0.0101 0.1723     0      0 0; 
14  15 100 1   60 0    0 0.0018      0.0217 0.366     0      0 0; 
15  16 100 1   60 0    0 0.0009      0.0094 0.171     0      0 0; 
16  17 100 1   60 0    0 0.0007      0.0089 0.1342     0      0 0; 
16  19 100 1   60 0    0 0.0016      0.0195 0.304     0      0 0; 
16  21 100 1   60 0    0 0.0008      0.0135 0.2548     0      0 0; 
16  24 100 1   60 0    0 0.0003      0.0059 0.068     0      0 0; 
17  18 100 1   60 0    0 0.0007      0.0082 0.1319     0      0 0; 
17  27 100 1   60 0    0 0.0013      0.0173 0.3216     0      0 0; 
19  20 100 1   60 0    0 0.0007      0.0138 0     1.06      0 0; 
19  56 100 1   60 0   10 0.0007      0.0142 0     1.07      0 0; 
20  57 100 1   60 0   10 0.0009      0.018 0     1.009    0 0; 
21  22 100 1   60 0    0 0.0008      0.014 0.2565     0      0 0; 
22  23 100 1   60 0    0 0.0006      0.0096 0.1846     0      0 0; 
22  58 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.0143 0     1.025    0 0; 
23  24 100 1   60 0    0 0.0022      0.035 0.361     0      0 0; 
23  59 100 1   60 0   10 0.0005      0.0272 0     0      0 0; 
25  26 100 1   60 0    0 0.0032      0.0323 0.531     0      0 0; 
25  60 100 1   60 0   10 0.0006      0.0232 0     1.025    0 0; 
26  27 100 1   60 0    0 0.0014      0.0147 0.2396     0      0   0; 
26  28 100 1   60 0    0 0.0043      0.0474 0.7802     0      0 0; 
26  29 100 1   60 0    0 0.0057      0.0625 1.029     0      0 0; 
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28  29 100 1   60 0    0 0.0014      0.0151 0.249     0      0 0; 
29  61 100 1   60 0   10 0.0008      0.0156        0              1.025    0 0; 
 9   30 100 1   60 0    0 0.00095    0.00915      0.145       0      0 0; 
 9   36 100 1   60 0    0 0.0011      0.0098        0.17         0      0 0; 
36  37 100 1   60 0    0 0.0005      0.0045 0.32     0      0 0; 
34  36 100 1   60 0    0 0.0033      0.0111 1.45      0      0 0; 
35  34 100 1   60 0    0 0.0001      0.0074 0     0.946    0 0; 
33  34 100 1   60 0    0 0.0011      0.0157 0.202     0      0 0; 
32  33 100 1   60 0    0 0.0008      0.0099 0.168     0      0 0; 
30  31 100 1   60 0    0 0.0013      0.0187 0.333     0      0 0; 
30  32 100 1   60 0    0 0.0024      0.0288 0.488     0      0 0; 
 1   31 100 1   60 0    0 0.0016      0.0163 0.25     0      0 0; 
31  38 100 1   60 0    0 0.0011      0.0147 0.247     0      0 0; 
33  38 100 1   60 0    0 0.0036      0.0444 0.693     0      0 0; 
38  46 100 1   60 0    0 0.0022      0.0284 0.43     0      0 0; 
46  49 100 1   60 0    0 0.0018      0.0274 0.27     0      0 0; 
 1   47 100 1   60 0    0 0.0013      0.0188 1.31     0      0 0; 
47  48 100 1   60 0    0 0.00125    0.0134         0.2     0      0 0; 
48  40 100 1   60 0    0 0.002      0.022 1.28     0      0 0; 
35  45 100 1   60 0    0 0.0007      0.0175 1.39     0      0 0; 
37  43 100 1   60 0    0 0.0005      0.0276 0     0      0 0; 
43  44 100 1   60 0    0 0.0001      0.0011 0     0      0 0; 
44  45 100 1   60 0    0 0.0025      0.073 0     0      0 0; 
39  44 100 1   60 0    0 0      0.0411 0     0      0 0; 
39  45 100 1   60 0    0 0      0.0839 0     0      0  0; 
45  51 100 1   60 0    0 0.0002      0.0052 0.72     0      0 0;   
50  52 100 1   60 0    0 0.0012      0.0288 2.06     0      0 0; 
50  51 100 1   60 0    0 0.0009      0.0221 1.62     0      0 0; 
49  52 100 1   60 0    0 0.0076      0.1141 1.16     0      0 0; 
52  42 100 1   60 0    0 0.004      0.06 2.25     0      0 0; 
42  41 100 1   60 0    0 0.004      0.06 2.25     0      0 0; 
41  40 100 1   60 0    0 0.006      0.084 3.15     0      0 0; 
31  62 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.026 0     1.04      0 0; 
32  63 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.013 0     1.04      0 0; 
36  64 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.0075 0     1.04      0 0; 
37  65 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.0033 0     1.04      0 0; 
41  66 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.0015 0     1      0 0; 
42  67 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.015 0     1      0 0; 
52  68 100 1   60 0   10 0      0.003 0     1      0 0; 
 1   27 100 1   60 0    0 0.032      0.32 0.41     1      0  0]; 
 
SW.con = [ ... 
  65      100        13.8    1.011        0        999        -999        1.5        0.5    35.91  1]; 
 
PV.con = [ ... 
  53      100        13.8      2.5        1.045      999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  54      100        13.8      5.45      0.98        999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  55      100        13.8      6.5        0.983      999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  56      100        13.8      6.32      0.997      999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
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  57      100        13.8      5.052    1.011      999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  58      100        13.8        7         1.05        999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  59      100        13.8      5.6        1.063      999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  60      100        13.8      5.4        1.03        999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  61      100        13.8        8         1.025      999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  62      100        13.8        5         1.01        999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  63      100        13.8       10        1             999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  64      100        13.8      13.5      1.016      999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  66      100        13.8      17.85    1             999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  67      100        13.8      10         1             999     -999      1.2      0.8  1; 
  68      100        13.8      40         1             999     -999      1.2      0.8  1];  
 
PQ.con = [ ... 
   1       100        1        2.527       1.186        1.2      0.8  0;   
   3       100        1        3.22         0.02          1.2      0.8  0;   
   4       100        1        5              1.84          1.2      0.8  0;   
   7       100        1        2.34         0.84          1.2      0.8  0;   
   8       100        1        5.22         1.77          1.2      0.8  0;   
   9       100        1        1.04         1.25          1.2      0.8  0;   
  12      100        1        0.09         0.88          1.2      0.8  0;   
  15      100        1        3.2           1.53          1.2      0.8  0;   
  16      100        1        3.29         0.32          1.2      0.8  0;   
  18      100        1        1.58         0.3            1.2      0.8  0;   
  20      100        1        6.8           1.03          1.2      0.8  0;   
  21      100        1        2.74         1.15          1.2      0.8  0;   
  23      100        1        2.48         0.85          1.2      0.8  0;   
  24      100        1        3.09        -0.92          1.2      0.8  0;   
  25      100        1        2.24         0.47          1.2      0.8  0;   
  26      100        1        1.39         0.17          1.2      0.8  0;   
  27      100        1        2.81         0.76          1.2      0.8  0;   
  28      100        1        2.06         0.28          1.2      0.8  0;   
  29      100        1        2.84         0.27          1.2      0.8  0;   
  33      100        1        1.12         0               1.2      0.8  0;   
  36      100        1        1.02       -0.1946       1.2      0.8  0;   
  37      100        1        60           3                1.2      0.8  0;   
  39      100        1        2.67        0.126         1.2      0.8  0;   
  40      100        1        0.6563   0.2353        1.2      0.8  0;   
  41      100        1       10            2.5             1.2      0.8  0;   
  42      100        1       11.5         2.5             1.2      0.8  0;   
  44      100        1       2.676       0.0484       1.2      0.8  0;   
  45      100        1       2.08         0.21           1.2      0.8  0;   
  46      100        1       1.507       0.285         1.2      0.8  0;   
  47      100        1       2.031       0.3259       1.2      0.8  0;   
  48      100        1       2.412       0.022         1.2      0.8  0;   
  49      100        1       1.64         0.29           1.2      0.8  0;   
  50      100        1        1            -1.47           1.2      0.8  0;   
  51      100        1       3.37        -1.22           1.2      0.8  0;   
  52      100        1       24.7         1.23           1.2      0.8  0;];  
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Syn.con=[... 
 
 
53   100   13.8   60   4   0.01 0   0.1     0.031   0.03 10.2 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.03
 1.5     0.04 84      4 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
54   100   13.8   60   4   0.04 0   0.3     0.07    0.05 6.56 0.05 0.28 0.06 0.05
 1.5     0.04 60.4 9.8 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
55   100   13.8   60   4   0.03 0   0.25   0.053   0.05 5.7       0.05 0.24 0.05 0.05
 1.5     0.04 71.6 10 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
56   100   13.8   60   4   0.03 0   0.26   0.044   0.04 5.69 0.05 0.26 0.04 0.04
 1.5     0.04 57.2 10 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
57   100   13.8   60   4   0.03 0   0.33   0.066   0.05 5.4       0.05 0.31 0.06 0.05
 0.44   0.04 52         3 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
58   100   13.8   60   4   0.02 0   0.25   0.05    0.04 7.3       0.05 0.24 0.05 0.04
 0.4     0.04 69.6 10 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
59   100   13.8   60   4   0.03 0   0.3     0.049   0.04 5.66 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.04
 1.5     0.04 52.8 8 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
60   100   13.8   60   4   0.03 0   0.29   0.057   0.05 6.7       0.05 0.28 0.05 0.05
 0.41    0.04 48.6 9 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
61   100   13.8   60   4   0.03 0   0.21   0.057   0.05 4.79 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.05
 1.96    0.04 69      14 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
62   100   13.8   60   4   0.02 0   0.17   0.046   0.04 9.37 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.04
 1.5     0.04 62      5.6 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
63   100   13.8   60   4   0.01 0   0.13   0.018   0.01 4.1     0.05 0.12 0.02 0.01
 1.5     0.04 56.4 13.6 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
64   100   13.8   60   4   0.02 0    0.1    0.031   0.03 7.4     0.05 0.1       0.03 0.03
 1.5     0.04 184.6 13.5 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
65   200   13.8   60   4   0.01    0   0.03  0.006   0       5.9     0.05 0.03 0.01   0                                                                                                                                                                                                               
1.5     0.04 496     33 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
66   100   13.8   60   4   0.03    0   0.02  0.003   0       4.1     0.05 0.02 0.01       0       
1.5     0.04 600     100 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
67   100   13.8  60    4   0.02    0    0.02   0.003  0       4.1     0.05 0.02 0.01       0           
1.5     0.04 600     100 0 0 1 1 1 0; 
68   200   13.8   60   4   0.01    0    0.04   0.007  0.01  7.8     0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01
 1.5     0.04 450     50 0 0 1 1 1 0]; 
 
Exc.con=[... 
1     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
2     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
3     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
4     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
5     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
6     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
7     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
8     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
9     2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
10   2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
11   2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
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12   2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
13   2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
14   2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
15   2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9  
16   2 10   -10    30 0.02 0 1 0.1 0.785 0.001 0 0.9;]; 
 
Tg.con = [ ...  
1    2  1  0.02  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
2    2  1  0.02  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
3    2  1  0.01  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
4    2  1  0.02  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
5    2  1  0.02  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
6    2  1  0.02  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
7    2  1  0.01  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
8    2  1  0.02  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
9    2  1  0.02  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
10  2  1  0.02  12  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
11  2  1  0.02  20  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
12  2  1  0.02  40  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
13  2  1  0.02  50  0.1   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
14  2  1  0.01  50  0.1   10  1  0  12  50  1; 
15  2  1  0.02  50  0.05 10  1  0  12  50  1; 
16  2  1  0.02  50  0.3   10  1  0  12  50  1;]; 
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